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Abstract
In a world of ever increasing interrelations among people, firms and countries, externalities 
become more and more significant as time passes by and, consequently, incentive schemes 
that overlook them will fail to fulfil their objectives.
This dissertation analyses how those schemes axe affected by the presence of externalities 
by focusing on some special cases. Depending on the type of externality involved, the 
cases can be labelled as either “endogenous” (if it is created by the designer’s choice of 
scheme) or “exogenous” (otherwise).
The analysis of the latter case finds that delegation of contracting rights improves the 
efficiency of a multi-agent organisation because it closes the gap between society’s and 
agents’ marginal benefits. The analysis of endogenous externalities, on the other hand, 
shows that sometimes the designer’s optimal action is to create an externality between 
agents and to take full advantage of the new interactions thus generated.
These findings indicate that when externalities are present incentive schemes can be rad­
ically affected and, moreover, that the mechanism designer may have incentives to create 
externalities between agents in order to advance her goals. These effects are illustrated 
using leading examples and experimental data.
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So much to do, so little time.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of externalities on the design of 
optimal incentive schemes. This is a relevant topic because in an increasingly “globalised” 
world the importance of the associated external effects is also on the rise. This increased 
sensitivity to other people’s actions means that actors that seemed to be entirely unrelated 
to one another in the past are now firmly connected, an example being the late 90s financial 
crisis that hit countries as disparate and far apart as Russia, Indonesia and Argentina.
Unsurprisingly, mechanisms designed to operate optimally in those once self-contained 
units will become inefficient if kept in place in the interconnected scenario, so it is worth 
exploring how those mechanisms should be adjusted to achieve their goals under the new 
circumstances.
Such exploration is, however, a vast enterprise, and so the present dissertation will instead 
analyse a few special cases in-depth. These cases can be classified, depending on the type 
of externality involved, into two categories, namely, exogenous and endogenous.
An externality of the first type is one whose existence is not the result of the designer’s 
choice of scheme, i.e., one that links actors’ payoffs via technological or preference-related 
channels. Its analysis (jointly undertaken with Rafael Hortala-Vallve and presented in part 
I of the thesis) focuses on the choice of the optimal contracting structure in a multi-agent 
organisation and uses the British railway system as a leading example. The main result is 
that in a hidden action scenario in which jointly-produced output is the only contractible 
variable, the associated positive externality that leads to inefficiently low effort can be 
mitigated by delegating contracting rights. Intuitively, agents with contracting rights 
realise the effect of their actions on other agents’ wellbeing, thus decreasing the gap
12
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between their private- and the social- marginal benefit and helping to partially internalise 
the externality.
The second part of the thesis investigates the case of endogenous externalities, that is, 
those created by the mechanism designer as part of the optimal scheme. These externali­
ties are entirely different from the standard, “exogenous” type because, unlike the latter, 
in the absence of the designer’s actions the externality would not exist. Their existence 
is, however, fundamental to the mechanism devised by the principal and, as such, plays 
a crucial role in the provision of incentives.
The study of the endogenous case is divided into two complementary modules, namely, 
the theoretical analysis (undertaken in chapter 4) and the empirical one (in chapter 5).
Using the design of anti-evasion policy as a leading example, the theoretical analysis 
investigates the problem of choosing an auditing policy when a group of similar taxpayers 
are affected by common income shocks and are imperfectly informed about the “type” of 
tax agency they face (i.e., how tough on evasion the agency is). The analysis finds that 
the optimal strategy consists of following a “contingent rule”, namely, auditing a given 
taxpayer with a probability that is a (weakly) increasing function of her fellow taxpayers’ 
declarations. Intuitively, since taxpayers are very similar to each other, other people’s 
declarations are informative about the likelihood of a particular one being an evader. 
This policy endogenously creates a negative externality between taxpayers: the expected 
utility of any of them is negatively related to her probability of being audited, which is 
a (weakly) increasing function of every other taxpayer’s declarations. This gives rise to 
the presence of strategic complementarities between declarations and, consequently, to a 
coordination game between taxpayers. The associated problems of multiple equilibria axe 
avoided by the fact that taxpayers do not know exactly the “type” of agency they face 
(soft/tough on evaders), but only get noisy private signals about it. This heterogeneity in 
information sets ensures, by the tenets of the global game technique, a unique equilibrium.
The predictions of the “Tax Evasion as a Global Game” (TEGG) model of chapter 4 
are tested in chapter 5 using data from a computerised experiment where participants 
interacted with each other in situations that resembled the tax compliance game. The 
findings suggest strong support for the superiority of the TEGG model’s “contingent 
rule” over the “cut-off rule” usually prescribed by the literature (a comparison between 
the TEGG rule and other rules is part of my future research agenda). Also, the estimated 
coefficients have the signs predicted by the global game’s comparative statics, but the 
data seem to reject the idea that people use higher-order beliefs when making decisions 
(though they may leam/adapt and make the same decisions as if using them).
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The main conclusion to draw is that the presence of externalities significantly affects the 
design of incentive schemes. Some times they could work against the designer (like in part 
I, leading to inefficiently low levels of effort), some other times they can work for her (like 
in part II, increasing the chances of taxpayers’ mistakes by creating a more complex game). 
Also, externalities can lead to the radical modification of incentive schemes (delegation 
being preferred over centralisation in part I) or become an integral and crucial part of them 
(modifying altogether the nature of the game in the process, as in part II). Furthermore, 
while in part I the externality is exogenously generated by the non-contractibility of 
output, in part II it is the designer itself that, by following the “contingent” policy, 
creates an otherwise non-existent externality.
Chapter 2
Literature review
The role of externalities in economics has been recognised for a long time, to the point that 
their absence is required for the Pareto-optimality of a competitive equilibrium to hold. 
Their presence, on the other hand, robs Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” of its ability to 
generate efficient outcomes, and so it generates the need for policies that correct or at least 
mitigate their effects. Prom the quintessential example of the tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin (1968)) to the idea of geographical “clustering” (Krugman (2005)) and from tax 
competition (Devereux and Pearson (1990)) to network effects (Katz and Shapiro (1985)) 
and self-control (Thaler and Shefrin (1981)), externalities have been thoroughly analysed 
by economists -usually with the goal of reducing the ensuing inefficiency.
The first part of the thesis follows this path and intends to design a mechanism that 
minimises the detrimental effect of the positive externality arising in an organisation in 
which contracts can only be contingent on jointly-produced output: each agent chooses 
her own effort based on her private marginal benefit and private marginal cost, without 
realising the positive effect her effort has on the utility of every other agent, and thus 
exerting too little effort compared to society’s optimum. The solution suggested here 
consists of the delegation of contracting rights from the Principal to one of the agents, 
who then subcontracts with the second one. This way, the intermediate agent becomes 
residual claimant, thus noticing the effect her effort has on the second agent and increasing 
her effort accordingly (as well as the overall level of efficiency).
The seminal reference on moral hazard in teams is Holmstrom (1982). Most of the subse­
quent literature focused on the problem of collusion among the agents (see Tirole (1986)), 
an issue that does not play a role here because -given that output is the same for everyone- 
there are no “lucky” agents that can compensate “unlucky” ones. In fact, the only pos-
15
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 16
sibility of collusion among agents consists in forming a kind of “cartel” and making their 
effort decisions jointly, thus internalising the externality they impose on each other but 
also increasing the Principal’s profits. The literature has also investigated the role of 
hidden information (like Melumad et al. (1995), who study the effects of different pro­
ductivities), the design of monitoring schemes (e.g., Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) or Baliga 
and Sjolstrom (1998)) and the allocation of different tasks to different agents (as in Pren- 
dergast (1995)). Though certainly all these topics are relevant, they have been explored 
frequently and in detail, and so will not be part of the present analysis, which focuses 
instead on the allocation of contracting rights. Closer to the topic of interest are the 
papers by Itoh (Itoh (1991) and Itoh (1994)), that consider the allocation of tasks when 
agents have incentives to help other agents and the desirability of implementing relative 
performance schemes. These factors, however, do not affect the results in settings where 
output is produced jointly, as is the case here. The closest references to our study are 
those of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1998) and Macho-Stadler and Jelovac (2002). 
They compare different contracting structures (using the Spanish health sector as their 
leading example) but the key aspect of their work is the timing of events rather than 
delegation and the internalisation of the externality.
The second part of the thesis deals with a less frequent scenario. In this case, the exter­
nality is not an inherent part of the economy under consideration but the result of the 
deliberate choice of the mechanism designer. The leading example used as illustration 
is that of a tax agency that has to decide its auditing strategy while knowing that the 
taxpayers’ incomes are subject to common shocks. In such a setting, it is found that the 
agency’s optimal strategy requires the probability of auditing a taxpayer that declares low 
income to be a (weakly) increasing function of the declarations of other taxpayers. This 
way, the agency creates a negative externality between agents: the higher the declarations 
of other taxpayers, the higher the probability of being caught if I evade, and so the higher 
my incentives to comply. This, in turn, means that taxpayers’ declarations are strategic 
complements and that the agency’s policy forces taxpayers to play a coordination game 
between them, a game that -as the externality that generates it-  would not exist if the 
agency did not create it.
Unlike the previous case, the literature on this kind of “endogenous” externality is rather 
scarce. Papers like Itoh (1991) do consider how incentive schemes could amplify or temper 
the effects of externalities, but the externalities are not created by the designer. A similar 
problem affects the analysis of “club goods” (Comes and Sandler (1996)). Morgan (2000)’s 
innovative analysis of lotteries as means to finance the provision of public goods is one 
of the few studies that can be included in the literature on endogenous externalities. In 
the particular area of tax compliance considered here, the closest reference is Basseto
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and Phelan (2004), who analyse how the optimal tax system can lead to “tax riots”, 
though they ignore the issue of the optimal auditing strategy that plays a critical role in 
the present analysis. Several studies, though, do consider the effects of externalities, but 
they are not endogenous. This is the case of, among others, Benjamini and Maital (1985), 
who introduce psychological costs and find that they lead to “epidemics” of compliance or 
evasion. Others like Fortin et al. (2004) and Myles and Naylor (1996) rely on social norms 
and model utility as an increasing function of conformity. This is also the case of Kim 
(2005), who uses the same equilibrium selection technique used here, namely, the global 
game approach (Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2002b)). For the 
empirical part the literature is limited as well, in spite of the large number of experiments 
framed as tax compliance problems that span from the seminal one by Baldry (1986) 
who compares tax evasion to gambling, to papers that study the connection between tax 
evasion and voting (Feld and Tyran (2002)). But the closest reference is, undoubtedly, 
Aim and McKee (2004), where tax compliance is analysed as a coordination game. The 
present study goes one step further and introduces uncertainty about the agency’s “type” 
and models tax evasion as a global game.
Part I
Exogenous Externality
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Chapter 3
D elegation of contracting rights
joint with Rafael Hortala-Vallve
3.1 Introduction
When a Virgin train derailed near Graygigg (1U.K.) on Friday 23 February 2007 and the 
sorrow associated with the casualties (includimg one death) settled down, old arguments 
regarding the organisation of the British railway system soon resurfaced.
The agency in charge of the track (Network Rail) was found guilty of negligence and 
several people (including Virgin chairman Sir Richard Branson) demanded a greater say 
in track maintenance by train companies. Briitain’s biggest train company First Group 
and the Conservative party went further andl proposed that train operators should do 
their own maintenance, thus reverting to pre-privatisation arrangements.
Following the 1993 Railways Act, the state ownced British Rail was privatised. This implied 
the separation between maintenance (undertaken by Railtrack) and train operation in an 
attempt to improve the efficiency of the systerm. Nevertheless the industry’s safety record 
suffered (5 accidents, 59 deaths) and so in 2(D02 the government created Network Rail 
(NR) to replace Railtrack. The latter’s reliance on sub-contracted personnel was blamed 
for the crashes, so since its inception the neiw agency has only used its own staff for 
maintenance tasks.
19
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The newly created Network Rail is monitored by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) 
but operates as a commercial business. Half of its income comes from the government 
and the rest is raised by access charges paid by the Train Operating Companies (TOC). 
The three actors (ORR, NR and TOC) can therefore be seen as the building blocks 
of a team production problem in which output is the quality of train services and the 
inputs are the efforts of the agents regarding the provision of the two basic determinants 
of quality, namely, track maintenance (NR) and train operation (TOC) . 1 These efforts 
are not verifiable, and so contracts can only be contingent on output, i.e., on observable 
proxies for quality such as customer satisfaction or punctuality.2 The combination of joint 
production and contracts being contingent only on output, therefore, creates a positive 
externality between the agents: the effort exerted by one of them increases output, which 
in turn increases not only its own payoff but that of the other party’s as well.3 Agents, 
however, ignore this interaction when they make their individual effort decisions, with 
the end result being inefficiently low levels of effort being exerted. We show that the 
principal (ORR) can mitigate this problem by simply delegating contracting rights to one 
of the agents. In this way, the latter becomes residual claimant and realises the positive 
externality that her effort has on the other party. This means that the difference between 
private and social marginal benefits is reduced and that overall efficiency increases as a 
result.
In the absence of contractual restrictions the Revelation Principle states that a delegated 
structure cannot improve upon a centralised one. In our setting, the Principal could 
centralise the delegated structure by offering one of the agents a contract contingent on 
the subsequent contracts this agent writes with her subordinates. However, this practice 
is not common in reality: a Manager/Subcontractor is unlikely to accept a contract that 
is contingent on her own actions as this will strip her of all freedom of choice. Indeed, 
no such contracts control the relationships between the component parties of the railway 
system, and so it is under the assumption that those contracts are ruled out that we find 
that delegation is optimal.
The seminal reference on moral hazard in teams is Holmstrom (1982). Most of the contract
1 Clearly this is an extremely simplified model of the railway industry that ignores many (and important) 
industry-related elements. However, our goal is not the suggestion of policies applicable to this particular 
industry: we only intend to use this very stylised model of the British railway system to illustrate the 
problem of choosing the contracting structure of an organisation.
2Alternatively, as is common in the moral hazard literature, efforts can be considered to be verifiable 
and verification to be costly, a reasonable assumption in this case in which monitoring a vast network is 
needed.
3 If tracks are not properly maintained, trains need to slow down and punctuality may suffer. Conversely, 
if train companies do not train their drivers or maintain their trains properly, they cannot take advantage 
of well maintained tracks. Efforts could be interpreted as maintenance or training activities but one could 
also think of efforts as investments as long as they are difficult (or too costly) to  verify in a court of law 
and hence no contracts can be written upon them.
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theory literature on teams analyses collusion and ways in which the principal can avoid 
it (see Tirole (1986) and subsequent literature). In our model, however, collusion can 
only benefit the Principal because it implies the agents make decisions as a unit, so that 
they internalise the positive externality they exert on each other and increase their effort 
accordingly. This may yield a positive surplus to the agents if the principal does not 
anticipate such behaviour but the Principal’s profits would still increase relative to the 
situation where no collusion occurs. The literature has also analysed repeatedly the role of 
hidden information and the effects of monitoring among agents (see Baliga and Sjolstrom 
(1998) and Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003)), and so we do not consider these issues here.
In a similar vein to our work, Felli and Hortala-Vallve (2007) show how delegation can 
costlessly prevent collusion between a Supervisor and an Agent. Itoh (1991) and Itoh
(1994) focus instead on the best way to allocate tasks among agents and whether the prin­
cipal benefits from offering relative performance schemes. Finally, the closest references 
to our study are those of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1998) and Macho-Stadler 
and Jelovac (2002). They compare different contracting structures in the health sector 
using a binary effort model but the key aspect of their work is the timing of events rather 
than delegation.
3.2 The M odel
The model presented below is based on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
A Principal hires two identical agents (i = 1,2) to undertake the production of a joint 
output, x. Agents are assumed identical in order to concentrate solely on the effects 
of different contracting structures. Output is assumed to be normally distributed with 
mean /i and variance a2 > 0. The expected output of the project increases with the effort 
exerted by the agents: fj, (ei, e2) =  e\ +  e^-
Efforts are non-verifiable and contracts (wi (x) , i =  1,2) can only be contingent on 
realised output. Moreover, we restrict contracts to be linear in output, i.e. W{ (x) = 
ai +  b{X, i =  1 , 2.4 Contract offers are assumed to be public (i.e. observed by all parties). 
We assume the Principal can credibly commit to her proposed policy, thus avoiding the
4Whenever contracts are not constrained to be linear and arbitrarily large punishments are allowed, 
first best can be achieved. However, this scenario is not realistic within our setting of passenger rail 
services.
The question of limited liability is explored in appendix A.I.
The possibility of writing contracts contingent on profits is analysed in appendix A .2.
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issue of renegotiation. Hereafter, capital letters denote aggregate variables: E  := e\ +  e2 , 
W{x)  := w\ (x ) +  W2  (x)...
The Principal is risk neutral and seeks to maximise the expected output minus total 
wages. Agents are assumed to be risk averse with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
utility and index of risk aversion r  > 0. The disutility of effort is . The setting just 
described allows us to rewrite agents’ expected utility functions in terms of their certainty 
equivalent: a* +  6* • E  — ^b2 — ^ef,  where 7  := ra2 > 0.5
3.2.1 F irst B est
When efforts are contractible the Principal maximises expected profits and ensures that 
the agents’ Participation Constraints are satisfied, i.e., that the expected utility they 
derive from the contract is not lower than their reservation utility U_ (which, without loss 
of generality, can be normalised to 0). The Principal’s program is therefore:
max Ex {tt(x )}
in (x) ,e2 }
(3.1)
s.t. {PCi : Ex {U (Wj (x ), ei)} > U , i =  1,2
The solution to the problem is such that the levels of effort exerted by the agents are 
e\ =  e£ =  1, the wages are w*(x) =  i =  1,2 and the Principal’s expected profit is 
E tv* =  1. As expected, risk averse agents face no risk and (since they axe identical to 
each other) are treated identically.
3.2 .2  C entralised  Second B est
The second best situation requires providing output-based incentives and insuring the 
agents against the resultant risk. This means that when the Principal optimises, she 
needs not only to ensure that both agents’ participation constraints axe satisfied, but
5The neutrality of the principal is not fundamental for the analysis. If she were risk averse, her objective 
function (assuming CARA utility) would differ from that of a risk averse person only in terms of a constant 
that reflects the disutility associated to the risk borne by her. Her choice of contracts, however, will not 
be affected.
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also to take into account that they will react optimally to the contract they are offered 
(Incentive Constraints). Her program, therefore, reads as follows:
max Ex {7r (x)}
{wi(x) ,eiW2(x) ,e2}
(3 .2 )
f PCi : Ex {U (wi (1 ) ,  e;)} > U, i = X, 2
S t) \' ’ I ICi : ei e  argm axEx {U (W{ (x ), e*)} , i =  1 ,2t ei
The second best efforts and contracts are e|* =  e%* = and w** (x) =  a** -f ■ x ,i —
1,2 respectively, where a** makes the participation constraints binding. The associated 
expected profit is En** =  . Henceforth we will call this situation the centralised second
best (CSB).
It is worth noting, however, that this solution to the 2-agent problem is equivalent to 
the solution of two independent 1-agent problems. That is, the contracts offered by the 
Principal do not take into account the existence of the positive externality between the 
agents that increases all agents’ expected wages when any of them increases her effort. 
Due to contractual restrictions, the Principal is unable to induce agents to internalise 
this externality when contracting with them in a centralised way. As a matter of fact, 
our simple model tells us that the best possible arrangement involves integrating all the 
activities so that effort decisions are made jointly.6 However, this is not possible in 
the case of the British railway industry because unmodelled aspects of it prevent such 
arrangements being reached, especially the EU Directive 91/440 that requires all EU 
member states to separate ‘...the management of railway operation and infrastructure 
from the provision of railway transport services, separation of accounts being compulsory 
and organisational or institutional separation being optional’. This means that a realistic 
model of the current situation has to reflect this constraint, and this is precisely what we 
do in the following section.
3.2 .3  D elegated  Second B est
The Principal can improve on the Centralised Second Best by changing the contracting 
structure to establish a hierarchy between the agents. The rationale for the improvement
6Such scenario is explored in appendix A.3. A comparison between this “Cartel” case and the 
Centralised- and Delegated- Second Best cases is also presented there.
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derives from the fact that the agent higher in the hierarchy recognises the positive ex­
ternality her effort has on the other agent and is willing to exert more effort at no extra 
cost.
Under the delegated structure, the Principal contracts with one agent, who then subcon­
tracts with the remaining one. The timing of the game is as follows: the Principal offers 
a contract W(x) = A  +  B x  to Agent 1, who subsequently decides her own level of effort 
together with the contract she offers to Agent 2, W2 (x) — a +  bx\ then Agent 2 decides 
her level of effort. If their participation constraints are met, agents exert effort. Finally, 
output is realised and payments are made.
The Principal’s program, therefore, reads as follows:
max Ex \n(x)}
{ W ( x ) , e l tW2 (x) ,e2 }
(3 .3 )
' PCi  : Ex [V (W  (x) -  w2 (x) ,ei)} >  U
max Ex {U (W  (x) — W2  (x ) , ei)}
{ e l t W2(x),e2}
PC2 : EX{U (w2 {x) ,e2) } > u
IC 2 : e.2 € argmaxKc {U (W2  (x ), e2)}
62
Agent l ’s program has a unique solution: e\ — B,  e2  = b = and a is such that the
participation constraint of Agent 2  is binding. Since Agent 2 ’s participation constraint 
enters the Lagrangean for Agent l ’s programme directly, it is clear that Agent 1 now 
internalises the effect of her effort on Agent 2’s payoff:in
C = ( A - a )  + ( B - b )  £ - | ( B - 6 ) 2 - i e ?  + A(’o +  6 B - | 6 2 - i e l ' ) + ro(e2-6)  
Its derivative with respect to e\ should be equal to zero at the optimum,
r\
—  =  ( B - 6 ) - C ! + A - 6  =  0oe 1
The above condition differs from the incentive constraint under the centralised structure 
because it includes the term (A • b). This term captures the positive externality that Agent 
1 has on Agent 2 : more effort by Agent 1 increases the expected output which in turn 
relaxes the participation constraint of Agent 2.
s.t. <
/C i : <
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The unique solution has all participation constraints binding and the following effort 
levels:
f  r d  — rfd  — 2 + 3 7
I el - U ~  (1+7)(2+7)
1 p d  _  ud _  2+37[ e2 -  b -  (1+27)(2+7 ) •
The associated expected profit is
d 1 (2 +  37)2 . .
2 ( l  +  27)(2 +  37 +  72) (3’ J
3.3 R esults
Proposition 3.1 The delegated structure always yields a higher expected profit to the 
Principal than the centralised one. The relative gains are higher the higher the risk of the 
project and/or the higher the index of risk aversion of the agents.
The proof is immediate from comparing Eir** = 3^  and E nd = ^ (1+2^)(23^ 37-(-7 2y and 
showing that E7rd/Eir** is increasing in 7 /
Before moving to the next proposition, remember that the disutility of risk borne by 
Agent i is equal to ^Var(w{ (x)). Thus, Agent 2’s disutility of risk is iff1)2 , and Agent 
l ’s is I  (B d - b df .
Proposition 3.2 Under the delegated structure, Agent 1 exerts more effort than Agent 
2. Moreover, both agents exert more effort than under the second best structure, i.e. 
ed > e2 > e\* =  e2* V7  > 0. In terms of risk, Agent 1 bears less risk than Agent 2 
(bd > B d — bd) and the latter bears more risk under the delegated structure than under the 
centralised one (bd > b**).
The effort results lead to the conclusion that expected output is greater under delega­
tion than under centralisation, and the prediction that managers (agents higher in the
'Note that the system’s total expected welfare (or total expected surplus, E S  =  E n  +  E U \  +  E U 2 )  
is equal to  the principal’s expected profits, and so this result indicates that the Delegated structure is 
more efficient than the Centralised one. This is a consequence of having assumed linear contracts and 
ignored limited liability constraints, thus ensuring that participation constraints are always binding in 
equilibrium, that is, E U \  =  0 and E U 2  =  0.
When limited liability constraints are taken into consideration the equivalence between expected profits 
and total surplus breaks down because agents can get a strictly positive expected payoff, E U i  >  0.
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Figure 3.1: Expected Profits.
Horizontal axis: 7 . Vertical axis: Thick line: E tt^ -, thin line: E ir** .
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Figure 3.2: Efforts.
Horiz. axis: 7 . Vert, axis: Thick solid line: ef-, thin solid line: e^; dotted line: e**
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Figure 3.3: Risk.
Horiz. axis: 7 . Vert, axis: Thick solid line: B d — bd; thin solid line: bd; dotted line: b**.
hierarchy) exert more effort than subordinates is in line with findings in Prendergast
(1995).
From Agent l ’s program we find that =  -■ e [5 , 1]; i-e. whenever the Principal
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induces a higher effort from Agent 1 , the latter also provides more incentives to Agent 2. 
From the Principal’s perspective this generates a (second-order) trickle down effect that 
multiplies the initial (first-order) effect of an increase in B h by increasing also bh. This 
effect is decreasing in 7 .
Notice that the slopes of the wage contracts, besides providing information on the optimal 
levels of effort, also indicate the risk borne by the agents. Moreover, while Agent l ’s effort 
depends on her gross wage (ef =  B d), her disutility of risk \  {Bd — bd) depends on her 
net wage instead. As a consequence, Agent 1 is able to transfer most of her risk to Agent 
2, though at the expense of exerting more effort than her subordinate (see figure 3.4). 
This result also shows how the fundamental trade-off in moral hazard situations, that 
of incentives versus risk, is lessened by the delegation of contracting rights: for Agent 
1, more incentives (greater B d) does not mean as much extra risk (Bd — bd) as in the 
centralised case since, as mentioned above, she will transfer some of the risk to Agent 2 
by increasing bd.
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w2
w2d=a2d+b2d(e1+e2)
w2**=a2**+fc>2~(ei+e2)
Figure 3.4: Agent 2’s incentive scheme. Second Best and Delegated Second Best.
At first sight, the fact that the agent who is higher in the hierarchy bears less risk than 
her subordinates may seem puzzling. However, it is well known that outsourcing, subcon­
tracting or decentralisation are ways to pass risk to those at lower levels of the hierarchy. 
Indeed, their tendency to generate precarious, deregulated working conditions is one of the 
main criticisms levelled at practices such as subcontracting in the construction industry, 
outsourcing in manufacturing and the privatisation of public services.**
3.4 Discussion
In spite of the convexity of the disutility of effort and the fact that agents are homogeneous 
and risk averse, the delegated structure results in an asymmetric distribution of risk and 
effort between agents. However, the associated internalisation of the externality overcomes 
the inefficiency generated by the unequal treatment of agents and overall efficiency is 
higher than under the centralised structure.
Two modelling assumptions are needed for our results to hold. First, each agent’s effort 
choice depends only on the power of her own incentive scheme (slope of her contract)
8The analysis of the relative importance o f risk and effort in an agent’s disutility under each contracting 
structure is undertaken in appendix A.4.
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and is independent of the effort exerted by the other agent (i.e. there are no strategic 
complementarities or substitutabilities). Consequently, any agent affects the other only 
by modifying the latter’s participation constraint. Second, under the delegated structure 
Agent 1 fully internalises her externality on Agent 2, hence her effort does not depend 
on the distribution of the wages among the agents but only on the aggregate wage bill 
(W (x)).
When we consider a more general setting the analysis becomes ambiguous precisely be­
cause these assumptions no longer hold. For instance, strategic complementarities rein­
force the pre-eminence of the delegated structure over the centralised one, while strategic 
substitutabilities work against the incentives of Agent 1 to exert more effort under the 
delegated structure.
The benefits of the delegated structure stem from the fact that Agent 1 internalises the 
externality. This happens when she takes advantage of the interaction of her two choice- 
variables (ei and W2 {x)); i.e. the individual at the top of the hierarchy not only proposes a 
contract to her subordinates but also decides her plans for the future (her effort decision) .9 
It would be boundedly rational for her not to take into account the interaction between 
both decisions. Indeed, in the British railway example, we can expect that if the Office of 
Rail Regulation (Principal) contracts with, for example, Network Rail (Agent 1), then the 
latter will choose simultaneously its investment in track maintenance (ei) and the access 
charges (W2 (x)) that the Train Operation Companies (Agent 2) have to pay in order to 
use the tracks.
Finally, it is important to note that although Agent 1 decides on her own effort before 
Agent 2 makes her decision, Agent 2 does not need to observe Agent l ’s choice.10 Though 
our model certainly works in such circumstances, it does not require them: it also works 
under the less demanding condition that agents are able to determine the equilibrium of 
the game, a common assumption in the literature.
Given the nature of both agents’ activities our model seems to suggest that ORR should 
delegate contracting rights to NR, which should in turn contract with the TOC (note that 
our model and results naturally extend to the situation where there are many TOCs). 
The rationale for this suggestion is that, since the same piece of railtrack may be used 
by several TOCs, the alternative delegated structure (i.e., that in which TOCs are given 
joint control over it) will imply the multiplication of fixed costs and/or costly coordination 
between companies. These problems would be eliminated if control is given to a unique
9 This is the reason why the Principal cannot replicate the Delegated Second Best outcome by simply 
offering the agents the DSB contracts. See appendix A .5 for a formal proof.
10 As was noted above, this last scenario introduces the possibility (which is out of the scope of the present 
paper) of message games where Agent 2 could disclose the information she oberves to the principal.
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maintenance company (NR), which will also be allowed to choose the fees that the TOCs 
should pay in order to use the track.
Finally, we remain silent on the question of the public or private ownership of the or­
ganisations involved. Rather, we have proposed a contractual framework that, while 
remaining within the regulatory framework created by EU directive 91/440, offers a way 
of improving passenger railway services.
3.5 E xtensions
The number of extensions that could be pursued taking the present model as a starting 
point is large, so we concentrate on three of them, namely, the cases of costly contracting 
and of heterogeneity of agents due to differences in risk aversion and productivity. The 
first one is relevant because it can shed light on the relative frequencies of delegated and 
centralised structures in the real world; the latter two because they affect the allocation 
of agents to different tiers of a hierarchy.
3.5.1 C ostly  contracting
Writing a contract is an activity whose cost can be divided into fixed and variable com­
ponents. The first one is usually larger than the second one, since legal fees and admin­
istrative costs are significantly higher than printing another copy of the contract. For all 
practical reasons, therefore, one can assume that variable costs are zero and so only fixed 
costs matter. Since the Principal always contracts with at least one agent, this means 
that her expected profits become
where ac > 0 is the contracting cost. Agent l ’s objective function is unaffected when she 
does not have contracting rights (case C S B ) but becomes
E'k' := Ett — ac (3.5)
Eu\ Eui — ac (3.6)
when she does have them (case D S B ). Agent 2 never subcontracts anyone, so her objec­
tive function is unaffected by the presence or absence of contracting costs.
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Under the centralised structure (C SB ), the costly-contracting solution is identical to the 
costless one, with the only difference that the Principal’s expected profits decrease by the 
amount corresponding to the contracting cost k . Under delegation (D SB ), however, both 
the Principal and Agent 1 contract (with Agent 1 and Agent 2, respectively) and so the 
social cost of contracting is doubled. The Principal foresees that subcontracting will occur 
and, in order to satisfy Agent l ’s participation constraint, she will have to compensate 
the latter for the contracting cost she will bear and expected profits will be reduced (when 
compared to the costless expected profits) by the social cost of contracting, 2k. Figure 
3.5 compares the Principal’s expected profits in cases C SB  and D SB  when contracting 
is costly and shows the areas in the parameter space (7 , k ) where each case dominates the 
other (D SB  dominates C SB  below the curve and the opposite is true above the curve).
0.2 -
0.0
80 2 4 6
Figure 3.5: Costly contracting. CSB v DSB.
Horizontal, axis: 7 . Vertical, axis: K.
As expected, D SB  dominates C SB  when contracting costs are low (in particular, the 
costless contracting case of figure 3.1 corresponds to the horizontal axis in figure 3.5), but 
the dominance relationship is non-monotonic in 7 : for low values of 7  (when agents are 
only slightly risk averse) C SB  dominates D SB  because of the duplication of contracting 
costs; however, as 7  increases, the gains from (partially) internalising the externality more 
than compensate the additional contracting cost and the inequality is reversed; finally, 
as 7  gets sufficiently high, the marginal gain from internalising the externality decreases 
and the duplication of costs recovers its prominent role, so that CSB  becomes dominant
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again.
This result, therefore, sheds light on the question of the frequency of centralised and 
delegated contracting structures in the real world. In particular, it can be seen that dele­
gation will work when contracting costs are low and the agents axe moderately risk averse 
(alternatively, the project is moderately risky). Also, because of the rapid escalation of 
contracting costs, it shows that multi-tiered hierarchies/subcontracting chains are unlikely 
to be observed in reality unless the externalities that are internalised are significant.
3 .5 .2  H eterogeneous agents
In the basic model of section 3.2, the assumption of homogeneous agents was chosen to 
avoid other factors that may have created incentives to treat them differently (in partic­
ular, to choose one agent over the other to play the role of Agent 1) and to highlight the 
beneficial effects of delegation even when there are no differences among agents. Indeed, it 
is only because of the efficiency gains from internalising the externality via delegation that 
the principal deviates from the (apparently obvious) policy of treating identical agents 
identically. And it is because the same efficiency gains that the pre-eminence of delega­
tion over centralisation is maintained when agents are heterogeneous. But heterogeneity 
brings forward an important question regarding the contracting structure, namely, who 
should be contracted by the principal? Two cases are analysed here: in one of them 
agents differ in their degrees of risk aversion, in the other in their productivities.
3.5.2.1 Risk aversion
The heterogeneity in terms of risk aversion is reflected by the values that 7  takes for 
different agents: from the definition of 7  on page 2 2 , the higher the degree of risk aversion 
r, the greater is 7 . Without loss of generality one agent (call her A) is assumed more risk 
averse than the other (named B). Formally,
l A  >  I B  >  0  (3 -7 )
In a similar way expected profits can be labelled depending on the contracting structure: 
E tt^ b  if the principal contract with agent A  and E itbA if she contracts with agent B. It
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is straightforward to show that 
F d „ d _ (7b -  1 a ) ((37b + 2 ) 7a + ( i B  +  2) (tb + ! )  (37a + 2)) _ n o-,
AB — BA — 2(1+7/1 +  7b)(2 +  7b)(1 +  7 J (2  +  7/i)(1 +  7 b )  > °  (3-8)
which implies that the principal should contract with the most risk averse agent (A  in 
this case).
This is consistent with the finding (with homogeneous agents) that Agent 1 faces a lower 
risk than Agent 2 (proposition 3.2). Intuitively, a very risk averse Agent 1 will transfer 
most of her risk to Agent 2  by choosing b very close to B , and this in turn implies that 
Agent 2’s effort (e2 =  b) will be very close to Agent l ’s effort (ei =  B), thus increasing 
(expected) output and profits.
3.5.2.2 Productivity
The second source of heterogeneity to be explored is related to the differences in pro­
ductivity among agents. These can be modelled by assuming that different agents have 
different marginal disutilities of effort , where $ (e*) := <^i > 0. Without loss
of generality one can normalise the marginal disutility of Agent 1 to 1 {4>\ — 1) and of 
Agent 2 to 0 (02 =  <f>). The principal’s expected profits then become
' "p.d 1 (0(1 + 7) + 1 + 27)2
2 ( 1  +  2 7 ) (p (1  +  2 7  +  <j> (1  +  7  +  7 2))
which is a decreasing function of 4>, so that the principal should contract with the most 
productive agent (A if (j> < 1 and B  if <j> > 1).
This result is in fine with that of proposition 3.2 that states that Agent 1 exerts more 
effort than Agent 2. Intuitively, since Agent l ’s disutility of effort is lower than that of 
Agent 2 (for a given level of effort), the principal needs to pay less to the former than 
to the latter in order to satisfy their participation constraints, thus increasing expected 
profits.
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3.6 Conclusion
We analysed how team production should be organised when contracts can be written 
contingent only on joint output. We find that the positive externality associated with this 
setup can be partially internalised by the delegation of contracting rights, which decreases 
the misalignment between the principal’s and the agents’ interests and thus increases the 
overall efficiency of the organisation. The superiority of delegation over centralisation 
shows, therefore, that the mere addition of the externality may have a radical effect on 
the design of incentive schemes.
Regarding the British passenger rail services, the present study seems to suggest the 
convenience of allowing Network Rail both to choose how to allocate its investment in 
track maintenance and to determine the access charges that train companies should pay 
for using the network. However, these conclusions are the result of analysing a very 
simplified model of the industry and hence have to be tempered by the fact that many 
crucial features that would affect the outcome (e.g., price regulation) were left out in 
order to concentrate on the organisational problem.
Part II
Endogenous Externality
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Chapter 4
Anti-Evasion Policy: Theory
4.1 Introduction
It is common practice for tax agencies worldwide to use observable characteristics of 
taxpayers to partition the population into fairly homogeneous categories in order to better 
estimate their incomes: all other things being equal, those who declare well below the 
estimate are likely to be evaders and are audited, while those who declare about or above 
it are likely to be compliant taxpayers and are not inspected. But this “cut-off” auditing 
policy (Reinganum and Wilde (1985)) can lead to systematic mistargeting in the presence 
of common shocks: in good years the category would be under-audited (bars and pubs 
in a heat-wave); in bad years it would be over-audited (chicken-breeders in an avian-flu 
outbreak).
The present chapter focuses on the problem a tax agency faces when deciding its auditing 
policy within each audit category in such scenario. To avoid systematic mistargeting, the 
government needs contemporaneous data correlated with the common shock. I examine 
the possibility of using the profile of declarations of the taxpayers in a category as a signal 
of the shock experienced by them and show that, for a government facing a low-income 
declarer, the optimal auditing strategy is (weakly) increasing in the other taxpayers’ 
declarations. Intuitively, the higher these declarations, the more likely the shock was a 
positive one, and so the more likely that someone who declares low income is an evader. 
Precisely this type of reasoning is presumed to be behind the method used by the IRS’s 
“Discriminant Index Function” (DIF) to determine which taxpayers to audit.1
10 n  page 301, Aim and McKee (2004) say: “(...) a taxpayer’s probability of audit is based not only
36
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This policy introduces a negative externality among taxpayers, one that would not exist 
otherwise: if someone increases her declaration, everyone else’s probability of detection 
is increased. This changes the nature of the evasion problem by creating a coordination 
game among agents: each one of them has incentives to evade if most other people evade 
as well, and prefers to comply if most of the rest are compliant. The resulting multiplicity 
of equilibria and its associated policy design problems are avoided by the presence of an 
information asymmetry in favour of the tax agency. A government’s innate “toughness” 
with respect to evasion is a parameter that is its private information, enters its objective 
function and affects its optimal policy: ceteris paribus, tougher agencies will audit more 
intensively than softer ones. Since this parameter is an agency’s private information, tax­
payers need to estimate it in order to decide how much income to declare and they do it 
based on the information available to them, namely, their incomes and their signals. Each 
taxpayer’s previous experiences, conversations with friends and colleagues and interpre­
tation of media news constitute noisy signals of the government’s type and are taxpayers’ 
private information. The heterogeneity of signals makes different taxpayers perceive their 
situations as different from other taxpayers’, and yet every one of them follows the same 
income declaration strategy. This leads to the survival of only one equilibrium in which 
(usually) some people evade and others comply, a result that is empirically supported and 
yet unlikely to be predicted by other tax evasion models.
Previous research on the area (started by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and surveyed by 
Cowell (1990) and Andreoni et al. (1998)) did analyse the effect of asymmetric information 
in the tax compliance game. Some only considered the presence of “strategic uncertainty” 
(i.e., the uncertainty that taxpayers face in coordination games about which equilibrium 
will be selected), usually generated by psychological and/or social externalities (Benjamini 
and Maital (1985), Fortin et al. (2004), etc.). Others restricted their attention to the 
“fundamental uncertainty” faced by the taxpayers with respect to the type of agency 
(Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989), Stella (1991), etc.). The present study, on the other 
hand, considers both types of uncertainty and thus models the situation as a global game 
(Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2002b)).
The closest references to the present article are Aim and McKee (2004), Basseto and 
Phelan (2004) and Kim (2005). The first one is a laboratory experiment where the (ad 
hoc) auditing policy is contingent on the distribution of income declarations, while the 
second and third ones use the global game technique to determine the optimal tax system 
and the auditing policy, respectively. This paper presents a theoretical analysis in which 
-unlike the laboratory experiment- the agency’s optimal strategy is derived instead of
upon his or her reporting choices, but also upon these choices relative to other taxpayers in the cohort. 
In short, there is a taxpayer-taxpayer game that determines each individual’s chances of audit selection.”
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assumed. The other two studies employ the same technique that I use here, but while 
Basseto and Phelan (2004) are concerned with the optimal tax system as designed by a 
government, this article focuses only on the targeting aspect of one of the agencies of the 
government. Finally, Kim (2005) generates the strategic interaction among taxpayers by 
adding a “stigma cost” to their utility functions, whereas in my case it is the result of a 
cunning tax agency that sets its auditing policy to maximise its objective function.
4.2 M odel
The model focuses on the interaction between the tax agency (also referred to as “the 
government”) and the taxpayers (or “agents”) within a given category. For simplicity, I 
will use “population of taxpayers” and “common shocks” to indicate the members of the 
category and the shocks faced by them, and not those of the whole population (i.e., the 
set which is the union of all the categories), unless indicated otherwise.
4.2.1 T im in g
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Actors (tax agency and taxpayers) receive their pieces of private information (the 
agency its “type” A, the taxpayers their incomes y and signals s).
2. Taxpayers submit their income declarations d and pay taxes accordingly.
3. Finally, the agency observes the vector of declarations d  and undertakes audits and 
collects fines (if any).
4 .2 .2  O b je c tiv e  fu n c tio n s
T a x p a y e r s
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Taxpayers are uniformly distributed on the [0,1] segment and are assumed to be risk- 
neutral, so that their utility is a linear function of their disposable income:
u (di, Oi,yi) =  yi -  tdi -  ai ■ $  (dh y{) Vi G [0,1] (4.1)
where yi G {0,1} is agent Vs gross (taxable) income, t £ (0,1) is the income tax rate ,2
di G {0,1} is agent i ’s income declaration, ai G (0,1} is an indicator function defined as
I 1 if agent i is auditeddi = < (4.4)
I 0  if agent i is not audited
and $  (di,yi) is the fine agent i should pay if audited, defined as
* v /  /  ' (Vi -  di) if di < yi
&(di,Vi)=<  _ . (4.5)I 0  otherwise
where f  := (1 + q )t and q G (0,1) is the surcharge rate that has to be paid by a caught 
evader on every dollar of evaded taxes) .3
T a x  a g e n c y
Narrowly defined, a tax agency’s objective is to raise revenue. More generally, its problem 
consists of determining which citizens should be audited and which ones should not.
An agency, therefore, chooses its auditing strategy in order to minimise its targeting 
errors.4
These errors can be of two types: Negligence and Zeal. A negligence mistake occurs when 
a “profitable audit” is not undertaken. A zeal error takes place when an “unprofitable 
audit” is carried out.
2 The tax system can be easily transformed into a progressive one by using the following change of 
variables
y  : = Y  — B  (4.2)
where Y  G {B,  B  +  1} is a taxpayer’s gross income, B  is the exemption level and y  is taxable income. 
The simplest progressive tax system is therefore
- B )  if D .  B  . . . .
if D  <  B  ,4  3)
where D  G {B ,  B  +-1} is the taxpayer’s declaration. Thus, in bad years everyone in the class is exempt 
and in good ones everyone is liable to pay taxes.
3The IRS applies rates between 20% (misconduct) and 75% (fraud) (Andreoni et al. (1998)), so 
G (0,1) covers the relevant range. It is assumed that (1 +  <j) t < 1 , such that the fine if caught evading 
does not exhaust a high-income person’s income.
4The analysis also holds if the the agency’s objective function is based on expected net revenue. See 
appendix B .l.
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An audit is defined as “profitable” if the fine obtained if undertaken more than compen­
sates for the cost of carrying it out (formally, if $  (di,yi) > c, where $  (dj, yi) is the fine 
-as defined in equation 4.5- and c € (st, (1 +  ?) t) is the cost of the audit). It is assumed 
that an audit that discovers an evader is always profitable, while an audit that targets a 
compliant taxpayer is always unprofitable. Formally, if =  1 means that auditing agent 
i is profitable, then
=  1 and di = 0f 1 if yi 
ai := <
I 0  otherwis
(4.6) 
e
Hence, a negligence error (Ni) occurs when the audit is profitable (a* =  1) and it is not 
undertaken (ai =  0). On the other hand, a zeal error (Z{) occurs when the audit is not 
profitable (ai =  0) and yet it is undertaken (ai =  1). Formally,
J 1 if ai = 1 and a* =  0  J 1 if a* =  0  and a; =  1
iVj *— S .— \
I 0  otherwise I 0  otherwise
(4.7)
For the rest of the article, and due to the fact that they make the problem more tractable, 
I will use -without loss of generality- the following two error functions:
Ni := (1 -  ai) (1 -  di) yi Zi := a* [1 -  (1 -  di) yi] (4.8)
Different agencies can, however, value each kind of error differently. If A is defined as the
weight attached to negligence errors, the loss inflicted by agent i on an agency of type A 
can be expressed as
Li := A Ni +  (1 -  A) Z* (4.9)
Aggregating over all taxpayers, the loss function becomes
L (a, d, y) := f  [XNi + (1 -  A) Zi]di (4.10)
Jo
since i (that indexes taxpayer i) is uniformly distributed on the [0 , 1] segment.
4 .2 .3  S trategy  spaces
A taxpayer’s strategy consists of choosing an income declaration d e {0,1}. A tax agency’s 
strategy consists of choosing a vector of auditing decisions a, such that its «th argument,
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ai G {0,1}, indicates the auditing decision regarding taxpayer i.
4 .2 .4  Inform ation  sets
At the node where an actor A  makes her decision, her information set, I  a , consists of the 
union of two sets: one that is common to all actors, I c, and one that includes the actor’s 
private information, I VA. Formally,
lA = I c U 1PA (4.11)
where A  € {T A ,i}  stands for actor, TA  for tax agency and i for taxpayer i, and su­
perindices c and p  identify the common and private sets, respectively.
C o m m o n  s e t  I c
The common set 1° includes the exogeneous parameters of the problem (like the tax rate 
t and the surcharge rate c) and the parameters of the probability distributions of the 
private information variables (income yi, type of agency A and signal st).
Incomes axe assumed perfectly correlated to reflect the fact that common shocks affect 
similar agents in similar ways:5
y i = y V i£  [o, 1] (4.12)
“Good years” (y = 1) occur with probability 7 e (0 , 1) and “bad years” with probability
1 - 7 -6
The agency’s type A is a non-manipulable characteristic of the agency that affects the gov­
ernment’s auditing policy. It is uniformly distributed on the [e, 1 — e] segment (0 < e < 
and is independent of the income shock.
Taxpayers’ signals Si convey information about the government’s type A and are, on 
average, correct. They reflect the information about the agency’s type that taxpayers get 
from all available sources: media news, previous experiences, conversations with colleagues 
and friends, etc. Formally,
S i :=A +  £i ViG [0,1] (4.13)
5The imperfect correlation case is analysed in appendix B.2.
6The case in which income can take more than two values is considered in appendix B.3.
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where £{ is the error term, which is assumed to be white noise (E (ei) =  0 Vi), uniformly 
distributed on the [—e, e] segment, and independent of income yi, other taxpayers’ errors 
£j^i and the government’s type A.
T a x p a y e r  i's p r iv a t e  s e t  I f
Each taxpayer knows the realisation of her private information variables, namely, her 
income yi and her private signal S{. Furthermore, since all taxpayers know that the 
income distribution is degenerate, they know that every taxpayer has the same income y 
(y =  0  if yi = 0  and y =  1 if yi =  1).
T a x  a g e n c y 's p r iv a t e  s e t  If.A
The agency knows the realisation of her private information variable, its type A. Also, 
given the timing of the game, it observes the vector of income declarations d, each ar­
gument di 6  {0,1} being the declaration of a taxpayer. Given the dichotomous nature 
of the declarations, the vector of income declarations can be summarised by a sufficient 
statistics, namely, the average declaration D  e [0,1], which will be used henceforth.
4.2 .5  Schem atic representation  o f  th e  gam e
Given the elements presented so far, the game can be represented as in tables 4.1 (for bad 
years) and 4.2 (for good years).
y =  0 Agency’s strategy
(1 - 7 ) Audit
( a = l )
Do not audit 
(a =  0 )
Taxpayer’s Declare low (d — 0) 1 - A
0
0
0
strategy Declare high (d = 1) 1 - A
- t
0
- t
Note: In each cell, Bottom-left element: taxpayer’s utility; Top-right element: agency’s loss.
Table 4.1: Compliance game in bad years (y=0).
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y = l Agency’s strategy
(j ) Audit 
(a — 1)
Do not audit 
(a =  0 )
Taxpayer’s Declare low (d =  0) 0
1 - /
A
1
strategy Declare high (d = 1) 1 - A
1 -  t
0
1 - 1
Note: In each cell, Bottom-left element: taxpayer’s utility; Top-right element: agency’s loss.
Table 4.2: Compliance game in good years (y=l).
Taxpayers observe their income before making their declarations, so that they know which 
of the two games is being played. The tax agency, on the other hand, does not know the 
true value of y, and therefore does not know which of the two games is being played.
4.2 .6  E quilibrium  concept
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium must specify actors’ posterior beliefs, taxpayers’ income 
declaration strategies, the agency’s auditing strategy and the average declaration in the 
category. Formally,
A | s ~  U [s — e, s +  e] (4-14)
s I A ~ U [ \ - £ , \  + £] (4.15)
Pr(y  =  l |£>)  =  { 1 (4.16)
I 7  if D  =  0
d- (s ,y ) e argm axE{u(di,ai,yi) \ h )  Vi € [0,1] (4.17)
di€{0,l}
a* (D, A) e argmin E  {L (a, d, y) \ I Ta }  (4.18)
ai€{0,l} vie[0,l]
f  dl (s, y) di 
Jo
D (d,A) =  / (4.19)
The first three lines indicate that all actors have Bayesian beliefs. In particular, taxpayers 
know that the posterior distribution of the type of the agency A (conditional on the 
taxpayer’s signal s) is uniform with support [s — e, s +  e] (equation 4.14). The tax agency, 
on the other hand, knows that the posterior distribution of signals (conditional on the 
agency’s type A) is uniform with support [A — e, A +£■] (equation 4.15). The agency also
CHAPTER 4. ANTI-EVASION POLICY: THEORY 44
knows that the posterior distribution of income (conditional on the observed average 
declaration D ) is such that equation 4.16 holds.
The following equations indicate that actors choose their actions optimally: taxpayers 
choose their declarations d in order to maximise their expected utility, conditional on the 
available information 7* (equation 4.17) and the tax agency chooses its auditing strategy 
a  so as to minimise the expected losses due to targeting mistakes, conditional on its 
available information It  a (equation 4.18). Finally, equation 4.19 aggregates the taxpayers’ 
decisions to give the average declaration.
4.3 Solving the m odel
4.3.1 Prelim inaries
In bad years (y =  0) taxpayers know that the game being played is the one depicted in 
table 4.1. The taxpayer’s optimal strategy is therefore:
P roposition  4.1 In bad years, every taxpayer declares low income. Formally, for all 
i 6  [0 , 1]
d j(s ,0 ) =  0 (4.20).
Proof. From direct inspection of table 4.1. Declaring low income strictly dominates 
declaring high income: the payoff is 0  in the first case and — t in the second one, irrespective 
of the other taxpayers’ declarations and the agency’s auditing decision. ■
It is therefore common knowledge that the game shown in table 4.1 simplifies to
y = 0 Agency’s strategy
( l - 7 )
1 
V
< 
3
Do not audit
(a — 0 )
Taxpayer’s
strategy
Declare low (d — 0) 1 - A
0
0
0
Note: In each cell, Bottom-left element: taxpayer’s utility; Top-right element: agency’s loss. 
Table 4.3: Compliance game in bad years (y=0).
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Thus, the compliance game consists of the ones shown in tables 4.2 (for good years) and
4.3 (for bad ones). Given the timing presented in section 4.2.1, the game is solved by 
backwards induction. Hence, I will analyse first the second stage and will solve the tax 
agency poblem
4.3 .2  Tax agency problem
The agency’s problem consists of choosing the audit vector a so as to minimise the ex­
pected losses, conditional on its information set It  a- The expected loss function is there­
fore:
E  {L (a, D, y ) | ITA} = Pr (y = 0 | ITA) • L (a, D, 0) +  Pr (y = 1 \ ITA) ■ L (a, D,  1) (4.21)
where L (a, D, 0) is the loss when income is low (y =  0) and L (a, D,  1) is the loss when 
income is high (y = 1). Define the probability of high income conditional on observing 
average declaration D as
^{D ) := Pr(y =  1 | I t  a )  (4.22)
Note, also, that D  represents the proportion of the population that declares high income. 
Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that taxpayers on the [0,1 — D\ segment 
declare low income and those on the (1 — D, 1] segment declare high income. The loss 
function (equation 4.10) can therefore be re-written as
r l —D r l  — D r l
L(a ,D,y)  = \ y  I (1 — az) di +  (1 -  A) (1 — y) I a{di +  (1 — A) I aidi (4.23) 
Jo Jo  Jl-D
where the first two terms correspond to the expected loss generated by those who declare 
low income and the last one corresponds to the loss generated by those who declare high 
income, and where the assumption of perfectly correlated incomes {yi =  y Vi G [0 , 1]) 
allows us to take y out of the integral.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the agency, taxpayers who declare low income are 
indistinguishable from each other, and the same is true for those who declare high income. 
This means that the government will treat every person in each group in an identical way. 
This implies, therefore, that the agency has only two policy variables: ao and ai, which 
are the audit decisions for taxpayers who declare low and high income, respectively. The 
loss function then becomes
L (a, D, y) =  Xy (1 -  a0) (1 -  D) +  (1 -  A) (1 -  y) a0 (1 -  D) + (1 -  A) axD (4.24)
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which takes the value
L (a, D, 0) =  (1 -  A) o0 (1 — D) +  (1 -  X) axD (4.25)
when the income shock is negative (y = 0 ), and the value
L (a, D, 1) =  A (1 -  a0) (1 — D) +  (1 — A) aj£> (4.26)
Thus, from equations 4.22, 4.25 and 4.26, the expected loss function of equation 4.21 
becomes
Eta (£) =  {[l~<t> (£>)] (1 -  A) a0 +  0 (£>) A (1 -  a0)} (1 -  D) + (1 -  A) aiD (4.27)
where the subindex TA  indicates that the expectation is conditional on the information 
set of the tax agency and the arguments of the loss function were omitted for simplicity.
The agency therefore minimises the expected loss, as indicated in equation 4.27. The 
results are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 For every taxpayer, a X-type agency’s optimal auditing strategy is as 
follows:
• if a taxpayer declares high income (di = 1), do not audit her (a\ =  Q);
• if every taxpayer declares low income (D = 0) and the agency is “soft ” (X sufficiently 
low), do not audit anyone (ao = 0);
• if every taxpayer declares low income (D = 0) and the agency is “tough” (X suffi­
ciently high), audit everyone (oq — 1);
• if some taxpayers declare low income and others declare high income (D > 0), audit 
everyone who declares low income (ao — 1).
Formally, for every taxpayer i e [0,1],
a* (di, D, X) =  <
0  i f  d{ =  1
0 i f  di = 0, D = 0, and X < X
G [0,1] ifd i = 0, D =  0, and A =  A
1 if di = 0, D = 0, and A > A
1 i f  d{ = 0, and D > 0
(4.28)
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where A := 1 — 7  and 7  G (0 , 1) is the probability of a good year.
Proof. In appendix B.4, page 122. ■
Intuitively, the proposition says that an agency’s optimal auditing decision with respect 
to a given taxpayer i depends on the taxpayer’s decision di, the declarations of all other 
taxpayers (summarised by the average declaration D) and the agency’s type A. When at 
least one person declares high income (and so D  > 0), the government knows for sure 
-thanks to the perfect correlation assumption- that the shock was a positive one (it was a 
“good year”), and so the optimal strategy consists of auditing everyone who declares low 
income (a* (0, D > 0, A) =  1, since they are evaders) and not auditing anyone who declares 
high income (a* (1, D, A) =  0, since only “rich” taxpayers ever declare high income, and 
so their declarations are truthful). When everyone declares low income (so D  =  0), the 
government cannot tell whether it faces a population of “poor” compliant taxpayers or 
one of “rich” evaders. The optimal policy therefore depends on how tough the government 
is (i.e., how high A is) and how likely it is for the taxpayers to face a good year (i.e., the 
value of 7 ). If the agency is rather tough (A is rather high), the optimal policy consists 
of auditing everyone (and the same is true if the probability of a good year, 7 , is high). 
Otherwise (if the agency is rather soft or a bad year is very likely), it is better for the 
agency to audit no one.
These results are summarised in the following proposition:
P roposition  4.3 For every taxpayer, a X-type agency’s optimal auditing strategy is: (1) 
(weakly) increasing in the agency’s type X, and (2) (weakly) increasing in the probability 
of a good year 7 . Formally,
(i) >  0 (2) > 0 (4.29)
Proof. By direct inspection of equation 4.28. ■
Further characterizing the agency’s optimal strategy, the next result describes how it de­
pends on the taxpayer’s own declaration as well as on every other taxpayer’s declarations:
P roposition  4.4 For every taxpayer, a X-type agency’s optimal auditing strategy is: (1) 
(weakly) increasing in every other taxpayers’ declaration dj^i, and (2 ) (weakly) decreasing 
in the taxpayer’s own declaration di. Formally,
(2) 9°,-w ,d ,a) $  0 (4.30)
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Proof. By direct inspection of equation 4.28. ■
Intuitively, this means that the agency audits individuals who declare high income with 
a lower probability than those who declare low income (as is standard in tax evasion 
models). The novelty of the present study is in the result of equation 4.30.1, which 
shows that a loss-minimising agency would use the information conveyed by the vector of 
income declarations (or the average declaration, which in this case is a sufficient statistics) 
when deciding its optimal policy. In particular, the declarations of other taxpayers provide 
contemporaneous information about the likelihood of a given income shock, improving the 
targeting proficiency of the agency that can thus perfectly distinguish between truthful 
and untruthful declarations when the average declaration is different from 0 .
4 .3 .3  Taxpayer problem
Once the second stage game is solved, we can turn to the first stage and solve the taxpayer 
problem.
As shown in section 4.3.1, in bad years all taxpayers declare low income. Hence, here I 
will focus on the case when income is high.
In good years, each taxpayer i chooses her income declaration di so as to maximise her
expected utility, conditional on her information set I{. Her expected utility function is:
E  {u (di, ai, y = l ) \ I i } =  Pr (at- =  1 | /*) • u (di, 1,1) +  Pr (a* =  0 | Ii) ■ u (di, 0,1) (4.31)
Noting that the expected value of the audit decision simplifies to the probability of an 
audit:
Ei (ai) =  Pr (ai =  1 | /*) (4.32)
and using equation 4.1, the expected utility function of equation 4.31 becomes
Ei (u) =  1 -  tck -  fi - Ei (ai) (4.33)
where the subindex i indicates that the expectation is conditional on the information set 
of taxpayer i and the arguments of the utility function were omitted for simplicity.
If the taxpayer evades di =  0, her expected utility equals gross income minus the expected 
fine:
Ei (u (evasion)) =  1 — f  ■ Ei (ai (di — 0)) (4-34)
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If the taxpayer complies, she gets utility
u(compliance) = 1 — t
with certainty.
(4.35)
The taxpayer’s optimal decision d* (yi,Ei (a* (d, — 0))) depends on the comparison be­
tween the two as follows
d* (1 , Ei (ai (di =  0 ))) =  <
0 if Ei (a{ (di = 0)) < P
€[0,1] if Ei (ai (di =  0)) =  P
1 if Ei (ai (di =  0)) > P
(4.36)
where P  := is the probability of detection that eliminates evasion.
Intuitively, in good years taxpayers evade only if their subjective belief about the proba­
bility of being audited is not too high. This implies that an agent’s declaration is (weakly) 
increasing in her expectation over the probability of detection.
Combining the results for bad and good years (proposition 4.1 and equation 4.36), the 
solution to the taxpayer problem is
d* (yi iE i(ai (di =  0))) =  <
0  if 2/j =  0
0 if yi = 1 and Ei (ai (di — 0)) < P
G [0,1] if yi = 1 and Ei (ai (di =  0)) =  P
1 if yi =  1 and Ei (ai (di = 0)) > P
(4.37)
from which it is clear that an agent’s declaration is (weakly) increasing in her gross income. 
The latter results are summarised in the following proposition:
P roposition  4.5 A taxpayer’s optimal declaration strategy is: (1) (weakly) increasing 
in her (subjective) expectation over the probability of detection Ei (ai (di = 0 )), and (2 ) 
(weakly) increasing in her gross income yi. Formally,
( t \  d d * ( y i , E i ( a i ( d i = 0 ) ) )  ^  n  d d ¥{y i , E i { a i {di = 0))) ^  n  ( a
 d E i (ai (di = 0))----- ^  U W  W i ------------- ^
Proof. By direct inspection of equation 4.37. ■
Equation 4.30.1 and the first part of proposition 4.38 make taxpayer Vs optimal declara­
tion strategy a (weakly) increasing function of the other taxpayers’ declarations:
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Proposition 4.6 Taxpayers’ declarations are (weakly) strategic complements. Formally, 
for every j  ^  i,
ddj{yi,Si) .  n 
ddfrt '
Proof. Directly from propositions 4.5 and 4.4. ■
This proposition opens a channel through which a higher signal leads to a higher declara­
tion: a high signal means that other taxpayers are also likely to receive high signals -and 
to declare high income too- which increases the expected probability of detection and 
makes compliance relatively more attractive (i.e., provides incentives to (weakly) increase 
the amount of income declared).
Even more importantly, this result transforms the nature of the tax evasion problem, 
because it creates a coordination game among the taxpayers on top of the cat-and-mouse 
game that each one of them plays against the agency and that is usually the only one 
considered by the literature. The strategic complementarity between taxpayers’ decla­
rations, however, is not an inherent characteristic of the game, but rather one that is 
created by the agency in its attempt to minimise its targeting errors. Indeed, it is the 
fact that the auditing strategy is an increasing function of other taxpayers’ declarations 
(Proposition 4.4) that creates a negative externality between taxpayers (proposition 4.6). 
That is, a cunning agency, willing to minimise its targeting-related losses, designs its 
optimal auditing strategy by introducing some strategic uncertainty (i.e., by creating a 
coordination game between taxpayers) that improves its ability to distinguish compliant 
from non-compliant agents and thus decreases the occurrence of targeting mistakes.
The taxpayer’s optimal declaration strategy can be further characterised in terms of 
private signals, as shown in the next proposition:
Proposition 4.7 In good years, a taxpayer’s optimal declaration strategy: (1) is the same 
for all taxpayers, and (2) is (weakly) increasing in her private signal S{. Formally,
0  if  Si < s
€[0,1] i fs i  = s (2) 0 (4.40)
1 if  Si > s
where s := A 4 - e (2P  — 1), A := 1 — 7  and P  :=
Proof. The first part is the result of s being a constant that is independent of the 
identity of the taxpayer whose strategy is being studied. The determination of s is shown
(1) <f(l,si)=<
CHAPTER 4. ANTI-EVASION POLICY: THEORY 51
in appendix B.4, page 123. For the second part, by direct inspection of equation 4.40.1. 
■
The intuition is straightforward: the higher the signal received (s* := A+£i from equation 
4.13), the higher is the taxpayer’s (subjective) expectation over the government’s type A, 
meaning that the agent believes that, very likely, she faces a tough agency and, conse­
quently, a high probability of detection. This decreases the (subjective) expected return 
of evasion and makes compliance more attractive, which leads the taxpayer to (weakly) 
increase her income declaration.
The first part of the proposition highlights the fact that, though having different private 
signals, all taxpayers agree on the “switching point” below which one should evade and 
above which one should comply. Note also that, as expected, each “type” of taxpayer 
(defining agent t ’s “type” as its private information pair ( y i ,  S i )) has a unique optimal 
strategy: taxpayers with low income (yi =  0 ) ignore their signals and always declare low 
income; taxpayers with high income (yi = 1) do take into account the signals they receive 
and declare income as shown in equation 4.40.1.
4.4 Equilibrium
A priori, the generation of a coordination game among taxpayers does not look as a good 
idea for the agency because this kind of games present multiple equilibria, which make 
policy design a complicated matter. Nevertheless, this difficulty is overcome thanks to 
the presence of a second source of uncertainty (called “fundamental uncertainty”) that 
allows for the tax evasion problem to be modelled as a “global game” (Carlsson and van 
Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2002b) ) .7
This equilibrium-selection technique eliminates all but one equilibria owing to the intro­
duction of some heterogeneity in taxpayers’ information sets in the form of the noisy 
private signals they receive and that convey information about the government’s private 
information parameter A (the source of the “fundamental uncertainty”). Thus, taxpayers 
do not observe the true coordination game (as they would do if signals were 10 0% accu­
rate), but slightly different versions of it. This is the case since taxpayers with different
7In other applications (bank runs, currency crises, etc), this technique has been criticised because of 
not taking into account the coordinating power of markets and prices (Atkeson (2000)). This criticism 
is greatly mitigated in the case of tax evasion, since there is no “insurance market against an audit” to 
aggregate information about the government’s type (the “fundamental” , in global games jargon).
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signals would work out different estimates of the agency’s type A and the average dec­
laration D , and so of their probabilities of detection. The optimal declaration strategy, 
however, is one and the same for every “type” of taxpayer (propositions 4.1 and 4.7). 
The rationale for this result goes along the lines described in the paragraph immediately 
after the proof of proposition 4.6: my own signal gives me information about the pos­
sible signals that other taxpayers may have received and, more importantly, about the 
signals that they cannot have received, thus allowing me to discard some strategies that 
they cannot have followed. The application of this process iteratively by every taxpayer 
leads to the elimination of all strictly dominated strategies and leaves only one optimal 
strategy to be followed by every taxpayer (Morris and Shin (2002a)), namely, the ones in 
propositions 4.1 and 4.7.
As a consequence, once the private information variables (the agency’s type A and tax­
payers’ incomes and signals (y, s)) are realised, the equilibrium will be unique.
However, depending on the value of A, the equilibrium can present different features, as 
illustrated by the following proposition:8
P roposition  4.8 In bad years (yi =  0 Vi E [0, \\), the average declaration is zero (D = 
0), as is the level of evasion (k* = 0). In good years (yi =  1 Vi G [0, \\), the corresponding 
values are as follows:
Full evasion Partial evasion Full compliance
(A < s — e) (s — £<  X < s + s) (s T e <C A)
Average declaration D 0 A+e—s  2e 1
Level of evasion k* 1 1 A +£-S  1 2e 0
(4.41)
Proof. In appendix B.4, page 127. ■
This shows that, as expected, evasion is lower the tougher the government is. 
Equilibrium strategies for each actor are shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.9 The unique equilibrium of the tax evasion game looks like one of the 
following cases: (1) Full evasion (X < s — e): in good years, every taxpayer evades and 
nobody is audited, (2) Partial evasion (s — e < X < s + e): in good years, taxpayers with
8 Since in bad years taxpayers declare low income in every scenario, the three cases are characterised 
(and labelled) according to the actions taken by taxpayers in good years.
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low signals (si < s) evade and are audited with certainty while those with high signals 
(si > s) comply and are not audited, and (3) Full compliance (s + e < X): in good years, 
every taxpayer complies and everyone who declares low income is audited. In bad years, 
taxpayers always declare truthfully. Formally,
Full evasion Partial evasion Full compliance
d* (0 , Si) 0 0 0
0 <
0  if Si  < s 
e [0,1] if Si  = s 
k 1 if Si  > s
1
a? (di, D, A) 0
|  0  i f  di = 1 
\  1 ifd i = 0
f 0  if  di = 1 
} 1 if  di = 0
Proof. Follows directly from the optimal strategies of the players (propositions 4.1 and 
4.7 for the taxpayers, propostion 4.2 for the agency) and the characterisation of the 
equilibrium in terms of the average declaration (proposition 4.8). ■
The full evasion case occurs when the agency is so soft (A < s — e) that all taxpayers know 
it will audit nobody who declares low income, and so everyone evades. The opposite occurs 
in the full compliance case, in which the agency is so tough (s +  e < A) that all taxpayers 
know it will audit everyone who declares low income, and so everyone complies. The 
partial evasion case occurs when the government is not too soft nor too tough (s — er < A < 
s + e) and so taxpayers would like to do as most taxpayers do (strategic complementarity). 
They follow the optimal strategy described in proposition 4.7, which means that the vector 
of declarations will be different from zero. The agency, observing this, would know for 
sure that true income is high and so will audit everyone who declares 0 and nobody that 
declares 1 .
Building on these results, one can further characterise the three cases:
P roposition  4.10 The payoffs of the players in the three possible scenarios are as fol­
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lows:
Full evasion Partial evasion Full compliance
Taxpayer/ 
Bad year
0 0 0
Taxpayer/ 
Good year
1
|  1 - f  if  di = 1 
\  l - ( l  +  ?)i  i f (k = 0
1 - 1
Tax
Agency
7 A J O  if  X <X  
\  (1 — 7 ) (1 — A) ifX  > X
1rH1rH
(4.43)
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of the payoff functions of the players (equa­
tions 4.1 and 4.10), their optimal strategies (propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.7) and the char­
acterisation of the equilibrium in terms of the average declaration (proposition 4.8). ■
In bad years a taxpayer’s payoff is a direct consequence of her declaring truthfully her 
low income and getting no punishment or reward for doing so, regardless of the value of 
A. The other two actors’ payoffs, on the other hand, are different depending on the case 
under consideration. In good years, with full evasion, every taxpayer evades and, since 
no one is audited, they keep their gross incomes. In turn, since the agency audits no one, 
it suffers an expected loss of 7A because with probability 7 the year is a good one and so 
everyone is an evader who is not caught (negligence errors) and with probability 1 — 7  the 
year is a bad one, everyone complies and nobody is audited (no zeal errors). Analogously, 
with full compliance, all taxpayers comply and so their disposable income is simply their 
gross income minus their voluntarily paid taxes, 1 — t. The expected loss of the agency is 
now (1 — 7) (1 — A) because with probability 7 the year is a good one, everyone complies 
and nobody is audited (no negligence errors) and with probability 1 — 7  the year is a 
bad one and everyone complies but is audited anyway (zeal errors). The most interesting 
scenario is, however, the partial evasion one. Here, a soft agency (s — £ < A < A) makes 
no targeting error whatsoever, thus reaching the best outcome it could aspire to. The 
rationale behind this result is that in good years some taxpayers will evade (those with 
low signals) while others will comply (those with high signals) and so the agency can 
perfectly distinguish evaders from compliant taxpayers, which implies that evaders are 
always caught (their payoffs are equal to gross income minus fine, 1 — /)  while compliant 
taxpayers are never targeted (they get payoffs equal to gross income minus taxes 1 — t ) .  
In bad years, everyone declares zero and nobody is audited, so no mistake is made. A 
tough agency (A < A < s +  e) will also catch every evader in good years, but will audit 
everyone in bad years, thus leading to the same expected loss than the “Full Evasion” 
case.
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A surprising corollary can thus be stated: “The relationship between the level of evasion 
and the agency’s payoff is not monotonic. ” Indeed, as we move from the right to the left 
column in equation 4.43 (i.e., as evasion increases), the agency’s welfare first increases 
and then decreases. This means that the government is better off when it can create a 
coordination game among agents but, especially, when it in turn makes taxpayers take 
different actions (some evade, others comply), thus getting valuable information about 
the true income of the population and increasing its targeting accuracy.
To conclude the characterisation of the equilibrium, it is important to analyse how more 
accurate signals affect the level of evasion and the agency’s payoff:
P roposition  4.11 More precise information (formally, a lower e) leads to: (1) (weakly) 
less compliance if  the agency is soft ((weakly) more i f  it is tough), and (2 ) a (weakly) 
higher expected loss. Formally,
® <«*>
where A := 1 — 7 .
P roof. In appendix B.4, page 127. ■
The first part of the proposition highlights the fact that the impact of better information 
on the level of evasion depends on the type of the agency. This is at odds with previous 
studies, which usually find that better information leads to more evasion, through the 
argument that it decreases the risk borne by taxpayers who, assumed to be risk averse, 
have therefore more incentives to evade.
Though compelling, this argument cannot be applied to the present case because here 
agents are assumed risk neutral. Yet, what matters is that the relationship between com­
pliance and accuracy of information is not intrinsically (weakly) increasing or decreasing, 
but rather one whose shape depends on the type of the government. Intuitively, when 
an agency is soft (A is low) it dislikes targeting compliant taxpayers and so would audit 
with a very low probability. For signals of a given precision e > 0, agents will estimate 
the probability of detection and decide their income declarations accordingly. If signals 
became more precise (if e decreased), agents would be more aware of the fact that the 
agency is soft (in the extreme case, when e = 0 , they would know it with certainty), and 
so would expect a lower probability of detection, which in turn makes evasion relatively 
more attractive and leads to lower compliance. An analogous story can be used when the 
agency is tough (A is high).
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The second part of the proposition, on the other hand, shows that more accurate in­
formation is never good for the tax agency. Though previous studies also found this 
relationship, they relied on the above mentioned risk aversion of taxpayers and on the 
monotonic relationship between the level of evasion and the tax agency’s payoffs (de­
bunked by proposition 4.10).
The channel used here, on the other hand, hinges on the new feature introduced by 
the agency’s policy: the coordination game played by taxpayers. Prom the agency’s per­
spective, and using proposition 4.10, the coordination scenarios (“Full Evasion” and “Full 
Compliance” cases) are (weakly) dominated by the coordination failure one (“Partial Eva­
sion” case). Since more precise information decreases the likelihood of the latter scenario 
(because the probability of A G (s — e, s +  e) decreases), then agencies prefer low-precision 
signals over very accurate ones. Note, however, that this benefit is only available to soft 
agencies (s — e < A < A), because it increases an agency’s ability to distinguish evaders 
from compliant taxpayers in good years and thus decreases the number of negligence er­
rors it makes. On the other hand, tough agencies ( A < A < s  +  e) cannot take advantage 
of it as the situation in bad years (which is the origin of such agencies’ zeal errors) is 
unaffected by a change in the informativeness of signals.
Alternatively, a lower e can be interpreted as an increase in the degree of aggregation of 
information (or information-sharing). That is, if taxpayers shared their signals, the effect 
would be equivalent to an increase in their precision, since the group’s average signal is 
expected to be closer to the true value of A than the individual ones. In the limit, if all 
signals were shared, taxpayers would know the government’s type with certainty -this is 
exactly the same result as if all signals were perfectly accurate (i.e., if e —► 0 )'.
4.5 D iscussion
As every other model, the one developed here is built around some simplifying assumptions 
that make it more tractable and elegant, but also more restrictive and unrealistic.
Indeed, it could be argued that tax agencies do not follow a “bang-bang” policy such that 
either everyone is audited or nobody is, but rather one where a fraction of the population 
is audited while the rest is not. The first approach is a direct consequence of the “ex-post 
horizontal equity” condition, while the second one would fit a situation that satisfies the 
condition of “horizontal equity in expectation”. The former is a stronger version of the 
latter, but also leads to situations where those who declare equal amounts are effectively
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treated equally, a desirable feature of an optimal auditing policy in my view. However, if 
the second approach were used, the results would not be significantly different from the 
ones presented in the text, the only “major” difference being that a tough agency would 
not audit everyone, but rather just a fraction of the population sufficiently large as to 
eliminate all incentives to evade (with the added benefit that the enforcement costs will 
be lower due to the smaller number of audits undertaken).
Also unlikely to be found in the real world is the dichotomous character of income as­
sumed here. When more than two levels of income are allowed, the auditing decision 
with respect to a given individual depends on the relative position of the taxpayer’s dec­
laration compared to the rest of the population’s: if it is among the highest ones, then 
the taxpayer’s probability of detection is still (weakly) increasing in the agency’s type 
and, under mild assumptions, (weakly) decreasing in the amount declared; if it is not, the 
agency knows the taxpayer is lying and audits her with certainty. When only two levels of 
income are considered, this policy collapses to the one presented earlier in this chapter.9
Along similar fines, it is clear that the assumption of perfect correlation among the tax­
payers’ incomes is an implausible one. However, it is just intended to capture the fact 
that usually taxpayers that belong to the same category are homogeneous in most aspects, 
including income. Relaxing it will not change the (qualitative) results, as long as the com­
mon shocks are maintained as the main source of income variability. This ensures that 
there is still a significant degree of correlation among incomes and, therefore, that other 
taxpayers’ declarations convey useful information about the common shock that affects 
the category. Also very important for the analysis is the fact that incomes within a class 
are more homogeneous than the signals received by its members, such that the differences 
among them are mainly due to disparate perceptions of the government’s type. Thus, 
the assumption of perfect uniformity allows us to observe the effect of the fundamental 
uncertainty unadulterated by the presence of income heterogeneity, and so the analysis is 
greatly simplified.
Finally, the importance of the partitioning of the taxpayer population into fairly homo­
geneous categories is highlighted by the fact that the above mentioned “relatively high 
correlation” condition is achieved when the category consists of agents that are very sim­
ilar to each other in terms of their “observables” (age, profession, gender, etc.), since in 
this case their idiosyncratic shocks will be relatively small compared to the category-wide 
ones.10 However, since the partitioning problem is an issue this paper is not concerned
9 Also, irrespective of the levels of income allowed, if they are bounded above (i.e., yi „ ymax Vi £ [0,1]), 
the agency would never audit those who declare ymM. In the more realistic case of unbounded domain, 
the probability of detection simply decreases as the declaration increases, as is standard in the literature.
10These “observables” refer to variables that are exogenous to (or costly to manipulate by) the agents, 
and so do not  include taxpayers’ current declarations.
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with, the only related matter worth discussing here is the type of classes that favours the 
present model. And since the latter clearly relies on some degree of uniformity within the 
class, its predictions are more likely to fit the data from classes with a large number of 
rather homogeneous people (e.g., unskilled manufacture workers or non-executive public 
servants) than the ones from small and/or heterogeneous classes.
4.6 Conclusion
The question of a tax agency’s optimal auditing strategy in the presence of common in­
come shocks is relevant because it is not unusual for such shocks to be the main source 
of income variability for a group of fairly homogeneous taxpayers. Under these circum­
stances an agency’s best policy consists of auditing those who declare low income with 
a probability that is (weakly) increasing in the declarations of the other taxpayers in 
the category. Intuitively, the higher these declarations, the more likely the shock was 
a positive one, and hence the more likely that someone who declares low income is an 
evader.
Implementing this policy does not require new information to be gathered by the agency, 
just using the available information better. Yet, it changes the nature of the problem 
for the taxpayers: on top of the standard cat-and-mouse game each one of them plays 
against the agency, they also play a coordination game against each other, a game in 
which a negative externality between them is created, a game taxpayers would not play 
if the policy were not contingent on the vector of declarations.
The heterogeneity in private signals eliminates the policy design difficulties that the mul­
tiplicity of equilibria appears to generate and paves the way for modelling the problem 
as a global game which not only is more realistic, but also predicts a unique equilibrium 
which is consistent with empirical evidence.
Chapter 5
Anti-Evasion Policy: Experim ent
5.1 Introduction
Common income shocks that affect similar agents in similar ways are well documented: 
airlines’ sales plummeted after 9/11, chicken breeders faced low demand after the avian 
flu outbreak, and emergent markets have difficulties attracting investors every time the 
U. S. Federal Reserve increases interest rates. As these examples show, often the common 
shocks are the main source of income variability, with a common f  idiosyncratic ratio well 
above 1 .
It is therefore not surprising that a tax agency that ignores common income shocks when 
deciding its auditing policy will act suboptimally. But this is exactly what happens if they 
follow the most popular policy prescribed by the literature: the “cut-off rule” (Reinganum 
and Wilde (1988)) which states that the agency should not audit any firm that declares 
about or above a certain fixed cut-off income level, while auditing those who declare below 
it with a sufficiently high probability. Combined with common income shocks, this policy 
leads to systematic mistargeting: the agency audits “too much” in bad years and “too 
little” in good ones.
In this environment the optimal policy is a contingent rule in which the agency audits 
every firm with a probability that is a non-decreasing function of every other taxpayer’s 
declarations. This is because other firms’ declarations give the agency information about 
the realisation of the shock and so the probability of a given taxpayer being an evader is 
(weakly) higher the higher are her fellow taxpayers’ declarations.
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The purpose of the present analysis is therefore to test the TEGG (“Tax Evasion as a 
Global Game”) model presented in chapter 4. This is a relevant task because it will help 
determining which of the alternative rules (contingent or cut-off) is superior to the other 
and, indirectly, whether the data is consistent with the modelling of tax evasion as a 
global game and its associated predictions.
However, real-world data on tax evasion is not readily available. Those who engage in 
tax evasion are not willing to declare it and tax agencies are reluctant to provide the 
information because of the confidentiality of tax returns: even if the datapoints are not 
labelled, in many cases it is quite easy to identify which individual firm they belong to, 
thus revealing sensitive information about taxpayers.
For this reason, the analysis will use the second-best available dataset, namely, the one 
collected in a computerised experiment in which participants interacted with each other in 
situations that resembled the scenario described by the TEGG model. This methodology 
has the obvious disadvantage of making difficult the extrapolation of results from the 
sample to the population, but allows the experimenter a greater control over the variables 
under study and is, as mentioned before, the only available one anyway.
The econometric analysis finds that the agency is better off when using the contingent 
rule than when using the cut-off one, and so that the key prediction of the TEGG model is 
strongly supported: the associated, artificially created negative externality does increase 
the payoff of the agency. The data also support the hypothesis that people make deci­
sions consistent with higher-order beliefs (which play an important role in ensuring the 
uniqueness of the global game equilibrium) and that the comparative statics follow the 
ones predicted by the global game method.
Although there are many laboratory experiments framed as tax compliance problems 
(see e.g. Baldry (1986), that compares tax evasion and gambling, Aim et al. (1992), 
that investigates the effects of institutional uncertainty, and Aim and McKee (2004), 
which analyses tax evasion as a coordination game) none has investigated tax evasion 
as a global game (see figure 5.1). The latter requires not only the strategic uncertainty 
generated by the coordination game but also the “fundamental uncertainty” created by 
the incompleteness of information regarding the payoff functions. Tests of the global 
game technique seem to support it in terms of predictive power (Cabrales et al. (2002)) 
and/or comparative statics (Heinemann et al. (2004b)), but are less supportive of the 
participants’ use of higher-order beliefs when making decisions. The latter result is also 
the conclusion of other studies, like Stahl and Wilson (1994) and Bosch-Domenech et al. 
(2002).
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Strategic uncertainty
Fundamental
uncertainty
No Yes
No Baldry (86) Aim & McKee (04)
Yes Aim e t al. (92) This study
Figure 5.1: Position in the tax evasion experimental literature.
5.2 Experim ent design
The experiment took place on the 28 of November 2006, at the ELSE computer laboratory 
(UCL, London). The pool of participants was recruited by ELSE from their database of 
about 1,000 people (most of them UCL students). 200 of them were chosen randomly and 
invited to take part and the first 100  who accepted the offer were allocated to sessions 
according to their time preferences.1 No person was allowed to participate in more than 
one session.
The day of the experiment 76 people took part in four treatments (labelled GC, G E , LC  
and L E ), each involving a 60-to-90-minute long session. The treatments were defined 
according to the policy used (contingent v cut-off, or “global” (G) v “lottery” (L)) and 
the predicted optimal strategy of the participants (which for this experiment, as will be 
shown later, reduces to determining the optimal choice when signal b is received: to evade 
(E) or to comply (C ) ) .2 This way the experimental setup can be visualised as in table
'Five “reserve” people were invited to each session and 7 of them had to be turned down because 
the target number (20 per session) was reached or because the treatment required an even number of 
participants (treatments GC and GE). Each one of them was paid the £5 show-up fee before being 
dismissed.
2Tax evasion has often been compared to a gamble in which the taxpayer “wins” (i.e., gets away with 
evasion) with probability w,  and “loses” (i.e., is caught and has to pay a fine on top of the unpaid taxes) 
with probability 1 — w.
The cut-off rule is equivalent to a standard lottery (and hence the name of the treatment) because it 
fixes the chances of winning (say w  =  1 — p) and losing (1 — w =  p ). Evasion can therefore be seen as 
equivalent to buying (1 — p) N  out of a pool of N  raffle tickets, each one of them equally likely to be the 
winner.
In the Global treatments, on the other hand, those probabilities are not fixed, because they are affected 
by what other people do. In particular, since other people’s compliance has a negative impact on my 
payoff, the fact that other people comply is equivalent to having the total number of tickets increased to, 
say, N' >  N,  so that my probability of winning w' (in spite of my holding the same number of tickets as
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5.1.
Participant’s strategy
Comply (C) Evade (E)
Auditing
rule
Contingent (G) GC GE
Cut-off {L) LC LE
Note: Participant’s strategy refers to the optimal
strategy of a participant when receiving hint b.
Table 5.1: Treatments.
Participants were lined up outside the lab according to their arrival time. At the desig­
nated time they entered and freely chose where to sit. They were not allowed to commu­
nicate for the entirety of the session and could not see other people’s screens.
Each session consisted of 6 stages, namely, instructions, short quiz, trial rounds, ex­
perimental rounds, questionnaire and payment. The instructions were read aloud by the 
instructor and, in order to ensure their correct understanding, the participants were asked 
to complete a “short quiz” (shown in appendix C.l; correct answers and the rationale for 
them were provided by the instructor after a few minutes). For the same reason, par­
ticipants then played two “trial” (practice) rounds whose outcomes did not affect their 
earnings. After each of these first three stages the instructor answered subjects’ ques­
tions in private. The experimental rounds (20 per session) were then played, and after 
that, subjects completed a questionnaire with information regarding personal data and 
the decision-making process they followed. Finally, each participant was paid an amount 
of money consisting of a fixed show-up fee (£5) and a variable component equal to the 
earnings accumulated over the 20 experimental rounds.3 Table 5.2 shows the exchange 
rate used to translate experimental currency into money, as well as other payment-related 
summary statistics.4
before, (1 —p) N ) is now comparatively lower: w' =  <  0 ~ $ N =  w.
3In other experimental studies (Heinemann et al. (2004a) among them) participants were paid accord­
ing to the result of one randomly-chosen round. The rationale for this is that it avoids hedging, something 
that is not a problem here: the maximum payment a person can receive in any given round is £0.50 or 
£0.90 (depending on the treatment), with expected values in the £0.30-£0.35 range.
4In order to minimise delays and computational hassle, every person’s payment was rounded up  to the 
closest multiple of £0.20. Participants were not told about this arrangement until after they completed 
their questionnaires in order to avoid strategic play with respect to this peripheral matter.
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Treatment Participants £ per 10 0 0  points Min/Avg/Max Payment
GC 18 0.50 10.80 11.52 11.80
GE 18 0.90 7.40 9.30 9.80
LC 20 0.50 11.60 11.65 11.80
LE 20 0.90 9.80 11 .20 11.60
All 76 7.40 10.95 11.80
Note: £  per 1000 points is the exchange rate at which 1000 “experimental points” 
where transformed into pounds.
Table 5.2: Treatments. Participants and Money.
Each experimental round consisted of two stages: the “Choice” one, where participants 
had to make a decision that would affect their payoffs, and the “Feedback” one, where 
they got information about their outcomes for the round.
Column player
Y z
Row player Y x(Y ,Y ,q ) x(Y ,Z ,q )
Z x{Z ,Y ,q ) x (Z ,Z ,q )
Note: Only Row player’s payoffs (x) are shown. Payoff’s com­
ponents are Row’s action, Column’s action and the realisation 
of the random variable q. Column’s payoffs are symmetrical.
Table 5.3: Stage game.
In the “choice” stage a one-shot game was played where the subjects had to choose one of 
two possible actions (Y  or Z) interpreted as Evasion and Compliance, respectively (the 
game’s normal form for the 2-person case is shown in table 5.3). A participant Vs payoff 
was determined by her own decision, di G T> := {Y, Z}, the decisions of the other n — 1 
people in her category, d_* := (d \,..., ...,dn), d _ 2 G T>n~l , and the realisation
of a random variable, q G Q := {A, B ,C }. Formally,
X{ := x{di,d_i,q) (5.1)
Different choices have different effects on payoffs, and so, while the payoff from option Y  
is uncertain (reflecting the uncertainty about being audited), that of option Z  is a known, 
fixed quantity: formally, for every d_z, d'_i G V n~l , q, qr G Q,
x (Z) := x (Z, d_j, q) = x  (Z, d'_,, q') (5.2)
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The random variable q can take values A, B  and C with probabilities p(A) = 0.20, 
p(B ) =  0.60 and p(C) = 0.20, respectively. It represents the different possible “types” of 
agency (A  : soft on evasion, B  : medium, C : tough) and corresponds to the “A” mentioned 
in the chapter 4 (page 38). It affects evasion payoffs (i.e., Y -payoffs) negatively: the 
tougher the agency, the more likely the evader will be audited and the lower her payoff. 
Formally, for every d_* G "D”-1 ,
X  (y, d_i, A) >  X  (y, d_i, B ) > x  (y, d_*, C) (5.3)
At the time of making a decision participants do not know the value of q, but each 
one of them gets a private signal s G S  {a, 6 , c) (called “hint” in the experiment) 
that is related to the realised value of q as shown in table 5.4 (and in the Instructions 
sample in appendix C.l). The instructions highlighted the fact that different people 
could get different hints but q was the same for everyone. No other probabilities were 
provided explicitly, though the instructions did supply the information required for their 
computation, namely, the prior probability distribution of q, p(q), and the conditional 
probability, /  (<?|s) .5
If hint =... ...then q =... ...with probability f  {q\s) =...
a A 1 .0 0 0
A 0.125
b B 0.750
C 0.125
c C 1 .0 0 0
Table 5.4: Hints and q.
The participant’s submission of her decision (Y  or Z) ended the “Choice” stage and gave 
way to the “Feedback” one, in which the person was informed about the realised value 
of q, the signal she received, her choice and her payoff for the round. At no stage was a 
subject given any information about the signals or choices of any other participant.6
By clicking on the “Continue” button, participants exited the “Feedback” stage and moved 
on to the next round (if any was left). Rounds were identical to each other in terms of 
their structure (Choice and Feedback stages) and rules (payoff computations, prior and 
conditional probability distribution of q), but may have differed in the realised values of
5 A “Choice stage” screenshot (labelled “Choice screen” in the experiment) can be seen in the instruc­
tions sample in appendix C .l, figure C .l. The programme used was z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
6A “Feedback stage” screenshot (labelled “Results screen” in the experiment) can be seen in the 
instructions sample in appendix C .l, figure C.2.
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the random variables (q and s). Participants were told explicitly about this and informed 
that each round was independent from every other one.
5.2.1 T reatm ents
As shown in table 5.1, treatments were defined according to the type of game created 
by the agency’s policy (Global or Lottery) and the predicted optimal strategy of the 
participants (Evade or Comply).
The difference between Global and Lottery treatments is related to the effect of other 
subjects’ choices on the payoffs of individual participants. In the Lottery treatments the 
rule implemented by the agency is of the cut-off type, and so what other people do does 
not affect taxpayer Vs payoff. Formally, for every q £ Q,7
x (Y ,Y ,q )= x (Y ,Z ,q )  (5.4)
In Global treatments, on the other hand, the auditing policy followed is the contingent 
one, implying that other people’s declarations have a negative impact on taxpayer i ’s 
payoff via the increased probability of detection (as in proposition 4.6 in chapter 4). 
Formally, for every q £ Q,
x (Y ,Y ,q )> x (Y ,Z ,q )  (5.5)
It is worth mentioning here that the Lottery treatment can be interpreted as a special 
(limit) case of the Global treatment in which the effect of other people’s decisions on a 
certain participant’s payoff is arbitrarily small. Consequently, and without loss of gen­
erality, henceforth the analysis will be restricted to the Global case, with the occasional 
reference to the Lottery one provided only when relevant.
For the experiment, participants in the Globed treatments were divided into 9 groups of 
2  people each, the matching protocol being random (equi-probable) within rounds and 
independent across them. The experimental setup reproduced the three typical scenarios 
described by the global game literature:
f The two ex trem e cases in which the “fundamentals” are “so bad” /  “so good” that there 
is a strictly dominant strategy which is chosen by everyone. In the experiment the 
fundamental is q, the agency’s “toughness” , and so strict dominance requires that
71 restrict my attention to the 2-person case, which will be the relevant one throughout the paper. The 
extension to the n-person case is straightforward.
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everyone should evade when the agency is very soft (q = A) and that everyone 
should comply when it is very tough (q = C). Formally, for every d' G
x (Y ,d ,A )  > x (Z )  (5.6)
x (Y ,c tt C) < x{Z )  (5.7)
f The in term ed ia te  one in which the “fundamentals” are not so bad but no so good 
either. In this case a coordination game is created and, consequently, no strategy
dominates all others: which one is optimal depends on what other people do. In
the experiment, this corresponds to the scenario in which the agency is “medium” 
(q = B): if the other person in my group evades, it is optimal for me to evade as 
well; if the other person complies, I am better off if I comply too .8
Formally,
x (Y, Y,B ) > x (Z) > x (Y, Z , B) (5.8)
Turning now to the other dimension that defines treatments, the difference between the 
Evasion and Compliance cases is due to their different predictions regarding what a par­
ticipant’s optimal strategy should be. Thus, distinguishing E  from C  treatments demands 
the solving of the taxpayer problem, namely, that of choosing between Evasion (Y) and 
Compliance (Z) using all the information available (s) in order to maximise expected util­
ity. In this setup, therefore, a taxpayer’s strategy a  is a vector of decisions, one for each 
possible signal s G S. Formally, cr := (a (a) ,a(b) ,a  (c)), where cr : S  —► T> is a function 
that maps signals into decisions.9 Therefore, finding the solution requires comparing the 
(certain) utility of compliance, u(Z), and the expected utility from evasion,
Eu  (Yjk7 (s') |s) := £  f  (q\s) £  Pr (s'|g) •
qtQ s'eS
{U  (s') u (Y, Y, q) + [1 -  U (s')] « (y , Z, ?)} (5.9)
where u (Y, d!, q) := u (x (Y, d', q)) is the utility from receiving payoff x (Y, d', q) ; s' G S  
and d' G D are respectively the signal and decision of the other member of the group; 
Pr(s'|g) G [0,1] is the conditional probability of the other member getting a signal s' 
given that the agency’s type is q; k '(s') := (k'(a), fc'(6), fc'(c)); and kf(s') G [0,1] is the 
taxpayer’s belief about the probability of evasion of a group-mate that receives a signal
8 Clearly, this condition does not apply to the Lottery case.
9 Actually, it maps signals into probability distributions over decisions, if one allows for mixed strategies. 
However, this possibility was explicitly ruled out here because its inclusion would not have provided any 
extra, significant insight as to justify the complexity-associated problems it would have entailed.
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This comparison depends crucially on the beliefs of the optimiser with respect to the 
actions of the other member of the group, k^s'), and, therefore, on the ability and so­
phistication of subjects at forming them, a matter that is directly related to the con­
cepts of common knowledge and higher-order beliefs (HOBs, Carlsson and van Damme 
(1993)). These HOBs refer to the levels of reasoning involved in reaching a conclusion and 
are neatly connected to the Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS) 
method: for each iteration, the order of beliefs increases one level. Furthermore, HOBs 
are the key factor behind the uniqueness of the global game equilibrium: In the first 
iteration, 2 =  1 , my private signal gives me information about the set of strategies (out 
of the original set, E°) that are strictly dominated (SDed) by others and will therefore 
never be played. In the second iteration, i =  2, the set of those strategies that survived 
the previous round of deletions is the new feasible set, E 1. Via an analogous mechanism, 
a new group of SDed strategies will be discarded and after that a new iteration i = 3 
with feasible set E2 will begin. The theory of global games proves that in the limit, after 
an arbitrarily large number of iterations, the feasible set E°° has only one element, <r*. 
In other words, the equilibrium is unique (Morris and Shin (2002b)).
In the present experiment, only 2 iterations are needed to find the unique solution to 
the taxpayer problem.10 Depending on the number of iterations used (1 or 2), a tax­
payer is then classified as “Rudimentary” or “Advanced”, respectively. Their behaviour 
is summarised in the following two propositions.
P roposition  5.1 (RD om ) R ud im en ta ry  D om inance: According to Rudimentary tax­
payers (RTPs): 1. if s = a (signal is low), Evasion strictly dominates (SDs) Compliance: 
Y  >-r Z ; 2. if  s =  b (signal is medium), no strategy SDs the other: Y  )/-r  Z  and Z  )/-r  Y ; 
and 3. if  s = c (signal is high), Compliance SDs Evasion: Z  >-r Y  .
P roposition  5.2 (ADom ) Advanced D ominance: According to Advanced taxpayers 
(ATPs): 1 . those strategies that are rudimentary-dominated (parts 1 and 3 of proposition
5.1) are also advanced-dominated; and 2. if  s = b (signal is medium), then: 2.a. in E  
treatments, Evasion SDs Compliance: Y  >-& X; and 2.b. in C treatments, Compliance 
SDs Evasion: Z  >~a Y .
At this point, it is worth defining the concepts of Soft, Medium and Tough games, which 
are simply the games played by the members of a group when the agency is soft, medium 
and tough, respectively (i.e., they are like the game shown in table 5.3, with q — A, B
I0This does not apply to  Lottery treatments for the obvious reason that in those cases, by definition, a 
taxpayer’s payoff does not depend on other people’s choices or the taxpayer’s beliefs about them.
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N
f(A|b)=1/8
N Pr(a|A)=1/2
Pr(b|A)=1/2
f(B|b)=6/8 N p r(b|B)=1
f(C|b)=1/8 N
Pr(b|C)=1/2
Pr(c|C)=1/2
SOFT k’(a)
SOFT k’(b)
MEDIUM k’(b)
TOUGH k’(b)
TOUGH k’(t)
Figure 5.2: Game tree if signal is medium (s =  b).
and C ). Clearly, these games g e Q := {5, M, T} depend on the type of the agency, and 
so both g and q are subject to the same probabilistic process.
Based on this taxonomy of games and on the conditional probability distribution of q 
(shown in table 5.4), two different scenarios can be identified: one in which the signals 
give perfect information about the game being played, and another one in which precision 
is less than perfect.
In the first iteration, therefore, a taxpayer who receives a soft signal (s = a) knows for 
sure that she is playing the Soft game (g — S). Furthermore, because of equation 5.6, she 
can immediately realise that Evasion SD s  Compliance, the very result indicated in part 
1 of proposition 5.1. Following a similar argument and using equation 5.7, part 3 is also 
proved.
When the signal is medium (s =  b), though, the person does not know the actual game 
g that is played, but she does know its conditional probability distribution f(g(q)\b) =  
f{q\b). Thus, the game that she faces is depicted in figure 5.2, and her expected utility 
from evasion is given by equation 5.9, where s is replaced by b. This expression is an
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increasing function of the beliefs about the other member’s probability of evasion, k'(s'), 
Vs' 6  S , because of the nature of the contingent policy (equation 5.5). The worst-case 
scenario for the optimising person occurs, therefore, when she expects the other member 
to choose Compliance irrespective of the signal received (k'(s') =  0, 0 := (0,0,0)), such 
that the expected utility from evasion is Eu  (Y, 0 |6) . Analogously, the best case scenario 
corresponds to that in which the other member always evades (k'(s') =  1 , 1 := (1 , 1 , 1)) 
and expected utility is E u (Y , 1|6). It is not difficult to see that the no-strict-dominance 
condition of proposition 5.1 (part 2) requires
Eu  (Y, 0|6) < u{Z) < Eu  (Y, 1|6) (5.10)
and if it is satisfied, a Rudimentary taxpayer will act exactly as predicted by the RDom  
proposition.11
A Rudimentary taxpayer would stop her analysis here, but an Advanced taxpayer will 
continue to the next iteration. Furthermore, the ATP will realise that, if the other member 
of her group is (at least) Rudimentary, then (by symmetry) she would have also worked 
out that Evasion is the strictly dominant strategy when the signal received is soft (a). 
Following an analogous argument, the ATP will also realise that the other person will work 
out that Compliance is the strictly dominant strategy when the signal received is tough 
(c). Formally, the ATP’s beliefs about the other person’s choices will have precise numbers 
attached to them, namely, k'(a) = 1 and k'(c) =  0. The expected utility will reflect this in 
general, Eu  (Y, (1, k' (b) , 0) \b) , as well as in the worst- and best-case scenarios, Eu  (Y, c |6) 
and Eu  (Y, e\b) ,where c := (1,0,0) and e := (1,1,0).
Depending on the position of the safe utility u(Z) with respect to Eu  (Y, c |6) and Eu  (Y, e |6), 
three cases can arise, of which we axe interested only in the following two:12
Eu{Y,c\b) > u(Z) (5.12)
u(Z) > Eu(Y,e\b) (5.13)
11 An alternative interpretation of this equation that will be used later is the following. Let us construct 
a new, artificial 2x2 game like the one in table 5.3, but which is a weighted average of the Soft, Medium
and Tough games defined above, A  := E  /  (q\b) ■ g{q),  so that the corresponding (expected) utility in
q€Q
each of its cells is
u(d,d' ,E(q \b) )  := E  f ( q \b ) - u (d , d ' , q )  (5.11)
q€Q
It can then be shown that u(Y ,Z ,E(q \b ) )  =  Eu(Y,  0|6), u (Y,Y,  E  (q\b)) =  Eu(Y, l \ b) ,  and
u ( Z , Y , E  (q\b)) =  u ( Z , Z , E  (q\b)) =  u(Z),  so that equation 5.10 implies that this “Average game” is 
a coordination game.
12The third one does not lead to a unique solution, which goes against the spirit of the theory of global 
games. The reason for the non-uniqueness is the discreteness of the model. Having continuous choices 
may have avoided this problem, but at the cost (considered to be too high) of increasing the complexity 
of the game and thus the noise in the observations.
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Condition 5.12 indicates that even in the worst-case scenario, the expected utility from 
Evasion is higher than that from Compliance or, equivalently, that the former SD s the 
latter. Equation 5.13, on the other hand, implies that, even in the best-case scenario, the 
expected utility from Evasion is lower than that from Compliance, and so that the second 
SD s  the first.
Which of these two mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied determines the taxpayer’s 
optimal strategy: either cr* = (Y ,Y ,Z )  if (5.12) holds or cr* = (Y ,Z ,Z )  if (5.13) holds. 
These strategies are of the “threshold” type (Heinemann et al. (2004a), Heinemann et al. 
(2004b)) but can be indexed by their second component, which is the only one that 
differentiates one strategy from the other and corresponds to the optimal choice when the 
signal is medium, cr* (6). The value of this component, therefore, is the one that defines 
the Evasion, cr* (b) =  Y , and Compliance, cr* (b) =  Z, treatments.
The rationale for including these two types of treatments reflects, above all, the lack 
of theoretical predictions or stylised facts about what strategy we should expect to be 
played in the medium case. Its presence, however, allows for the testing of some hypotheses 
regarding the comparative statics of global games: in particular, the change of parameters 
predicts that the number of people receiving b signals that choose Y  should be greater 
in E-treatments than in C-ones, while no significant difference should exist if signals are 
soft (a) or tough (c) . 13 This is summarised as follows:
H ypothesis 5.1 (OS) Optim al strategy: 1. I f  signal is soft (s =  a) then evade (d =  
Y ); 2. if  signal is tough (s — c) then comply (d =  Z ); and 3. if  signal is medium (s — b) 
then: 3. a. in E  treatments, evade (d = Y ); and 3.b. in C treatments, comply (d=  Z).
If choices satisfy all three parts of the hypothesis, then one can say they are “consistent 
with the ADom  predictions” and label the taxpayer as “Advanced”. If they only satisfy 
the first two parts, they are “consistent with the RDom  predictions” and the taxpayer 
can be labelled as “Rudimentary”.
13For L-treatments, the analysis is greatly simplified since other people’s choices do not affect one’s 
decisions. Then, the equivalents of equations 5.12 and 5.13 are, respectively,
Eu(Y,b) >  u(Z)  
u(Z) >  Eu(Y,b )
(5.14)
(5.15)
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5 .2 .2  S election  o f  payoffs
Turning now to the main prediction of the TEGG model, it is clear that, in order to test 
which of the auditing rules (contingent or cut-off) is better, one needs a “level playing 
field”. In this setup, it requires the enforcement costs to be the same in G- and L- 
treatments, which further simplifies to undertaking the same (expected) number of audits 
(for a given value of q) in each treatment. This way, the mere comparison of the errors 
made by each type of agency across treatments will indicate which rule is superior to the 
other (if any). Formally,
H ypothesis 5.2 (SCR) Superiority o f  C ontingent Rule: Given a fixed level of en­
forcement,, Global treatments yield less (expected) errors than Lottery ones for all possible 
types of agency, q £ Q.
The expected number of audits is
Ea(d,d!,q) =  £  Pr (y) £  Pi (s\q) £  Pr (s'|g) £  Pr(d |s,y)
y&y ses s 'e s  deP
P r(d '|s',y) X) Pr (a\d,d!,q) £  Pr (a '|d,d!,q) - (a + a!) (5.16)
d'eV a^A a’zA
where y  := {0 , 1 } is the set of possible values that income y can take (1 in “good” years 
and 0 in “bad” ones), A  (0,1) is the set of possible values that an audit can take 
(1 if the audit is undertaken and 0 if it is not) and a, a' £ A  are the agency’s decisions 
regarding whether to audit or not the taxpayers of a group.14
Thus, the equalisation of enforcement costs demands that, for each and every value of the 
agency’s type q £ Q, the expected number of audits in G-treatments must be equal to the 
corresponding one in L-treatments. Since payoffs are linear functions of the probabilities, 
the equalisation requires the following conditions to hold:15
14In the experiment, however, implicit in the stage game (table 5.3) is the assumption that all taxpayers 
have high income (y  =  1). The reasons for this are that introducing the possibility of low income periods 
will not add to our knowledge (trivially, if y =  0 everyone declares truthfully) and that all interesting 
hypotheses to test are related to the high-income scenario (not to mention the extra cost and time that 
running this expanded experiment will demand).
15See appendix C.2 for the derivataion of these conditions.
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LE GE LC GC
ul e (Y,A) = uGE (Y, Y, A) uLC (Y, A) = E
d'e v
cv(d')-uGC (Y, d', A)
uLE (Y ,B ) = uGE (Y, Y, B) uLC (Y, B ) = uGC (Y, Y, B)
uLE (Y, G) = E u;(d')-uGE(Y,d',C)
d'GV
uLC (Y, C) = uGC (Y, Y, G)
Note: The weights, w (d’), d ’ED, are functions of the parameters of the problem. In the experiment, 
w (Y )= l/6  and w (Z )=5/6 .
Table 5.5: Payoffs. Conditions for the equalisation of enforcement costs.
Focusing on the Evasion case (columns 1 and 2), it requires that the payoff of evaders when 
the agency is soft (A) or medium (B) should be the same regardless of the auditing rule. 
This is logical because in these cases taxpayers can only get soft or medium signals (a or 
b) and, because of Rudimentary and Advanced dominance (equations 5.6 and 5.12/5.14), 
they will always evade. Since the agency cannot tell whether the pair of low declarations 
is the result of a bad year or of evasion, it will audit with the same probability in both 
G and L treatments (no difference in the information available to the agency) and so the 
(expected) payoffs of taxpayers are the same as well. When the agency is tough, however, 
taxpayers could receive medium or tough signals, s e {b, c), with those receiving s = b 
choosing Y  (because of equation 5.12 or 5.14) and the others choosing Z  (equation 5.7). 
In the L-treatments the agency only uses the information derived from an individual’s 
action; in G-treatments, on the other hand, it also uses the information derived from 
the other person’s choice. In particular, if choices are different from each other, the 
agency knows that the one who chose Y  is likely to be lying and can therefore audit 
her with a higher probability and the other one with lower probability. This is the basic 
mechanism behind the contingent rule and relies heavily on the extra difficulty taxpayers 
face when trying to coordinate on the Full Evasion equilibrium (strategic uncertainty). 
The actual position of uLE (Y, C) between uGE (Y, Y, C) and uGE (Y, Z, C ) is determined 
by the weights co (df) e  [0 , 1], d! e  D, which depend on the parameters of the problem 
(especially p(q ) and f{q\s)) and in the experiment take the values 1/6 (for d' =  Y) and 
5/6 (for d! = Z). The conditions for the G-treatments (columns 3 and 4) are found 
following a similar argument.
The parameters chosen for the four treatments are therefore the ones shown in table 5.6.
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Person l ’s choice Person 2’s choice Type of agency GC GE LC LE
Y Y A 1 ,000 1 ,000 715 1 ,000
Y Y B 655 145 655 145
Y Y C 579 6 579 1
Y Z A 658 156 715 1 ,000
Y Z B 651 135 655 145
Y Z B 0 0 579 1
Z {Y,Z} {A,B,C} 654 140 654 140
Note: Only payoffs of Person 1 are shown. Those of Person 2 are symmetric.
Table 5.6: Payoffs. All treatments.
These payoffs satisfy all the conditions mentioned so far: “type of agency” (equation 5.3), 
“global game” (equations 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8), “average game” (equation 5.10), “equal en­
forcement costs” (table 5.5), and the conditions that define treatments: L v G (equations 
5.4 and 5.5) and E  v C (equations 5.12 and 5.13, or 5.14 and 5.15).
The actual vector of values chosen is just one among many that satisfy the above- 
mentioned conditions. The feasible set was narrowed down by setting, without loss of 
generality, the maximum and minimum payoffs in the G-treatments equal to 1 ,000 and 
0 respectively, and by restricting attention to natural numbers.16 Noting that payoffs in 
L-treatments are deterministic functions of those in G-treatments (see table 5.5), only 10 
parameters remain to be determined, namely, the intermediate payoffs of the GC and GE 
treatments (including the safe payoffs). Before getting to it, however, a digression about 
equilibrium selection is in order here.
The global game (GG) technique selects one of the equilibria of a coordination game, an 
equilibrium that coincides (for 2 x 2 games like the ones used here) with the one selected by 
the “risk dominance” criterion, RD (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). Intuitively, the latter 
chooses the equilibrium which, if abandoned, inflicts the highest costs on the players. Since 
the criterion applies to the global game we need to consider all three possible scenarios 
it usually entails: the two extreme ones and the intermediate one mentioned on page 
6 6 . In this particular case, however, it is enough to concentrate on the “average game” 
(defined in footnote 11), since it neatly summarises the whole game and thus simplifies the 
analysis. Because this “average game” is a coordination game, it will have 2 pure-strategy 
equilibria: one in which both players choose Y  and get Eu  (Y, 116), and another one in 
which they both choose Z  and get u (Z ) . Which of the two is risk-dominant depends on
16To simplify computations and understanding by subjects, as well as to avoid prospect-theoretical 
interpretations (which, though interesting in themselves, are not the focus of the present analysis).
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the relationship between Ie  '-= E u (Y , 1|b) — u (Z )  (the loss from deviating from the Full 
Evasion equilibrium) and lc  := u (Z ) — Eu  (Y, 0|6) (the loss from deviating from the Full 
Compliance one). If deviating from (Y, Y) is more costly than deviating from (Z, Z ) (i.e., 
if Ie  > lc), the risk-dominant equilibrium (RDE) is (Y, Y); otherwise, it is (Z, Z). In 
the experiment, the RDE depends on ,the treatment: it is (Y, Y) in GE  and (Z, Z) in 
GC. These are, not surprisingly, the choices that equations 5.12 and 5.13 predicted to be 
optimal in those treatments, thus confirming that both the global game theory and the 
RD criterion select the same equilibrium.
There is, however, an important competitor for the RD/GG criterion: the payoff-dominance 
criterion, PD (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). It simply states that if all equilibria can be 
Pareto-ranked, players will coordinate on the dominant one. In the experiment, the payoff- 
dominant equilibrium (PDE) is always (Y, Y) regardless of the treatment, because of the 
Average game being a coordination game and the contingent policy penalising evaders in 
case of coordination failure.
Thus, the PD and RD criteria select the same equilibrium (Y, Y) in the GE  treatment 
but different equilibria ((Y, Y) and (Z, Z), respectively) in the GC one. Since the criteria 
reinforce each other in G E  but compete against each other in GC , this suggests an 
interesting hypothesis to test:
H ypothesis 5.3 (R F) Relative frequency G E /G C : The frequency of choices consis­
tent with the GG/RD prediction will be (weakly) higher in GE than in GC.
The main hypothesis of interest, however, is whether data fits the global game predictions 
(hypothesis 5.1). Thus, the 10 “free” parameters in table 5.6 were chosen to make the 
satisfaction of the predictions as difficult as possible, i.e., by making the RDE as little 
risk-dominant as possible. This required minimising Ie  and maximising lc  in G E ,and the 
opposite in GC. This way, if the data supports the global game predictions in these most 
demanding conditions, then the theory could be expected to be an even better predictor 
in more favourable environments.
Finally, it is important to mention here that risk aversion could dramatically alter the 
predictions of the model, and this may be especially important since evidence indicates 
that attempts to induce risk-preferences seem not to work (Selten et al. (1999)). The 
solution implemented in the experiment was to choose parameters such that all constraints 
will be satisfied for a large range of risk preferences. In particular, in E-treatments the 
parameters of table 5.5 are robust to degrees of relative risk aversion as high as 0.4 
(about 60% of the population, according to Holt and Laury (2002)). For C-treatments,
CHAPTER 5. ANTI-EVASION POLICY: EXPERIMENT 75
they are robust for values as low as 0  (about 80% of the population, according to the 
same study). Also, it is acknowledged in the experimental literature that when playing 
complex games people often avoid the complications of utility maximisation and instead 
simply maximise payoffs, which implies that risk preferences should not be an important 
issue here (probably most of the participants will end up acting as if their degrees of risk 
aversion were somewhere in the [0,0.4] range).
5.3 R esults
A total of 1,520 observations were collected in the experiment; table 5.7 shows the break­
down by treatment. It also shows summary statistics of the key variables needed for 
testing the hypotheses of the previous section: “Dominance” and “Errors”. The first 
one measures the coincidence between the data and GG theoretical predictions about the 
subjects’ choices (DOM=l if data fits predictions and 0 otherwise). Its name reflects the 
fact that those predictions are based on the concepts of dominance (propositions 5.1 and
5.2). The second one quantifies the number of errors (per observation/datapoint) made 
by the agency (ERR=1 if an error was made, 0 otherwise). Note that Dominance is never 
lower than 50% and Errors never above 35%.
Treatment Observations Dominance (DOM) Errors (ERR)
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
GC 360 0.7722 0.4200 0.1522 0.2252
GE 360 0.8639 0.3434 0.2028 0.3034
LC 400 0.5450 0.4986 0.3473 0.3303
LE 400 0.9300 0.2555 0.3243 0.3726
All 1,520 0.7757 0.4173 0.2608 0.3248
Note: D O M =l if subject’s choice coincides with GG’s prediction, 0 otherwise. 
Error=l if agency made an error, 0 otherwise.
Table 5.7: Summary Statistics. Dominance and Errors.
For hypothesis testing, it would be useful to aggregate data in two different ways, de­
pending on the information available to the relevant actor. Thus, for hypotheses related 
to the decisions of the taxpayers (OS and RF), data are aggregated by signal (columns 
3-5 in table 5.8). For those related to actions of the agency (SCR), on the other hand, 
the aggregation is done according to the type of agency (columns 6 -8  in the same table).
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Treatment Observations Signal (s) Agency’s type (q)
a b c A B C
GC 360 7 295 58 18 234 108
GE 360 29 292 39 54 234 72
LC 400 29 330 41 60 260 80
LE 400 51 337 12 100 280 20
All 1,520 116 1,254 150 232 1,008 280
Note: The agency can be soft, medium or tough on evasion (q = A, B  or C
resp.). Signals can be soft, medium or tough (s =  a, b or C resp.).
Table 5.8: Number of observations, aggregated by signal and type of agency.
For the analysis, data from all subjects for all periods were pooled. This is justified 
by the fact that there is little variability in behaviour after the first few rounds of each 
treatment,17 with many people choosing exactly the same option every time they receive a 
given signal. This lack of variability over time is not a bad thing in itself (since the theory 
actually predicts such rigidity), but it precludes the possibility of using other econometric 
techniques (e.g., panel data).
5.3.1 OS and R F hypotheses
The set of variables that is going to be used for testing is described in table 5.9.
17Except in the G E  one, that requires 10 rounds to become stable. This, however, does not usually 
have an impact on results, and when it does, it will be mentioned in the text.
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Variable Role Type Description
DOM Dependent Dummy 1 if choice coincides with prediction, 0  otherwise
DOMs Dependent Dummy Idem DOM, but for a fixed s £ S
RDOM Dependent Dummy Idem DOM, but for s £ {a, c}
ADOM Dependent Dummy Idem DOM, but for s =  b
g Explanatory Dummy 1 if G treatment, 0 otherwise
e Explanatory Dummy 1 if E  treatment, 0 otherwise
ge Explanatory Dummy Interaction term: 1 if GE  treatment, 0 otherwise
a Explanatory Dummy 1 if s = a, 0  otherwise
b Explanatory Dummy 1 if s =  b, 0  otherwise
c Explanatory Dummy 1 if s =  c, 0  otherwise
Note: “Predictions” as defined in hypothesis 5.1.
Table 5.9: Variables of the model. Dominance.
DOMs measures Dominance when only observations with a given signal s are considered. 
RDOM means Rudimentary Dominance and considers only observations when signals are 
soft (a) or tough (c). ADOM measures Advanced Dominance and only takes into account 
observations with medium signals (hence, it is identical to DOMfc). The model used for 
testing is then
DOM  =  a  -f fi \ 9  +  /?2e +  P3 9 e +  7 ia +  7 2  ^+  7 3 c +  e (5-17)
(analogous ones are used for the alternative dependent variables) and the estimates are 
shown in table 5.10.
Table 5.11 shows the results of the test in a schematic way. 18 The first panel tests the OS  
hypothesis (see note below the table for interpretation of symbols). The null hypothesis 
is that data are consistent with GG predictions, 19 a hypothesis that is supported in the 
cases of low and high signals (s =  a or c) and that implies that people are, at least, 
Rudimentary.20 When the signal is medium, however, the GG’s predictions are rejected 
for all treatments and, therefore, the OS  hypothesis is statistically rejected as well (i.e., 
those aspects related to part 2 of the hypothesis). In terms of the sign of the relationship, 
however, the results do support the predictions, as can be seen in figures 5.3 and 5.4, 
where the observed strategies resemble the shape of the predicted ones (except for LC ,
18The tests are shown in table C .l in appendix C.3.
19The predicted value (following proposition 5.2, AD)  is 1 for all cases, which is interpreted as requiring 
that all observations should match predictions.
20The null hypothesis is rejected in the G E  case because of an outlier. If eliminated, the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.
CHAPTER 5. ANTI-EVASION POLICY: EXPERIMENT
Dep. Var.: DOMa DOM6 DOMc RDOM ADOM DOM
a 1.0205 0.7091
b
[0] [0]
0.5030
c 0.9855
[0]
0.7671
g 0.0000 0.2803 -0.0345
[0]
-0 .0 2 0 1 0.2803
[0]
0.2227
e
[0.082]
-0.0196
[0]
0.4714
[0.158]
0.0000
[0.35]
-0.0297
[0]
0.4714
[0]
0.3928
ge
[0.323]
0.0196
[0]
-0.3543
[0.706]
-0.0681
[0.072]
-0.0095
[0]
-0.3543
[0]
-0.2998
cons
[0.323]
1.0000
[0]
0.4485
[0.217]
1.0000
[0.804] [0]
0.4485
[0]
[•] [0] [0] [0]
Obs. 116 1,254 150 266 1,254 1,520
LC 1.0000 0.4485 1.0000 1.0000 0.4485 .5450
LE 0.9804 0.9199 1.0000 0.9841 0.9199 .9300
GC 1.0000 0.7288 0.9655 0.9692 0.7288 .7722
GE 1.0000 0.8459 0.8974 0.9412 0.8459 .8639
Note: Top panel: Probability that estimate = 0  is shown in brackets below esti­
mate. Bottom panel displays estimated average values of the dependent variable 
for each treatment.
Table 5.10: Estimation. Dominance. Overall and by signal.
Dep. Var.: DOMa DOM6 DOMc RDOM ADOM DOM
LC X X X
LE X X X
GC X X X
GE X X X X X
LC=GC GC GC GC
LE=GE GE LE LE LE LE
LC=LE LC LE LE LE
GC=GE GE GE GE
Note: Top panel: Empty if data fits prediction in hypothesis OS; “X” other­
wise. Bottom panel: Empty if no difference, treatment with higher dominance 
otherwise.
Table 5.11: Dominance tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
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that will be analysed in detail later) .21 Having in mind the discreteness of the model 
(which amplifies divergences) and that the parameters were chosen to make the test as 
difficult to pass as possible for the GG theory, the result is still encouraging.
R esu lt 5.1 (QAD) Qualitative Advanced Dominance: People are, at least, Rudi­
mentary: they act as predicted by the Rudimentary Dominance proposition (5.1) when 
signals are low or high. The hypothesis that they make decisions in a way consistent with 
the Advanced Dominance predictions (proposition 5.2) is statistically rejected (and so is 
the OS hypothesis, consequently) but supported qualitatively (i.e., the relationship exhibits 
the expected sign).
The bottom panel of table 5.11 compares the levels of Dominance across treatments. The 
null hypothesis for the first two lines is that Dominance is the same in Global and Lottery 
treatments, a hypothesis that (following the general result) is supported for RDom  but 
not for ADom. On the other hand, the result that the G /L  comparison depends on 
whether E  or C is played is something that the theory cannot explain (there should be no 
difference, theoretically). It is important to mention, though, that the difference between 
GE  and LE  is drastically reduced if considering only the last 10 periods of the session 
(see figure 5.6, as well as tables C.3, C.4 and C.5 in appendix C.3), so it could be said 
that Global treatments foster more Dominance than Lottery ones.
For the last two lines, the null hypothesis is that Dominance is the same in Evasion and 
Compliance treatments. Once again, RDom  is satisfied but ADom  is not, but in the 
latter case the results are clear now: E  treatments are more consistent with predictions 
than C ones. This can be explained by the coincidence of the risk- and payoff-dominant 
equilibria in the former ones and the discrepancy between them in the latter ones.22 This 
is therefore consistent with the R F  hypothesis.
R esult 5.2 (R /P D E ) R isk- v Payoff-D om inant Equilibrium: Choices in E  treat­
ments are consistent with predictions more frequently than in C ones.
These results can also be visualised in figures 5.5 and 5.6. The first one confirms that 
RDom  is strongly supported by data and that different treatments do not affect it. The 
second one focuses on choices when the signal is medium and attests that ADom  pre­
dictions are statistically rejected, though qualitatively supported. It also shows that
21 In the figures, 1 corresponds to Evasion (d — Y)  and 0 to Compliance (d =  Z).
22 Actually, this only applies to the Global treatments, since clearly there is no coordination game in 
Lottery ones. There is no similar explanation for the difference between E  and C  in the Lottery cases.
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Figure 5.3: Observed and Predicted choices. E-treatments.
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Figure 5.4: Observed and Predicted choices. C-treatments.
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Rudim entary Dominance. All treatm ents. Period averages.
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Figure 5.5: Rudimentary Dominance. All treatments. Period averages
Advanced Dominance. All treatm ents. Period averages
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Figure 5.6: Advanced Dominance. All treatments. Period averages.
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Variable Role Type Description
ADOM Dependent Dummy 1 if data fits prop. AD  (part 2), 0 otherwise
g Explanatory Dummy 1 if G treatment, 0 otherwise
e Explanatory Dummy 1 if E  treatment, 0 otherwise
ge Explanatory Dummy Interaction term: 1 if GE  treatment, 0 otherwise
gender Explanatory Dummy 1 if female, 0  otherwise
age Explanatory Natural
study Explanatory Dummy 0  : no study, 1 : non-economics, 0  : economics
#  exp Explanatory Dummy 0 : none, 1 : 1 to 4, 2 : 5+ experiments
math Explanatory Dummy 0  : none, 1 : basic, 2  : advanced knowledge
prob Explanatory Dummy 0  : none, 1 : basic, 2 : advanced knowledge
game Explanatory Dummy 0  : none, 1 : basic, 2 : advanced knowledge
Note: “Study” refers to “area of study”. “Math”/ “Prob”/ “Game” refer to knowledge of mathe­
matics, probability theory and game theory, respectively.
Table 5.12: Questionnaire variables. Dominance.
treatments can be ranked as determined by the tests, namely, (from higher to lower 
Dominance), LE, GE, GC and LC .23
5.3 .2  C haracteristics and D ecisions
The analysis of choices can be furthered by using the information collected in the ques­
tionnaire run after the experimental rounds. The relevant variables are shown in table 
5.12.
The analysis will be restricted to that of ADOM , that is, to the analysis of Advanced 
Dominance. The reasons for this are two: first, the previous section proved that RDom  
is satisfied almost perfectly for the whole sample of participants, regardless of their indi­
vidual characteristics; and second, AD O M  explains most of the variability of the overall 
dominance {DOM) because in most observations the signal is medium (see table 5.8).
The questionnaire also asked participants about the strategies they followed and the 
rationale behind them. This information was then used to classify them according to 
some stylised characteristics, in a fashion similar to the one used by Bosch-Domenech 
et al. (2002). The distribution of subjects in terms of categories and treatments is shown 
in table 5.13.
23Restricting attention to the last 10 periods so that the learning process in GE  converges, the difference 
between G E  and LE  vanishes. This is consistent with the R D E / P D E  argument (hypothesis 5.3), since 
it seems that people learn to play the only “reasonable” equilibrium.
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Category GC GE LC LE All
Expected payoff maximisers (EPM) 1 0 /1 1 8 /1 1 5 5/13 28/40
Chance maximisers (CM) 1 /2 0/3 6/7 0 /8 7/20
Learners (L) 0 3 1 1 5
Mixers/Experimenters (M/E) 1 2 0 2 5
Non-independent (NI) 1 0 4 3 8
Randomisers (R) 1 2 1 0 4
Confused (C) 1 0 1 /2 1 3/4
Risk-lovers (RL) 2 0 1 0 3
All 18 18 20 20 76
Note: Cells with two numbers separated by “/ ” reflect uncertainty about the
allocation of some subjects to specific categories.
Table 5.13: Questionnaire. Classification of subjects.
The different categories are defined as follows:24
• Expected payoff maximisers (EPM): Those who indicated they played either Y  in E  
treatments or Z  in C ones, based on expected-payoff maximisation. Note that this 
category includes everyone who played according to the OS  strategy, even though 
they did not use higher-order beliefs.
• Chance maximisers (CM): Those who only considered the probabilities of outcomes 
being higher or lower than the safe option, without weighting them using the asso­
ciated payoffs.25
• Learners (L): Those whose decisions varied in the first periods, but chose always 
the same action afterwards.
24 Appendix C.4 shows comments from some subjects’ questionnaires that are characteristic of each one 
of these categories.
25To see the difference between an EPM and a CM, consider the decisions in the two following cases:
In the LE  treatment the “safe” payoff is 140 and so, with probability 1 /8  the subject gains (receives 
payoff 1000), with probability 3 /4  she gains (payoff 145) and with probability 1 /8  she loses (payoff 1). A 
CM finds that if she evades (chooses Y ) the number of “gain” scenarios is greater than the number of 
“loss” ones, and hence she evades. An EPM computes the expected payoff of evasion 233.875, compares 
it to the safe payoff 140, and chooses to evade. Thus, in this case both CMs and EPMs would choose the 
same option and one cannot, based solely on their choices, classify them into one or the other category.
In the LC  treatment the safe payoff is 654 and so, with probability 1 /8  the subject gains (receives payoff 
715), with probability 3 /4  she gains (payoff 655) and with probability 1 /8  she loses (payoff 579). CMs 
still prefer evasion over compliance since the number of “gain” cases is greater than that of “loss” cases. 
EPMs find that the expected payoff of evasion is 653, which is lower than the safe payoff 654, and so they 
comply. In this case, therefore, choices can distinguish those who belong to one category from those who 
belong to the other one.
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• Mixers/Experimenters (M/E): Those that deviated just once or twice from the 
predictions of the O S  hypothesis but, unlike the Learners, did so at times other 
than the first periods (Experimenters). An alternative rationale could be that they 
followed a strategy such that they evaded and complied with probabilities that 
usually replicated the relevant odds ((1 / 8 ,7/8) in C treatments and (7/8,1/8) in E  
ones), and so could be labelled “Mixers”.
• Non-independent (NI): Those who (despite the instructions clearly stating that 
rounds were independent from each other) followed some kind of history-dependent 
strategy.
• Randomisers (R): Those who chose randomly between Y  and Z. Also called “Guessers” 
(G).
• Confused (C): Those who seemed to be (or acknowledge they were) confused.
On top of these strategies, the degree of risk aversion is expected to play a role as well.
In particular, risk aversion fosters compliance (ceteris paribus) and hence makes Global 
Game’s predictions easier to be satisfied in Compliance treatments, but works against 
them in Evasion ones. Combining the strategies defined above and the degree of risk 
aversion, one can usually categorise all subjects and find some interesting stylised facts.
The first stylised fact is that categories seem to order themselves in three “Dominance 
bands” according to their degree of coincidence with the GG predictions (see figures 5.7, 
5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). Near the top we can find the E P M s  (high dominance). In the middle- 
ground there is a mixed bag of types (M /E , L, N I  and C) who chose different actions 
in different periods, even though they always got the same signal b. Risk lovers (RL) axe 
close to the top in E  treatments and to the bottom in C treatments, and the opposite is 
true for risk averse (RA) people.
All these results, however, axe not surprising. The category that is really exciting to 
analyse in detail, on the other hand, is that of the Chance Maximisers, since it is behind 
the case with the largest deviations from predictions (the GC treatment). Now, the first 
thing to notice is that in some cases CM s cannot be distinguished from E P M s, because 
the observed data axe consistent with the predictions of both criteria (expected-payoff 
and probability maximisation) and the questionnaire information is vague (this is the 
rationale for the ambiguity in table 5.13). For this very reason, the most interesting 
scenarios are those where the two criteria prescribe different actions, as is the case in 
C treatments (global game theory predicts Compliance, chance maximisation predicts 
Evasion). Focusing on these treatments, it can be seen that significant deviations from
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Figure 5.7: Advanced Dominance. Subject averages. GC treatment.
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Figure 5.10: Advanced Dominance. Subject averages. LE treatment.
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the GG predictions take place, thus confirming the results of the tests that compare the 
levels of dominance in C  and E  treatments (table 5.11). Also, since C M ’s prescription to 
evade depends on what the other person does in GC but not in LC, it is not surprising that 
the degree of dominance in the former is greater than in the latter: the uncertainty about 
the other person’s action in GC works against the incentives to evade and (as seen in figure 
5.7) only risk loving people end up evading in all periods. Since this interdependence does 
not play a role in LC, the number of subjects that evade in all periods is far greater (see 
figure 5.9), and explains the huge divergence between predictions and data (and confirms 
the ranking of treatments according to Dominance found on page 82).
The stylised facts shown so far give us a snapshot of the data, but the question that 
remains to be answered is: what is behind these choices? What (if any) are the personal 
characteristics that drive them? To answer these questions, the variables defined in table 
5.12 were used to estimate the following model:
ADOM  — cx +  P\Q “I- "b /?3<?e+ 
-I- 7  gender  +  72  a9e +  7 3 #  exp -\-jAmath +  7  5prob +  7  egame +  e (5.18)
The results (shown in table 5.14) indicate that estimates are robust to the specification 
of the model (last three columns)26 and usually there is not much difference between 
treatments or between individual treatments and the whole sample. The analysis finds 
that being male, young, bad-at-maths and good-at-game-theory makes a subject more 
likely to make decisions that coincide with the global game predictions. There is no 
rationale for the gender effect (which, apart from the whole sample, is only significant 
in one treatment, anyway), though it is important to note that a similar result is found 
by Heinemann et al. (2004a). The age effect may seem to reflect that most subjects 
are university students, but actually it is driven by a few older outliers: if the analysis 
restricts its attention to “up-to-25-year-olds” , age becomes non-significant (see table C .6  
in appendix C.3). The negative sign of the mathematics coefficient is surprising and may 
be the result of people’s mis-estimation of their mathematical knowledge. Area of study 
is not significant and, surprisingly, knowledge of probability theory or participation in 
other experiments are not significant either (though Heinemann et al. (2004b) find the 
same result regarding experience).
The only robustly significant variable seems to be knowledge of game theory, which in­
creases Dominance. Furthermore, it is significant in both treatments in which strategic 
(i.e., game theoretic) interactions took place. This may indicate that some degree of in-
26For this very reason, only OLS estimates are shown throughout the whole paper.
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doctrination may have played a role and so that training can breed “sophistication”. This 
suggests that a typical population (where average knowledge of game theory is expected 
to be negligible) would make choices quite different from the ones suggested by the GG 
theory. However, if one considers that firms are sophisticated, then the theory should 
be a good predictor of their behaviour. Moreover, a similar result could be achieved if 
individual taxpayers had access to sophisticated professional advice, something that is 
indeed likely to occur.
OLS Probit Logit
GC GE LC LE All All All
g 0.2914 0.8573 1.3932
[0] [0] [0]
e 0.4895 1.7349 3.0951
[0] [0] [0]
ge -0.3894 -1.4149 2.4897
[0] [0] [0]
gender -0.0306 0.0078 0.0937 -0.0738 -0.0616 -0.2761 0.4752
[0.745] [0.853] [0.31] [0.005] [0 .011] [0.003] [0.004]
age -0.0385 -0.0282 -0.0251 0.0039 -0.0078 -0.0304 0.0540
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
study 0.1916 0.0349 -0.5397 -0.0149 -0.0306 -0.1446 0.2348
[0.004] [0.514] [0] [0.787] [0.369] [0.312] [0.382]
#exp 0.0006 0.1402 -0.0677 -0.0160 -0.0059 -0.0416 0.0729
[0.988] [0] [0.161] [0.575] [0.738] [0.513] [0.507]
maths -0.5119 0.0418 0.1660 -0.0788 -0.0993 -0.3749 0.6982
[0] [0.432] [0.196] [0.099] [0 .002] [0 .001] [0 .002]
prob -0.0454 -0.0060 0.0033 0.1204 0.0047 0.0219 0.0314
[0.635] [0.893] [0.963] [0.007] [0 .866] [0.834] [0.867]
game 0.3409 0.1840 0.0362 0.0242 0.0961 0.4249 0.6918
[0] [0] [0.464] [0.193] [0] [0] [0]
cons 2.0118 1.2868 1.3768 0.8555 0.7772 1.1536 2.1058
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
Obs. 295 292 330 337 1,254 1,254 1,254
Note: Probability that estimate = 0  is shown in brackets below estimate.
Table 5.14: Estimation. Effect of personal characteristics on choices.
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5 .3 .3  SC R  hypothesis
The key prediction of the TEGG model is that an agency would be advised to use the 
contingent auditing rule and to discard the cut-off one. This means that the agency would 
make fewer targeting errors if implementing the former than if using the latter, given that 
enforcement costs axe the same in both cases. These are the Zeal and Negligence errors 
defined on page 39, though -for the reasons explained in footnote 14- the analysis will 
focus on the Negligence errors only.
The expected loss of a 2-person group can then be expressed as
E L(d,d ',q ) =  £  Pr(y) £  Pi (s\q) £  Pr (s'|g) £  Pi (d\s,y) £  P r (dV>2/) 
y€.y s£S s'eS d£T> d'€T>
£  Pr (a\d, <r, q) Pi (a!\d, df, q) [(1 -  a) (1 -  d) y +  (l -  of) (l -  d!) y] (5.19)
aeA a'tA
where the expression in square brackets is the sum of negligence errors for the 2-person 
group. Armed with this information, the model to be estimated is therefore
E R R  = -f 02e +  P3  Qe +  7 i ^  +  72 R  +  +  £ (5.20)
where the variables are defined as in table 5.15.
Variable Role Type Description
ERR Dependent Dummy 1 if an error was made, 0  otherwise
ERRg Dependent Dummy Idem ERR, but for a fixed q 6  Q
g Explanatory Dummy 1 if G treatment, 0 otherwise
e Explanatory Dummy 1 if E  treatment, 0 otherwise
ge Explanatory Dummy Interaction term: 1 if GE treatment, 0 otherwise
A Explanatory Dummy 1 if q =  A, 0 otherwise
B Explanatory Dummy 1 if q = B, 0 otherwise
C Explanatory Dummy 1 if q = C, 0  otherwise
Note: ERR measures errors per person in a 2-person group.
Table 5.15: Variables of the model. Errors.
The estimates can be seen in table 5.16.
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Dep. Var.: ERRA ERR B ERRC ERR
A 0.8610
B
[0]
0.2886
C
[0]
0.1526
g 0.0059 -0.1610 -0.1847
[0]
-0.1242
e
[0.956]
0.3718
[0]
-0.2130
[0]
-0.1950
[0]
-0.1007
ge
[0]
-0.0967
[0]
0.1466
[0]
0.1856
[0]
0.0804
cons
[0.423]
0.5482
[0]
0.3477
[0]
0.1954
[0]
[0] [0] [0 ]
Obs. 232 1,008 280 1,520
LC 0.5482 0.3477 0.1954 0.3473
LE 0.9200 0.1346 0.0004 0.3243
GC 0.5541 0.1866 0.0107 0.1522
GE 0.8293 0.1203 0.0013 0.2028
Note: Top panel: Probability that estimate = 0  is shown in 
brackets below estimate. Bottom panel displays estimated av­
erage values of the dependent variable for each treatment.
Table 5.16: Estimation. Errors. Overall and by type of agency.
In a fashion similar to the one used in section 5.3.1, several tests axe shown in a schematic 
form in table 5.17 (the values of the tests can be found in table C.2 in appendix C.3).
The top panel tests the accuracy of predictions and shows that the data do not fit them. 
In particular, errors are usually higher than predicted in C  treatments but lower than 
predicted in E  ones. This is consistent with the Dominance results, which indicate that 
“too many” people evade when they should comply (C treatments) and comply when 
they should evade (E  treatments), as shown in figures 5.3 and 5.4. The main conclusion, 
thus, is basically the same as the one found for Dominance in Result 5.1, and subject to 
the same qualifications.
The first two fines of the bottom panel are the important ones: they show the tests for the 
SC R  hypothesis. Given the minimum variability in the extreme cases (when the agency
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Dep. Var.: ERIL4 ERRB ERRC ERR
LC + + + +
LE - -
GC + + +
GE - - -
LC=GC GC GC GC
LE=GE GE LE GE
LC=LE LC LE LE LE
GC=GE GC GE
Note: Top panel: Empty if data fits predictions; “+ ” if observed 
errors are higher than predicted; otherwise. Bottom panel: 
Empty if no difference, treatment with less errors otherwise.
Table 5.17: Errors tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
is too soft, q =  A, or too tough, q = C), the relevant tests are those for the medium one, 
and this one shows clearly that the Global treatments lead to less errors per capita than 
the Lottery ones. In other words, the SC R  hypothesis is strongly supported.
R esu lt 5.3 (SCR) Superiority o f  C ontingent Rule: From the agency’s perspective, 
the contingent rule is better than the cut-off rule.
The last two lines test whether there are significant differences between E  and C treat­
ments and show (again focusing on the medium case) that the first lead to less errors than 
the second. Again, this can be linked to the Dominance analysis, where E  treatments 
show a higher degree of coincidence with predictions than C  ones. This means, in other 
words, than in the latter many people evaded when they should have complied, and the 
higher number of associated errors thus explains the present result.
Finally, it is important to notice that all these findings axe also supported graphically, as 
shown in figures 5.11 to 5.16. It can be clearly seen there that G treatments (i.e., those 
in which the contingent policy is implemented) lead to (weakly) less errors than L ones 
(those in which the cut-off one is used). It also shows the (expected) result that errors 
are a decreasing function of the agency’s “toughness”, which is consistent with the global 
game comparative statics.
R esu lt 5.4 (EAT) E ffect o f  agency’s type: Errors decrease with the agency’s “tough­
ness”.
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Figure 5.16: Errors. Tough agency. GE v LE.
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5.4 Conclusions
The empirical analysis of tax evasion is problematic because of the reluctance of both 
taxpayers and tax agencies to provide the relevant information. This study, therefore, 
uses experimental data as a second-best alternative and focuses on the testing of some 
of the theoretical predictions of the model developed in chapter 4, though the richness 
of the dataset also allows for the investigation of other interesting hypotheses related to 
decision-making processes and the global game theory.
Results are strongly supportive of the main prediction of the TEGG model, namely, that a 
tax agency using a contingent auditing policy would do better than if it used the standard 
cut-off one. The negative externality between taxpayers generated by the contingent 
policy and the associated strategic uncertainty it creates seem to be the powerful forces 
behind this result.
Also supported by the data are the predictions derived from the comparative statics of 
global games: evasion is higher in Evasion treatments than in Compliance ones, errors 
decrease with the agency’s “toughness” , and “tougher” signals lead to lower evasion.
The picture, so encouraging in terms of the sign of the relationships, is however radically 
different when considering it in terms of statistical significance: in general, the numerical 
predictions of the theory are rejected by the data. This is true for the medium cases (when 
the signal is medium), but not for the extreme ones though: in the latter, results are as 
expected and support the idea that people are, at least, “Rudimentary” and (intuitively) 
understand the concept of dominance in simple scenarios. Medium cases, on the other 
hand, show that most people do not use higher-order beliefs when making their decisions 
(not even in this simple experiment, in which only two iterations are needed). In spite 
of this, many times they do choose the actions predicted by the theory of global games, 
usually after playing the game a few times. This “learning” result is not so surprising, 
as it was already hinted by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and found experimentally 
by Cabrales et al. (2 0 0 2 ). Other factors also seem to affect decisions, like the tension 
between the risk-dominant and payoff-dominant equilibria, with their predicted effects 
closely mimicked by the data. More worrying, however, is the apparently pervasive pres­
ence of a significant group of people (“chance maximisers”) who choose their strategies 
without taking into account all the available information (in this particular experiment, 
the payoffs in different scenarios) and that lead to the largest differences between observed 
and predicted actions (treatment LC). This concern is connected to the main result de­
rived from the analysis of questionnaire data, which suggests that those with knowledge of 
game theory (“sophisticated” agents) are more likely to play according to predictions than
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those without that knowledge (“simple” agents). This indicates that game theoretical “in­
doctrination” helps subjects to analyse strategic interaction in a quick and standardised 
way. In terms of policy, this suggests that firms will react to the implementation of the 
contingent rule almost exactly as predicted by the theory, while the responses of indi­
vidual taxpayers (who axe expected to be less “sophisticated” than firms) will be more 
erratic (though the difference in the behaviour of the two groups can be greatly reduced 
if the latter have access to sophisticated professional advice).
The bottom line is, therefore, that though people may not use higher-order beliefs, many 
times their decisions are indistinguishable from those of people who do use higher-order 
beliefs. Consequently, predictions are usually supported in terms of the sign of the co­
efficients (comparative statics and inter-treatment comparisons) but rejected in terms of 
statistical significance. The latter problem is, however, mitigated by two factors: First, 
the discreteness of the model can work against it because it amplifies small differences and 
thus makes the data-predictions matches more difficult (something already highlighted by 
Heinemann et al. (2002)). Second, the parameters of the model were explicitly chosen 
to discourage said matches. This may indicate that, since the estimated coefficients have 
the signs predicted by the theory in these most demanding conditions, the model would 
be a better predictor in more favourable environments. On the other hand, the present 
analysis only compared two possible auditing strategies (the “cut-off” and the “contin­
gent” rules), and a proper test of the optimality (or not) of the latter demands further 
comparisons against other rules. This testing is something that I plan to undertake as 
part of my future research agenda regarding this topic. In particular, I intend to design 
experiments such that, for a given situtation, the contingent rule and the alternative ones 
predict different behaviour by the subjects, so that I will be able to determine which of 
them reflects more accurately the empirical evidence.
C hapter 6
Conclusion
Improved communication and lower transportation costs have practically eliminated the 
concept of distance in the present, globalised world. Networks have multiplied and got 
bigger (e.g., Facebook), thus increasing the size of not only a person’s direct, first-order 
circle of acquaintances, but also of second- and higher-order ones: for a sample, just check 
the number of times a chain email was forwarded before it got to you.
This means that interconnectivity has soared, but with it have also soared the associated 
external effects: simply think about that chain email once again...
Going back to the pre-globalised world of independent, self-contained “islands” is, how­
ever, not an option. But continuing to use pre-globalised incentive schemes in a globalised 
world does not seem a smart alternative either: they will probably do more harm than 
good.
Analysing how those mechanisms are affected by the increased connectivity and how to 
devise new ones that are better adapted to it are therefore the goals of this thesis. Such 
enterprise, however, is a vast one, and so the present dissertation focused instead on a 
few but thoroughly studied cases, using the British railway system and the design of 
anti-evasion auditing policies as leading examples. The first one helped to illustrate how 
delegation of contracting rights can improve the efficiency of an organisation in which 
jointly produced output is the only contractible variable. The second one showed that 
sometimes the optimal incentive scheme requires the creation of an externality by the 
designer.
The results suggest that the presence or absence of externalities is an important factor 
to consider when designing incentive schemes. Thus, externalities can radically modify
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the schemes (like in the British railway example, in which delegation is preferred over 
centralisation) or become an integral part of them, transforming the nature of the game 
in the process (like in the anti-evasion case in which a coordination game is created).
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Appendix A
Exogenous externality
A .l  Lim ited liability
Since adding limited liability constraints (w{ (x ) > 0 , \fx) greatly complicates the problem, 
we explore here an alternative that intends to capture the intuition of what could happen 
if we introduced such constraints. Thus, we compute the maximum value of x  for which 
the contracts offered to the agents are non-positive (i.e. the point where the limited 
liability constraint bites) for both the Centralised Second Best and Delegated Second 
Best contracting structures. In figure A.l we have depicted these thresholds in terms of 
the parameter 7 .
Note that the curve that corresponds to the hierarchic net contract of the first agent 
(X(w^(x))) is always lower than the two remaining curves. That is, the limited liability 
constraint of Agent 1 under the delegated structure bites at a lower value of realized 
output x  than the one of Agent 2 (X(w 2 (x))). This indicates that Agent 1 is able to 
ensure that she gets a positive payment more often than Agent 2 , a result that is consistent 
with proposition 3.2 -Agent 1 bears less risk than Agent 2- and with the fact that the 
Principal is able to induce Agent 1 to exert a high level of effort while transferring her a 
relatively low level of risk. When comparing the Centralised Second Best (X(w**(x))) and 
Delegated Second Best (X(w^(x)), X(w^(x)))  structures, we can see that for low levels 
of 7  the latter is more affected by the limited liability constraint (in particular, Agent 
2’s realization of wages is negative for a larger range of output realizations). However, 
for large values of 7 , the limited liability constraint affects the Centralised Second Best 
structure more than the Delegated Second Best one.
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Figure A.l: Limited liability
This result, together with the fact that the relative gains of the delegated structure are 
strictly increasing in 7  (proposition 3.1), suggest that delegated structures should be 
frequently found when agents are very risk averse and/or the project is very risky.
A .2 Profit-sharing schemes
Empirical evidence shows that many agents are rewarded not in relation to their output, 
but to profits generated. This is the standard practice, for example, in the case of CEOs. 
From a theoretical point of view, allowing for profit-based incentive schemes does not 
represent much of a difficulty, as profits are verifiable by court if disagreement between 
the parties arises. How would these compensation schemes affect the results?
Let us keep the assumption of linear contracts, but now instead of linear in output, they 
are assumed to be linear in profits. Hence, the wage schedule faced by agent i is given by
Wi(x) =  ai +  Cin(x) Vi G {1,2} (A.l)
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Profits are defined as output minus the total wage bill
2
7r (x) := x  — ^  Wi (x) (A.2 )
i=l
Plugging equation A l  into equation A.2 and rearranging the terms, we get profits as a 
linear function of output:
7r(x ) = -----“ 2----- x ----- (A-3)1 +  E i= i  a i + TLiCi
Plugging now equation A .3 into equation A l,  we can express the wage schedule of agent 
i as a linear function of output only:
Wi(x) = Q*i ELi Qi 1 + i+Ei=iCi x Vi G {1,2} (A.4)
Defining
cti = a{ -  (A.5)
-  r r fc  ( A - 6 )
the wage schedule can be further simplified to
Wi(x) = on + PiX ViG {1,2} (A.7)
Hence, it is clear that a linear contract contingent only on profits can be rewritten as 
another linear contract, this one contingent only on output. This means that our analysis 
can be applied to situations where the incentive schemes are based on profits rather than 
on output if a simple change of variables is undertaken.1
’ in fact, any linear contract contingent on both profits and output can be rewritten as another linear 
contract contingent only on output.
That is, every contract of the form
Wi(x) =  a,i +  b i i  +  Ci7r(x) V ie  {1 ,2 }  (A.8)
can be analysed as a contract contingent only on output (by undertaking the appropriate change of 
variables).
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A. 3 Cartel
When the agents make their decisions jointly, the Principal’s programme becomes 
max Ex {ir(x)}
{u>i {x),e\'W2(x),ei}
(A.9)
PC C : EUC := £  Ex {U (w{ (x ), e*)} > U
S.t. < 2=1 2
IC C : (ei,ei) e argm axEUC =  Ex {U (wi (x ), e*)}
1
where the superindex c labels the Cartel variables, such as the expected utility of the 
cartel, EUC, which is defined as the sum of the agents’ expected utilities.2 The objective 
function of the Principal remains unchanged:
E tt = Ex { t t  ( x ) }  =  Ex {x -  W  ( x ) }  (A.10)
The incentive compatibility constraint yields the result that both agents choose the same 
level of effort, B:
e\ = ec2 = B  (A.11)
which means that both agents fully internalise the externality they generate on the other.
Given the linearity of the incentive scheme, the participation constraint will be binding,
and so the expected total wage bill EX{W  (x)} will cover exactly the Cartel’s disutility 
of effort and risk. Using the certainty equivalent defined on page 22, the expected total 
bill is given by the following expression
Ex {W  (*)} =  \  (B -  b f  +  \ e \  +  l b 2 +  i e l  (A.12)
which, using equation A .ll, simplifies to
Ex {W (x) )  = ' l ( B - b f  + y ?  + B2 (A.13)
The Principal’s expected profits are therefore given by
Ex { t t  ( x ) }  =  2B -  [ |  (B -  b f  + +  B 2] (A.14)
"Introducing inter-agent transfers to ensure their participation constraints are satisfied does not change 
the results of this section. Therefore, for simplicity, such transfers will be ignored here.
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Solving for the optimal values of b and B  gives
4 +  7
and so the Principal’s expected profits are
bc = (A.15)4 +  7 v '
B c =  - i — (A.16)
E ttc = —i -  (A.17)
4 +  7 v '
The first conclusion one can draw is that both agents are treated equally: they exert the 
same level of effort (equation A .ll) and bear the same level of risk (from equations A.15 
and A.16, the risk borne by Agent 1 , B c — bc, is equal to the risk borne by Agent 2 , bc). 
This highlights the fact that the delegated structure presented in section 3.2.3 of chapter 
3 increases the efficiency of the system (compared to the centralised structure) in spite of 
allocating efforts and risks asymmetrically between the agents.
In terms of expected profits, the Principal prefers the Cartel case, then the Delegated 
Second Best case, and finally the Centralised Second Best (see figure A.2).
The difference E itc — En** represents the profits lost due to the externality when con­
tracting in a centralised manner. Defining the “Internalisation ratio” as
s E tkc -  En** v ’
£ can be interpreted as the proportion of the loss that is “recovered” (or the propor­
tion of the externality that is internalised) when using delegation instead of centralised 
contracting. The ratio is depicted in figure A.3 and ranges from (approx.) 0.4 to (ap­
prox.) 0 .6 8 ,3 suggesting that delegation allows for the recovery of a significant part of 
the profits overlooked by centralised contracting. Furthermore, the ratio is greater than 
i V7  < Zi^IZ «  7.275.
An alternative way to analyse the effectiveness of the DSB is by using the ratio of (ex­
pected) profits: the DSB’s in the numerator and the Cartel’s in the numerator. Formally,
v : = i r -  (A -19)E ttc v '
3Actually, the ratio is equal to 1 when 7  =  0 , but in that the case the analysis is purely academic, 
since then First Best feasible.
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Figure A.2: Expected Profits.
Horizontal axis: /y. Vertical axis: Thick line: E ttc', Dotted line: E tt^ ; thin line: Eft**.
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Figure A.3: Internalisation ratio.
Horizontal axis: Vertical axis: £.
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This ratio measures how close the DSB gets to the optimal scenario (Cartel) and is shown 
in figure A.4. It is equal to 1 when 7 = 0  and tends to ^  =  0.5625 as 7 —> 00, thus 
confirming the effectiveness of the DSB suggested above.
0 . 7 5 ”
0 . 5 ”
0 . 2 5 ”
2.5 7.5
Figure A.4: DSB to Cartel ratio.
Horizontal axis: 7. Vertical axis: V.
In conclusion, when agents make their decisions jointly, the Principal offers contracts 
that treat them equally. The joint decision ensures that both agents fully internalise the 
externality, thus increasing the expected profits of the Principal (compared to those she 
gets under Centralised contracting). The Delegated Second Best can therefore be seen as 
an intermediate scenario in which only one agent fully internalises the externality (Agent 
1), so that the expected profits under the DSB structure are higher than under the CSB 
but lower than under the Cartel. The effect of partial internalisation is, however, powerful, 
as suggested by the fact that the rate of “recovery” of “profits lost due to Centralised 
contracting” is higher than 50% for a large range of values of 7.
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A .4  C om position o f the “d isutility  portfolio”
110
It may be important to consider how the composition of an agent’s disutility (or cost) 
varies as different contracting structures axe used.
An agent’s cost consists of two components: the disutility due to the effort exerted
& : = H  Vi 6  {1,2} (A.20)
and the disutility generated by the risk borne
R i : = l b 2i V ie {1,2} (A.21)
Thus, in order to analyse the behaviour of these components, a “Risk ratio” can be 
constructed as follows
P i - = w f r t Vi 6  {1,2} (A.22)
Equation A.23 and figure A.5 show the values of the ratios for each agent under the two 
relevant contracting structures, namely, Centralised Second Best and Delegated Second 
Best:
nd __.____ 7 3 - nd _  7
p  1 (7+ l)(37+72+ l)  P% 7+1 (A.23)
n** _  7 —  7  ’ '
P i  7+1 P% 7+1
It can be noted that, irrespective of the contracting structure, the ratios are equal to 0 
when 7  =  0  and they tend to 1 when 7  —> 0 0 . This is consistent with intuition: when 
risk is not an issue (7  =  0 ), the ratio is 0  and only the disutility of effort matters; on the 
other hand, when risk is infinitely more important than effort (7  —*• 0 0 ), then the ratio 
tends to 1 .
As expected, the equal treatment under CSB leads to the equality of agents’ ratios (p\* =  
P 2 * ) .  Under DSB, on the other hand, risk accounts for a greater fraction of total disutility 
for Agent 2  than for Agent 1 (pf < pi)-
The comparison CSB v DSB yields the results that Agent 2’s ratios are the same under 
both structures (p =  pf) and that Agent l ’s ratio is lower under DSB than under CSB 
(p{* > pf). The intuition behind these results relates to the trade-off between risk and 
incentives that is a standard feature of moral hazard settings: Agent 2 ’s perception of the
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Figure A.5: Risk ratios.
Horizontal axis: 7 . Vertical axis: Thick line: p^\ thin line: — p\* =  P2*
trade-off is unaffected by the change in structure, and so her decisions (and “portfolio”) 
are unaffected. On the other hand, Agent 1 faces a “looser” trade-off under DSB than 
under CSB because she can transfer part of her. risk to Agent 2 when choosing Agent 2’s 
incentive scheme and, thus, she can decrease the importance of risk as a proportion of 
her total disutility.
All these results are in line with those presented in proposition 3.2 and, furthermore, they 
will also hold if the wage schedule of Agent 2, w (x), were included as part of Agent l ’s 
cost in the DSB case. This is so because it only increases the numerator of the latter’s 
risk ratio.
An important caveat of the present analysis, however, is that different functional forms 
could lead to slightly different results, though the most important one (that Agent l ’s 
ratio is lower under DSB than under CSB, p\* > pf) is expected to be robust to the 
abovementioned modifications.
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A .5 N o replicability result
The basic (intuitive) proof derives from the Centralised Second Best in section 3.2.2: the 
Principal can choose any pair of contracts (01 , hi), (0 2 , 62), including those corresponding 
to the delegated structure, (ad,bd), (ad,bd), but she chooses the CSB contracts (a^*, frp), 
(a^*, 62*) instead.
Formally, consider the case when the Principal offers the agents the Delegated Second 
Best contracts:
(0 1 . 61) =  (Ad - a d, B d - b d) (A.24)
(02 . 62) =  ( 4 ,b d) (A.25)
Agents then choose their levels of effort optimally, which requires their efforts to be equal 
to the power of their respective incentive schemes:
ei =  B d - b d (A.26)
e2 =  bd (A.27)
Notice, however, that while Agent 2 will choose the same level of effort as in the DSB 
setting, Agent 1 will exert less effort than in the DSB case:
e2 =  bd = ed (A.28)
e\ = B d - b d < B d = ef (A.29)
As a consequence, expected output will be strictly lower than in the DSB case:
x =  e\ +  e2 =  bd < B d +  bd =  ed +  e\ =  xd (A.30)
Now, in the DSB case, the participation constraints of both agents are binding. In the 
case of Agent 2, this requires
EUi = 4  + bjxd -  |  (&g)2 -  i  (e£ ) 2 =  0 (A.31)
so that
4  = + + \ { 4 f  (A.32)
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The expected utility of Agent 2 when offered contract (a2, fo) is therefore
EUi = a2 +  b2 X -  2 -  i  (e2)2 (A.33)
Using the information about the contract, optimal choice of effort and value of a!j> (equa­
tions A.25, A.29 and A.32) equation A.33 becomes
EU2 = - 4  (xd ~  *)
and so (due to equation A.30) the expected utility of Agent 2  is negative.
That is, if the Principal offered the DSB contracts to the agents, Agent 2 would reject the 
offer. This means that the Principal cannot replicate the Delegated Second Best result 
because the contract offered to Agent 2 is not individually rational. The rationale for this 
is that Agent 1 has no incentives to exert extra effort (ei < ef) because she is not residual 
claimant and, therefore, she cannot take advantage of choosing simultaneously both her 
effort and Agent 2 ’s incentive scheme. As a consequence, expected output is lower and 
Agent 2’s expected income does not compensate for the disutility of effort and risk she 
suffers, so that she would rather reject the offer.
A ppendix B
Endogenous Externality: Theory
B .l  E xpected net revenue
The existing literature (Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Cronshaw and Aim (1995), etc.) 
usually considers the expected net revenue (taxes plus fines minus auditing costs) as the 
government’s objective function, justifying it by arguments that range from the willingness 
to avoid using normative social welfare functions to the assumption that, by nature, a tax 
agency’s goal is to collect as much revenue as possible.
In the model used in chapter 4, expected net revenue (ENR) is given by the expression 
E N R  = — (1 — j ) p c  + 7  (1 — k) t +  7 /cp((l +  <?) t — c) (Bd)
The first term corresponds to the revenue lost (c) when income is low (which happens with 
probability 1 — 7 ) and the agency audits with probability p. The second term corresponds 
to the expected net revenue when income is high (which occurs with probability 7 ) and 
the taxpayer complies (which occurs with probability 1 — k): the taxpayer pays tax t 
and is not audited. The final term corresponds to the case when income is high (which 
occurs with probability 7 ), the taxpayer evades (which occurs with probability k) and the 
agency audits (with probability p): the taxpayer is caught and pays a fine (1 +  ^) t. In 
this setting, the government’s “type” (its private information) can be interpreted as the 
cost of an audit, c. This assumption is a plausible one, since usually taxpayers do not 
know how costly an audit it, while they are more likely to know other parameters of the 
problem like the tax rate t or the surcharge rate q.
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In order to find the relationship between the two competing objective functions, it is 
necessary to construct their respective “gap” functions similar to those used by HM 
Revenue and Customs in the United Kingdom (see Ratto et al. (2005)). These functions 
measure the gap between the first-best (perfect information) outcome and the actual value 
of ENR (or EL). Formally,
xGap := x — x* x e  {EN R , EL] (B.2)
In the case of the expected loss, an agency that knew with certainty taxpayers’ incomes 
would make no targeting error, so the expected loss would be zero (EL* =  0) and the 
ELGap would be equal to the E L  function:
ELGap : = EL -  EL* (B.3)
=  EL  (B.4)
=  (1 ~ 7 ) p ( l  -  A) +  7/c(1 - p ) X  (B.5)
where the first term corresponds to the loss due to zeal errors and the second one to the 
loss due to negligence errors.
Analogously, the first-best ENR is given by
ENR* = (l —7) . 0  +  7 { ( l - « ) t  +  k[(1 —0)-0 + l - ( ( l  +  <)£ —c)]} (B.6 )
=  7 { ( 1  — K,)t + k[(1 + s ) t  — c]} (B.7)
since the government will not audit anyone who declares her true income (be it low or 
high) and will audit everyone who evades. The ENRGap  function is then
ENRGap  : =  ENR*  -  E N R  (B.8 )
=  (1 - 7 )pc +  7 « ( l  - p )  [(1 + s)t  -  c] (B.9)
A straightforward comparison between equations B.5 and B.9 suggests a high degree of 
similarity between the two objective functions. Formally, the ENRGap can be expressed 
as a linear function of the ELGap (and vice versa):
ENRGap = a +  /? • ELGap (B.10)
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or, using the equations above,
(1  -  7 ) c • p + 7  ((1  +  <;) t -  c) • k (1 -  p) =
a  +  p  (1 — 7 ) (1 — A) • p +  /37A • k (1 -  p) (B .ll)
This relationship holds for every (k, p) e [0,1] x [0,1] if and only if
a =  1 - ( T T ^  (b -12)
and
a = 0 (B.13)
P = (1 +  0 * (B.14)
It can be seen that the greater is the cost of an audit, the lower is A (i.e., the importance 
attached by the agency to negligence errors). This is understandable, as both situations 
(low audit cost and high importance of negligence errors) lead the government to under­
take the same action, namely, to follow a high-intensity auditing policy. Thus, if c =  0 
(auditing is costless), then A =  1 (government is only concerned with negligence errors), 
and so the agency will audit as much as possible. On the other hand, if c =  (1  + <;)t
(i.e., when the fine paid by a discovered evader just covers the cost of the audit), A =  1
(government is only concerned with zeal errors), and so the agency will audit nobody.
The interpretation of equation B.12 is easier if it is re-organised as follows:
V = ( T T ^  (B'15)
where the left hand side measures the relative importance of zeal errors (1 —A) with respect 
to the importance of negligence errors (A). The condition in equation B.15, hence, is a 
logical one: the relative importance of zeal vis-a-vis negligence, must be equal to 
the ratio between the cost of an audit, c (the loss in case of a zeal error) and the net 
fine extracted from a caught evader, (1 +  s) t — c (the revenue not collected in case of a 
negligence error).
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B .2  Im perfect correlation
When imperfect correlation is allowed, the results of chapter 4 will hold as long as the 
common shocks are the main source of income variability.
In the simplest case, assume that a taxpayer’s income yi consists of two elements: a 
common component y £ {0,1} and an idiosyncratic one Vi € {—v,v} .  The idiosyncratic 
shock is assumed small compared to the common shock. In this particular case, v < 
This means, in particular, that the government can still detect the common shock if at 
least one person declares 1 — v  or 1 + v. The probability of a good common shock (good 
year) is 7  £ (0 ,1) as before; the probability of a good idiosyncratic shock is  ^ (i.e., the 
idiosyncratic shock Vi is a white noise variable).
Audits are assumed to be profitable if someone with a positive common shock evades and is 
audited; otherwise, they are unprofitable. That is, the important case is when the common 
shock is missed. The idiosyncratic shocks are so small that even if the agency knew for 
sure that someone underdeclared their idiosyncratic positive shock (though declaring their 
common shock truthfully), it does not pay off for the government to undertake the audit. 
This is a radical assumption, but highlights the importance of the common shock, which is 
the focus of the present analysis. Formally, this requires the following condition regarding 
the cost of an audit c:
(1 + <;)t ■ 2v < c < (l + < ; ) t  (B.16)
It implies that the fine collected from someone who underdeclares the common component 
but tells the truth about her idiosyncratic component (the expression on the right hand 
side) is greater than the cost of the audit, which in turn is greater than the fine collected 
from someone who tells the truth about the common component but underdeclares her 
idiosyncratic one (the expression on the left hand side).
In such scenario, as in the perfect correlation case, nobody who declares the maximum 
possible income (1 +  v ) is ever audited: a ( l -f u,d_i) =  0. The relative position of 
someone’s declaration also matters, though the relationship is a bit more complex than 
in the perfect correlation scenario: anyone who declares — v or v  when at least one other 
person declares 1 — v or 1 +  v will be audited with certainty, because the government 
knows that they underdeclared the common shock: a (±u, 1 ±  v) = 1
From the previous assumptions, it is also clear that nobody who declares 1 — v will ever 
be audited: the government knows the person has high income, and auditing the person 
in order to recover a small fine from the (potentially) underdeclared idiosyncratic shock 
is unprofitable: a(l — v, d_j) =  0.
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The only cases that are left for analysis, therefore, are those when:
1 . both taxpayers declare v,
2 . both taxpayers declare —v, and
3. one taxpayer declares v, the other —v.
The three cases, however, lead to the same result. This is the case because only the 
common shock matters when computing the negligence and zeal errors, which are therefore 
the same in all three cases. The agency’s objective function is
E L (± v , ±u) =  7  • 2A - [1 -  a (±v, ±v)] +  (1 -  7 ) • 2 (1 -  A) • a (±u, ±u) (B.17)
and so the optimal strategy is
a (±u, ±v) = <
0 if A < 1 — 7
€ {0,1} if A =  1 — 7
1 if A > 1 — 7
(B.18 )
Thus, summarizing all the results, the agency’s optimal policy is
a (d,d\ A) =  <
0 if d =  1 ±  v
1 if d =  ±v, d! = 1  ± v
1 if d =  ±i>, d' = ±u, A > 1 — 7  
0 if d =  ±u, d' = ±v,  A < 1 — 7
(B.19)
This auditing policy is (weakly) decreasing in a taxpayer’s declaration and increasing in 
the other taxpayer’s declaration, a result that replicates the one in proposition 4.4.
It is straightforward to show that taxpayers’ declarations are (weakly) increasing functions 
of their expected probabilities of detection, and so the equivalent of proposition 4.5 is 
obtained.
The combination of these two results yield the strategic complementarity analysed in 
chapter 4 and which generates the associated coordination game.
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B .3 M ore levels o f incom e
The analysis with more levels of income is more cumbersome than when only two levels of 
income are considered, so for the time being the only situation that will be investigated 
is the one in which income can take three possible levels: y £ {0, 1}, which occur with
probabilities I, m  and h, respectively (I +  m  +  h := 1). In such scenario the intermediate 
case {y — \ )  can be interpreted as the “status quo” while the lower and higher ones (y =  0 
and y — 1, respectively) can be interpreted as the bad and good years, respectively. Let 
us consider the case with just two taxpayers, i and j .
A taxpayer can therefore declare only 0, \  or 1. Expected utility in each case is given by 
EUi (di \ yi) = yi -  tdi -  {1 + s)t(yi -  di) • Ei [a(di, d_j)] (B.20)
and it is straightforward to show that declared income is an increasing function of the ex­
pected probability of detection, just as in the case with just two levels of income (equation 
4.38.1).
Considering now the tax agency’s problem, two results are self-evident:
• Anyone who declares 1 will never be audited:
a{l,d j)  = 0 (B.21)
• If different taxpayers declare different incomes, the one who declares less income 
will always be audited (assuming that audits are profitable):
a(d{,dj) =  1 Wdi < dj (B.22)
Hence, we need only to consider what happens in the following cases:
1. Both taxpayers declare 0,
2. Both taxpayers declare and
3. One taxpayer declares 0 and the other ^ .
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In the first case, the government’s expected loss is
E L ta  (d =  (0,0)) =  Z [2 (1 — A) • a (0,0) +  0 • (1 — a (0,0))] +
+m  [0 • a (0,0) +  2A • (1 -  a (0,0))] +  (B.23)
+h [0 • a (0,0) +  2A • (1 — a (0,0))]
=  2 [{ l -  A ) - a (0,0)+ (1 — 0  A] (B.24)
where the first term is the loss if y =  0 (if both are audited: two zeal errors, if none is
audited: no errors) and the second and third the respective losses when y and y = 1
(if both are audited: no losses, if none is audited: two negligence mistakes). The agency 
therefore chooses the auditing strategy such that
a (0 , 0 ) — <
0 if A < Z 
e  {0,1} if A =  Z
1 if A > Z
(B.25)
In the second case, the government’s expected loss is
ELt a [ d = ( ^
where
) )  =  , [ 2 ( l - A ) . a Q , i ) + 0 . ( l - a ( i , i ) ) '
•aG-9+
+ ( 1 - 0 )
=  20(1 — A)
+2 (1 — 0) A (-&{))
771
777 +  h
(B.26)
(B.27)
(B.28)
is the probability of y = \  conditional on d  =  (5 , 3 ). That is, the government can discard 
y =  0 given that at least one person declared The optimal strategy is now
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In the final case, the expected loss is
E L ta  ( d  =  [ - ,0
and the optimal strategy is
=  <P 
+  ( i -4>)
(1 — A) ■ a ( 2* 0)  +  0 • [ 1 —•(j’0))
(B.30)
= <A(l-A) a Q , o )  + ( 1 - , « A -  A - a Q , < A V b .31)
if A < (j) 
if A = <f> 
if A > <f>
(B.32)
Getting all cases together, the government’s optimal strategy is
a (d, df, A) =  <
if d — 1 
if d =  ^ , df =  1 
if d =  i ,  d' < 1, A > I
0 if d =  d! < 1, A < I
1 if d = 0, dr > 0
1 if d =  0, dr =  0, A > <j>
0 if d = 0, dr -  0, A < 0
(B.33)
It is straightforward to show that, keeping d and A fixed, as d' increases, a (d, d') also 
(weakly) increases. Also, under mild assumptions1, it can be shown that (for fixed df and 
A), higher d leads to a (weakly) lower probability of detection a (d, d'). These two results 
axe the counter-parts of proposition 4.4 in the two-income case.
Similarly mild conditions (i.e., based on hazard rates) are expected to be necessary for the 
results to hold when more than three levels of income are considered. Thus, the optimal
1The condition needed is
I < <t>
In a more general environment, it requires the "hazard rate" to be increasing in income:
q ( /(*) ^
dx > 0
(B.34)
(B.35)
a condition that is satisfied as long as the probability distribution of shocks is not too skewed to the right. 
It is satisfied, for example, by the uniform distribution and for a symmetric distribution where I = h <m  
(which could replicate a situation with a "most likely scenario" (m) and both "bad" and "good" ones (I 
and h)).
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policy being non-decreasing in the average declaration and the associated coordination 
game it creates seem to be robust features of the analysis.
B .4  Proofs
Proof. Proposition 4.2
Derive the expected loss function (equation 4.27) with respect to the agency’s two policy 
variables, namely, ao := a (0, D, A) and a\ := a (1, D, A).
For the first part of the proposition, compute the derivative of the expected loss with 
respect to a\:
=  ) D  (B.36)
which is positive2, so that the optimal strategy in order to minimise expected losses is to 
set
al =  0 (B.37)
That is, the agency must not audit anyone who declares high income.
For the last three parts of the proposition, that determine the value of ao, it is necessary 
to distinguish two eases: one when the average declaration is zero (D = 0, parts 2 and 3 
of the proposition) and another when the average declaration is positive (D > 0, part 4 
of the proposition).
Consider first the scenario in which the average declaration is positive (D > 0). Since it 
is common knowledge that declaring low income is the dominant strategy for taxpayers 
when income is low (proposition 4.1), the agency is able to infer that whoever declares
high income says the truth, i.e., the posterior probability of the taxpayer having high
income conditional on the taxpayer having declared high income is 1:
Pr (yi = 1 \ di =  1) =  1 (B.38)
Furthermore, given the perfect correlation between incomes, if the agency observes at 
least one high declaration (i.e., if D > 0), it is able to infer that the year is a good one 
with probability one: the posterior probability of a good year (y = 1) conditional on the
2VariabIe a i is the audit decision regarding a taxpayer who declares high income. This means that at 
least one person declared high income, and so the average declaration D  is strictly positive.
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average declaration being strictly positive is 1 :
Pr (y =  1 | D > 0) =  1 (B.39)
(thus the first part of equation 4.16). From the definition of a negligence error (equation 
4.8), therefore, the agency’s best strategy is to audit everyone who declares low income 
(di =  0) when average income is strictly positive (D > 0). This proves the last part of 
the proposition.
Consider now the case when every taxpayer declares low income, so that the average 
declaration is zero (D = 0). In this scenario, the agency does not know if income is 
truly low (y =  0 ) or if it is high and every taxpayer evaded (y = 1 and d{ =  0  for every 
i 6  [0,1]). The agency’s posterior belief over the probability of a good year conditional 
on the average declaration being equal to zero is therefore:
Pr(s/ =  1 | D =  0) =  7  (B.40)
where 7  is the prior probability of a good year (thus the second part of equation 4.16). 
Hence, deriving the expected loss function (equation 4.27) with respect to the audit 
decision ao yields
This expression is positive if A < 1 — 7  and negative otherwise, so the agency will audit in 
the latter case (A > A := 1 — 7 ) and will not audit in the the first case (A < A := 1 — 7 ). 
This proves parts 2 and 3 of the proposition ■
Proof. Proposition 4.7
The proof is similar to that in Morris and Shin (1997), so I will concentrate on those 
elements specific to my model.
Propose a taxpayer strategy (for good years) of the following type:
di ( S i) -  <
0 if Si < s
€ [0,1] if Si =  s
1 if s < Si
(B.42)
that is, a strategy according to which the taxpayer declares high income (comply) when 
the signal is sufficiently high and low income (evades) when it is sufficiently low.
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To be optimal, such strategy must satisfy the following condition
s ^  Si if and only if Ei (u (evasion)) ^  u (compliance) (B.43)
where Ei (u (evasion)) and u (compliance) are given by equations 4.34 and 4.35.
The average declaration in the economy is therefore given by the proportion of taxpayers 
that receive signals greater than s. Since signals are uniformly distributed around the true 
type of the agency A (with support [A — e, A +  e]), there are three cases to consider:
1. If s < A — e, then D — 1;
2. If A — e < s < A + £, then D  =  J^+£ ^ d s  =  X+£TS; and
3. If A +  e < s, then D  =  0;
That is, the average declaration in the economy D  is a weakly increasing function of the 
type of the agency A. In particular, if the agency is so tough (case 1 above) that even the 
person with the lowest signal (A — e) complies (see equation B.42), then everyone declares 
high income and D  =  1. On the other hand, when the agency is so soft (case 3 above) 
that even the person with the highest signal (A +  e) evades, then everyone declares low 
income and D = 0. In intermediate cases, some people declare high income and others 
declare low income, so D £ (0,1). Formally,
D(A) =
0 if A < s — e
G [0,1] if s — e < A < s + e
1 if s +  e < A
(B.44)
Equation 4.28 gives the agency’s optimal strategy. Such strategy depends on the individ­
ual taxpayer’s declaration di, the declarations of every other taxpayer in the category D, 
and the type of agency A. In particular, it states that the agency will audit a person who 
declares low income (di = 0) only if one of the two following scenarios occur:
1. The average declaration in the economy is strictly positive: D > 0.
2. The average declaration in the economy is zero and the agency is “tough”: D = 0 
and A > A (where A is defined as in proposition 4.2).
Consider first case 1: From equation B.44, this scenario occurs when A > s — e.
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Case 2, on the other hand, requires both A < s — e (from equation B.44) and A > A (and
therefore, implicitly, that A < s —e). Combining the two, case 2 occurs when A < A < s —e.
Therefore, the agency audits a taxpayer who declares low income only if A > A, where 
A := min | s  — e, A j .
The agency’s optimal strategy can then be reduced to the following expression
0 if di = 0
cti (di, A) =   ^ g [0,1] if d{ = 1 and A < A (B.45)
1 if d{ =  1 and A > A
The expected utility of a taxpayer i who evades is given by expression
Ei (u (0, Oi, 1)) = E[u  (0, at (0, A), 1) | s] (B.46)
Taxpayer Vs posterior distribution of A conditional on her private signal s is uniformly 
distributed around s, so there are three cases to consider:3
1. If A < s -  e, then a; =  1 and Ei (u (0, a;, 1)) =  =  fs-e = 1 _ />
2. If s — e < A < s +  e, then Ei (u (0, a ,^ 1)) =  +  f?+£ - ^ I ’^ dX =
i L  TsdX +  / / +'  =  1 -  ^  . . . .
3. If s +  e < A, then a* =  0 and Ei (u (0, a*, 1)) =  ^dA =  1.
Intuitively, if the signal is so high (case 1) that even her lowest estimate of A, s — £, is high 
enough as to trigger an audit (from equation B.45), then her payoff from evasion is 1 — /  
with certainty. On the other hand, if the signal is so low (case 3) that even her highest 
estimate of A, s +  e, is low enough as to avoid triggering an audit, then her payoff from 
evasion is 1 with certainty. In intermediate cases, the taxpayer’s payoff is not certain, and 
the expected utility takes values in the (1 — / ,  1) range.
Thus, the taxpayer’s expected utility of evasion is given by the following expression:
1 if s < A — £
Ei (u (0, cii, 1)) = E[u (0, ai (0, A), 1) | s] = < 1 — s+2e x f  if A — £ < s <A  + e 
1 — /  if A +  £ < s
(B.47)
/  is the fine paid if caught evading, as defined in equation 4.5
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Note that this function is a continuous and (weakly) decreasing function of the taxpayer’s 
signal and that it can take values in the range [1 — / ,  1], Prom the definition of /  (equation 
4.5), it is straightforward to show that
1 -  /  < 1 -  t <  1 (B.48)
This means that the utility of compliance (the term in the centre, from equation 4.35) 
is higher than the utility if caught evading (the left-hand side term) but lower than the 
utility if evasion goes undetected (the right-hand side term). This implies that exists a 
signal s such that the expected utility of evasion (equation B.47) equals the utility of 
compliance 1 — t. Formally
E  [u (0, at (0, A), 1) | s] := 1 -  t (B.49)
or, equivalently, using equation B.47,
s := A — e +  2eP  (B.50)
where P  is defined as in equation 4.36.
When A =  s — e, then equation B.50 becomes
s =  (s — £■) — £■ +  2 eP  (B.51)
which simplifies to
2er (1 — P) =  0 (B.52)
and is only satisfied in extreme and rather uninteresting cases: when e = 0 (no funda­
mental uncertainty regarding the type of agency A) and/or P  := =  1 (when no fine
is paid if caught evading). Thus, this case will be ignored.
When A =  A, on the other hand, the switching point becomes
s := A — e +  2eP  (B.53)
and, since the expected utility of evasion (equation B.47) is a weakly decreasing function
of the private signal received by the taxpayer and 1 — /  < 1 — i < 1, this means that s
is unique. This proves the first part of the proposition: every taxpayer follows the same 
threshold strategy.
Furthermore, it is now straightforward to show that the expected utility of evasion is 
higher (respectively, lower) than the utility of compliance when the private signal s is
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lower (respectively, higher) than the threshold s, thus proving that the threshold strategy 
of equation 4.40.1 is indeed optimal (i.e., satisfies the condition in equation B.43) and 
hence, trivially, that the optimal declaration strategy is a weakly increasing function of 
the private signal received.This proves the second part of the proposition. ■
Proof. Proposition 4.8
The average declaration is defined as
(B.54)
where G (s | A) is the probability distribution of signals, conditional on the type of agency 
being A. Prom equation 4.13, s | A is uniformly distributed on the [A — e, A +  e] segment. 
Note that, because of the taxpayer’s optimal strategy in good years (proposition 4.7), the 
average declaration can be interpreted as the fraction of the population that gets a signal 
above the threshold s.
Depending on the value of A, three cases can occur:
1. Full evasion (A < s — e): Even the person with highest signal (i.e., s* =  A +  e) would 
evade. Formally, D := (0) ^ d s  = 0.
2. Partial evasion (s — e < A < s +  e): Those with signals between A — e and s 
evade, those with signals between s and A +  e comply. Formally, D  := J^_£ (0) •
3. Full compliance (s +  e < A): Even the person with the lowest signal (i.e., S{ = A — e) 
would comply. Formally, D  := (1) ^ d s  =1.
The level of evasion in good years is simply the fraction of the population that gets a
signal below the threshold s. That is, k =  1 — D. ■
Proof. Proposition 4.11
Consider first the full evasion case (A < s — e). Since the threshold s is defined as in
equation B.53, the condition A < s — e becomes
D  := J  di (1, s)dG(s  | A)
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where P  is the auditing intensity that eliminates evasion.
Since P  E (^ , l ) , 1 — P  can only take values in the interval (0, ^). Also, since the noise
of the signals cannot be negative, it must be the case that
0 < e (B.56)
Combining equations B.55 and B.56, the full evasion case requires 0 < e < 2(i-p) > which 
is only feasible if A < A (i.e., full evasion is only feasible if the government is soft).
In the full compliance case (s +  e < A), the condition s +  £ < A becomes
 ^ ^  (B.5 7 )
Combining equations B.57 and B.56, the full compliance case requires 0 < £ < which 
is feasible only if A < A (i.e., full compliance is only feasible if the government is tough).
Finally, the condition needed for the existence of the partial evasion case (s—e < A < s+e) 
becomes e > max |  2 ^ ~p) > If A < A it becomes e > • If A < A, it is s > 4 ^ .
Summarising the results so far, there are two cases to consider: (1) if the government is 
soft (A < A) the full evasion case arises when the noise is low (e < 2(i-p )) and the partial 
evasion one when it is high; and (2) if the government is tough (A < A) the full compliance 
case occurs when the noise is low (e < 4 ^ )  and the partial evasion when it is high.
Hence, using proposition 4.8, the average declaration in each of the two cases is given by
(2) D* =
0 i f O A £
1 - - p + A-A2e i f
A -
2(1-
A
-P ) K £
1 i f 0 < £ <
1 - - p + A-A2e i f
A-A  
2 P < e
A-A  
2 P
(B.58)
It is straightforward from here to prove the first part of the proposition by simply com­
puting the derivative of D with respect to e.
For the second part, using the two cases considered above and proposition 4.10, the
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expected loss of the agency is as follows 
(1) EL* = 7 A if 0 < £ < 2 (1—P)
0  if ottztpt < £2(T=py
(2) £L* =  ( 1 - 7 ) ( 1 - A )
Deriving with respect to e yields the result stated in the proposition.
(B.59)
Appendix C
Endogenous Externality: 
Experiment
C .l Instructions for treatm ent GC
Introduction1
First of all, thank you very much for taking part in this experiment. It is important to 
start by saying that, though part of a serious research programme, this experiment is 
NOT a test. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers.
How it works
Before we do anything, we have to run through a few ground rules and instructions. After 
that we will move to the experiment proper, where you will be asked to make decisions 
in a number of economic situations presented to you. Finally you will get paid: on top of 
a show-up fee of £5, you will get a sum of money that will depend on your performance 
in the situations mentioned before.
The experiment consists of 5 stages:
• Instructions
• Trial rounds
instructions for the other treatments were similar to these ones, with the logical changes in rules and 
parameters needed in each case.
130
APPENDIX C. ENDOGENOUS EXTERNALITY: EXPERIMENT 131
•  Experiment rounds
• Questionnaire
•  Payment
We will go through these in detail below.
Ground rules
For the experiment to work we need to run it according to fairly strict rules, but there 
are not too many:
• From now until the end of the experiment, please do not talk (it will not take long!)
• If there is something you need to ask about the way the experiment works just raise 
your hand -the experimenter will come to your desk.
• Please do not use the computer until you are told to.
The Six Stages
1 Instructions
The experimenter will read out the instructions. If you have questions, this is the time to 
deal with them. Just raise your hand and the experimenter will answer them privately.
2 Short quiz
This is to ensure that you understand the instructions.
3 Trial rounds
The experiment is organised in a series of rounds. Each round is a period in which you 
interact -via the computer only- with the other participants and make decisions that 
determine the amount of money you will get at the end of the session.
As a warm-up you will first take part in 2 trial rounds. These trial rounds are identical to 
the experiment rounds in every respect with one exception: the effect on payment. Trial 
rounds do NOT affect your reward at the end of the experiment. They allow you to check 
out the interface and familiarise yourself with the screen tables, buttons and commands. 
They also allow you to make mistakes without losing money.
4 Experim ent rounds
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This is the real thing. What you do during these rounds will determine the total amount 
of money you will get.
The following “Frequently Asked Questions” will lead you through the basic mechanics 
of the rounds.
4-1. What is this all about?
Let us start by saying that the experiment will consist of 20 experiment rounds. In each 
one of them the computer will pair you up with one other participant. Each of the other 
participants in the room is equally likely to be paired up with you.
4.2. What do I  have to do?
You have to choose one of two possible actions, namely Y or Z. You choose one or the 
other by clicking on your preferred option in the bottom left panel of the choice screen 
(see figure C.l) and then pressing the “OK” button in the same panel.
rwiua
...
1 end erf 20
Payoff* Raiaransmp between your twnt and t>« ffu* yaiua at q
Kyou oisv Z. your payoff is always 654 
ffyou play Y. your payoff is as in the taWa below
ffyou pal a bint equal to than q is aqua! to wff> probability
8 A 1
Vsfcwofq
0 A 0125
b 8 0 750
A B c b C ' 0.125
Olhei participants Y 1000 655 570
: t  Y  c  i
decision Z 658 651 0
Your hint i t  a
Your choice is r  Y
<' 1
Figure C.l: Choice screen
4.3. How is my payoff for the round determined?
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Your payoff for the round depends on your own action, the action of the other participant, 
and an unknown parameter called q.
4 .4 . But exactly how is my payoff for the round determined?
There are two cases to consider:
a. If you choose action Z, your payoff is 654 “experimental points” with certainty.
b. If you choose action Y, your payoff depends on both the value of q and the action of
the other participant, as shown in the table below (and also in the top-left panel of the
choice screen (see figure C.l)):
Value of q
A B C
Other participant’s 
choice
Y 1000 655 579
Z 658 651 0
That is, if you choose Z, you always get 654 “experimental points” , regardless of what 
the other participant does and what the value of q is. But if you choose Y, then there 
are several cases to consider. Let us see some of them (remembering that in all of them 
you choose Y and your payoff is measured in “experimental points”):
If the other participant chooses Y and q equals A, then your payoff is 1000.
If the other participant chooses Y and q equals B, then your payoff is 655. And so on.
4-5. So how much money do I  get then?
Your payoffs are transformed into money at a rate of: 1000 “experimental points” =  50 
pence
That is, if your payoff for the round is, for example, 655 “experimental points” , your 
corresponding money earnings are 655 x 50/1000 =  32.75pence.
Your session earnings are computed by adding up the money you got during the 20 
experiment rounds.
4 .6 . But, what is q?
q is a parameter that can only take one of 3 values: A, B or C. In any given round, 
your computer will choose one of these 3 values, with probabilities 0.20, 0.60 and 0.20,
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respectively.
Intuitively, you can think of these probabilities in the following way: Consider an urn 
with 100 balls. 20 of them are labelled “A”, 60 “B” and 20 “C”. The value of q will 
be determined by the label of one of the 100 balls in the urn, chosen randomly (by the 
computer).
4-7. Is there anything I  could use to make a more informed decision?
Yes, there is. Before you make a decision you will get a “hint” . This hint will be known 
only to you and can only take one of 3 values: a, b or c. It provides some information 
about the value of the unknown parameter q, as shown in the following table (and in the 
top-right panel of the choice screen (figure C.l)):
If hint is... ...then q is... ...with probability...
a A 1.000
A 0.125
b B 0.750
C 0.125
c C 1.000
For any given round, your hint can be found immediately below this table in the choice 
screen (figure C.l).
The table may seem a bit complicated but do not worry, it is not. It simply says that if 
your hint is equal to a, then you can be sure that q is equal to A. Analogously, if your 
hint is equal to c, then q is equal to C. When your hint is equal to b, however, you do 
not know for sure what the value of q is, but you can tell how likely each value is: q is 
equal to B with probability 0.750, while it is equal to A or C with probabilities 0.125 and
0.125, respectively.
Important note: Although q is the same for you and the other participant, your hints 
may differ from each other.
4-8. Anything else I  should know before making my choice?
If you want to make some computations before choosing your action, you can press the 
calculator button on the choice screen (the small square button just above the darker 
area (see figure C.l)). Pens and paper are available for those who prefer them: raise your 
hand and an experimenter will take them to your desk.
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Also, it is worth mentioning that there is no “Back” button, so please make your decisions 
carefully and only press the “OK” or “Continue” buttons when you are sure you want to 
move to the next screen.
4-9. So I  made my decision, what now?
After you submit your decision, you will be shown the action you chose and the payoff 
you got for the round, as well as the value that q took (see figure C.2). By clicking on 
the “Continue” button you will move to a new round (if there is any still to be played).
r b
r  C 
Yout htnlw»* 9 
Your CltOKt VMM Y
r  z
Your payoff *9 B5B
Figure C.2: Results screen
4-10. And then? Is it the same over and over again?
Basically, yes. In every round, the structure is identical to the one described above: first a 
new q will be selected by the computer and you will be paired up with another participant, 
then you will be assigned a hint and will have to make a decision, and finally your payoff 
will be shown on the results screen.
You can check what happened in previous periods by taking a look at the darker area in 
the bottom-right panel of the choice screen (see figure C.l). It includes information about
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the values adopted by q, the hints you got and the actions you chose in earlier rounds.
Important note: Every period is like a clean slate: the value of q, the participant you are 
paired up with and the hint you get may vary from round to round, but the RULES that 
determine them (explained in questions 4.6., 4.1. and 4.7.) do not. In short, rounds are 
independent: for example, you can think that in every round a new urn with 100 balls -20 
“As”, 60 “Bs” and 20 “Cs” - is used to determine the value of q, as explained in question 
4.6. Similarly, the pairings and hints of a given round are independent of the pairings and 
hints of previous rounds.
5 Questionnaire
We will ask you a few questions that will help us to further understand the data collected 
in the session.
6 Payment
Finally! You will be paid a show-up fee of £5 plus the sum earned during the session, as 
explained in question 4.5.
And that is it. Once again, thank you very much for participating!
SHORT QUIZ
1. What is your payoff (in “experimental points”) if you choose Y, the person paired- 
up with you chooses Z and q is equal to A ? .........................
2. What is your payoff (in “experimental points”) if you choose Z, the person paired-up 
with you chooses Y and q is equal to C ? .........................
3. If your hint is equal to b, what is the probability that q is equal to A ?.........................
C.2 Equal enforcem ent cost
In order to test hypothesis 5.2 (on page 71), it is necessary to ensure that the (expected) 
enforcement cost in both treatments (GE and LE, or GC and LC) are the same, so 
that the comparison is a valid one. This, in turn, requires analysing the problem of the 
government in each of the 12 possible scenarios: those generated by the combination of
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the four treatments (GE, LE, GC and LC ) and the type of the agency (Soft, Medium 
and Tough).
The task is greatly simplified, though, thanks to the result mentioned on page 65, namely, 
that L treatments can be seen as special cases of the G ones.
Before getting into the computations, however, it is important to notice that some actions 
that in the experiment lead to a fixed, certain payoff, in the real world lead to uncertain 
ones.
In the experiment, the payoff generated by a given combination of parameters and choices 
(d, d', q) is certain: for example, if the agency is soft (q = A), the taxpayer evades (d =  Y)  
and the other taxpayer complies {d! =  Z), her payoff is x(Y, Z, A) with certainty, and the 
associated utility is u (Y, Z, A ). In real life, however, the payoff x(Y, Z , A) (actually, any 
payoff other than the safe one) is not certain, but rather the expected payoff the taxpayer 
gets when (d,d',q) =  (Y, Z, A). Indeed, in such scenario, what actually happens is the 
following: with probability a(Y, Z, A) the taxpayer is audited and gets utility uc (Y), and 
with probability (1 — a(Y,Z,A))  she is not audited and gets utility un (Y). Thus, utility 
from payoff x(Y, Z, A) can be defined as
u (Y, Z, A) =  a(Y, Z, A) ■ uc (Y) +  (1 -  a(Y, Z, A)) • un (Y) (C.l)
where u° (Y) is the utility of the taxpayer when she evades and is caught and un (Y) is 
the utility she gets when she evades and is not caught. This means that there is a linear 
relationship between utility and probability, which can therefore be used to analyse the 
conditions for equal enforcement cost. In particular, one can define the following relevant 
probabilities:2
• pq: the probability of detection in L treatments when the agency is of type q E Q;
• pq: the probability of detection in G treatments when the other person complies 
and the agency is of type q G Q; and
• 7rq: the probability of detection in G treatments when the other person evades and 
the agency is of type q e Q.
Since in G treatments payoffs satisfy equation 5.5, it is necessary that
7Tq< pq Vq G Q (C.2)
2Since the government will never audit anyone who declares high income (anyone who chooses Z  in 
the experiment), only the probabilities corresponding to low declarations (i.e., ^-choices) are important 
for the analysis.
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That is, the probability of detection for a taxpayer that evades is higher when the other 
taxpayer complies (pq) than when the other taxpayer evades (7rg). This is exactly the 
type of relationship expected to exist between these two probabilities when the agency 
chooses its auditing strategy optimally, as found in chapter 4.
Turning back to the problem of ensuring equal enforcement costs, what is needed is to 
equalise the expected number of audits, Ea, in G and L treatments, for each possible value 
of q. Computing the Ea for each of the 12 cases above mentioned yields the following 
results:
1. GE, Soft:  With probability 7  (equal to 1/2 in the experiment) true income is high 
and both taxpayers get low or medium signals and evade, so Ea = 2ns- With 
probability 1 — 7  (= 1/ 2 ) true income is low and both taxpayers truthfully declare 
low income, so Ea =  27rs again. The overall (expected) number of audits is therefore
EacE,s = 27rs (C.3)
2. GE, Medium: With probability 7 = 1 /2  true income is high and both taxpayers 
receive medium signals and evade, so Ea = 2itm- With probability 1 — 7  =  1/2 true 
income is low and both taxpayers truthfully declare low income, so Ea = 2-km. The 
overall (expected) number of audits is therefore
EacE,M = 27*m  (C.4)
3. GE, Tough: With probability 1/8 true income is high and both taxpayers receive 
medium signals and evade, so Ea = 2itt- With probability 1/4 true income is high 
and one taxpayer receives a medium signal and evades while the other receives a 
tough signal and complies, so that the first one is audited and the second is not: 
Ea — pT. With probability 1/8 true income is high and both taxpayers receive 
tough signals and comply, so nobody is audited and Ea  =  0. With probability 1/2 
true income is low and both taxpayers truthfully declare low income, so Ea — 2ttt- 
The overall (expected) number of audits is therefore
E a c E ,T  =  2 (  27Ft +  2^ /  7I"T
4. LE, Soft:  Since Lottery treatments can be interpreted as special cases of the Global 
ones where the probabilities are independent of the other taxpayer’s choice, then,
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from equation C.3, the overall (expected) number of audits is
Ea = 2ps (C.6)
5. LE, Medium: From equation C.4,
Ea 2pm  (C.7)
6. LE, Tough: From equation C.5,
Ea = \  {^P T  +  \ p r Sj  +PT = ^PT (C.8)
7. GC, Soft: With probability 1/8 true income is high and both taxpayers receive soft 
signals and evade, so Ea = 2ns- With probability 1/4 true income is high and one 
taxpayer receives a soft signal and evades while the other receives a medium signal 
and complies, so that the first one is audited and the second one is not: Ea = ps . 
With probability 1/8 true income is high and both taxpayers receive medium signals 
and comply, so nobody is audited and Ea  =  0. With probability 1/2 true income 
is low and both taxpayers truthfully declare low income, so Ea = 2ns- The overall 
(expected) number of audits is therefore
E a = \  (ns  +  Ps) +  ns  (C.9)
8. GC, Medium: With probability 1/2 true income is high and both taxpayers receive 
medium signals and comply, so nobody is audited and Ea = 0. With probability 1/2 
true income is low and both taxpayers truthfully declare low income, so Ea =  2tvm- 
The overall (expected) number of audits is therefore
Ea = 'em  (C.10)
9. GC, Tough: With probability 1/2 true income is high and both agents receive 
medium or tough signals and comply, so Ea = 0. With probability 1/2 true income 
is low and both taxpayers truthfully declare low income, so Ea = 2ixt- The overall 
(expected) number of audits is therefore
Ea = 7tt (C.11)
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10. LC , Soft: From equation C.9,
1 3
E a =  -  (ps  +  ps) + P s =  2 ps  (c -12)
11. LC , Medium: From equation C.10,
Ea =  pm (C.13)
12. LC, Tough: From equation C .ll,
Ea  =  pr  (C.14)
The constraints in table 5.5 are therefore obtained by equalising the relevant equations
(C.3 and C.6, C.4 and C.7, etc.) and using the relationship between utility and probability 
mentioned on page 137.
C.3 Extra Tables
DOMa DOM6 DOMc RDOM ADOM DOM
LC . 0.0000 . 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LE 0.3231 0.0000 . 0.3180 0.0000 0.0000
GC . 0.0000 0.1578 0.1552 0.0000 0.0000
GE . 0.0000 0.0390 0.0418 0.0000 0.0000
LC=GC . 0.0000 0.1578 0.1552 0.0000 0.0000
LE=GE 0.3231 0.0042 0.0390 0.1920 0.0042 0.0029
LC=LE 0.3231 0.0000 . 0.3180 0.0000 0.0000
GC=GE • 0.0005 0.2170 0.4359 0.0005 0.0014
Note: Values of F-tests. Values below 5% imply the null hypothesis is rejected.
Dots mean there is no variability in data as to compute the statistics.
Table C.l: Dominance tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
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ERRA ERR B ERRC ERR
LC 0.3456 0.0000 0.0000 0.0518
LE 1.0000 0.1450 0.0004 0.3515
GC 0.2939 0.0000 0.0000 0.0147
GE 1.0000 0.145 0.0010 0.2445
LC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LE 0.0038 0.0000 1.0000 0.1441
GC 0.0092 0.0000 0.1575 0.0000
GE 0.0006 0.0000 0.2612 0.0092
f O II o o 0.9556 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LE=GE 0.1082 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000
LC=LE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3555
GC=GE 0.0135 0.0000 0.2160 0.0112
Note: Top panel: Predicted values of dependent variable. Mid­
dle and bottom panels: Values of F-tests. Values below 5% 
imply the null hypothesis is rejected.
Table C.2: Errors tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
Dep. Var.: DOMa DOM6 DOMc RDOM ADOM DOM
LC X X X
LE X X X
GC X X X
GE X X X
LC=GC
LE=GE
GC GC GC
LC=LE LE LE LE
O O II o H GE GE GE
Note: Top panel: Empty if data fits prediction in hypothesis OS; “X” other-
wise. Bottom panel: Empty if no difference, treatment with higher dominance 
otherwise.
Table C.4: Dominance tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons. Last 10 
periods.
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Dep. Var.: DOMa DOM6 DOMc RDOM ADOM DOM
a 1.0473 0.6725
[0] [0]
b 0.5053
[0]
c 0.9890 0.7641
[0] [0]
g dropped 0.2561 -0.0476 -0.0393 0.2561 0.2024
H [0] [0.321] [0.281] [0] [0]
e dropped 0.4821 0.0000 -0.0310 0.4821 0.3982
H [0] [0] [0.073] [0] [0]
ge dropped -0.2485 -0.1103 -0.0295 -0.2485 -0.2158
H [0] [0.265] [0.586] [0] [0]
cons 1.0000 0.4479 1.0000 0.4479
[•] [0] [0] [0]
Obs. 62 616 82 144 616 760
LC 1.0000 0.4479 1.0000 1.0000 0.4479 0.5500
LE 1.0000 0.9300 1.0000 1.0000 0.9300 0.9300
GC 1.0000 0.7040 0.9524 0.9643 0.7040 0.7722
GE 1.0000 0.9376 0.8421 0.9167 0.9376 0.9333
Note: Top panel: Probability that estimate = 0  is shown in brackets below esti­
mate. Bottom panel displays estimated average values of the dependent variable 
for each treatment.
Table C.3: Estimation. Dominance. Overall and by signal. Last 10 periods.
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OLS
GC GE LC LE All
g
e
ge
gender 0.0052 -0.1064 0.1704 -0.1118
0.2653
[0]
0.3871
[0]
-0.2935
[0]
-0.0785
[0.958] [0.039] [0.059] [0.002] [0.005]
age -0.0068 0.0264 -0.0339 -0.0089 0.0020
[0.742] [0.236] [0.142] [0.416] [0.781]
study 0.2118 0.0060 -0.3627 -0.1777 -0.1052
[0.011] [0.906] [0.02] [0.052] [0.002]
#exp -0.0615 -0.0275 0.0619 0.0718 0.0401
[0.175] [0.658] [0.118] [0.24] [0.055]
maths -0.4264 -0.1135 0.4849 0.0345 -0.0750
[0] [0.326] [0.001] [0.404] [0.036]
prob -0.1368 0.0990 0.8721 -0.0770 0.0323
[0.181] [0.219] [0.303] [0.298] [0.302]
game 0.3613 -0.0432 -0.0825 0.0729 0.0917
[0] [0.722] [0.218] [0.005] [0]
cons 1.3190 0.4526 0.9149 1.2914 0.6329
[0] [0.224] [0.178] [0] [0]
Obs. 231 177 251 239 898
Note: Probability that estimate = 0  is shown in brackets below estimate.
Table C.6: Estimation. Effect of personal characteristics on choices. Age<26.
DOMa DOM6 DOMc RDOM ADOM DOM
LC 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000
LE 0.0006 . . 0.0006 0.0007
GC 0.0000 0.3207 0.3171 0.0000 0.0000
GE 0.0021 0.0694 0.0766 0.0021 0.0004
f O II o Q 0.0000 0.3207 0.3171 0.0000 0.0001
LE=GE 0.7927 0.0694 0.0766 0.7927 0.6365
LC=LE 0.0000 . . 0.0000 0.0000
GC=GE 0.0000 0.2645 0.4187 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Values of F-tests. Values below 5% imply the null hypothesis is rejected.
Dots mean there is no variability in data as to compute the statistics.
Table C.5: Dominance tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons. Last 
periods.
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C .4 Exam ples o f categories
Expected-Payoff M axim isers (E PM ): “If the hint was a, I selected action Y; oth­
erwise, I selected action Z. There are only three outcomes that generate more than 654 
points, and two of them only generate a negligible increase (relative to their risk). The 
only way to "gamble and win" is to play Y when the hint is b, and in that case, I am 
gambling that either my "opponent" has a hint of a (very unlikely), or my opponent has a 
hint of b, is risking that q is really A, and is right (also very unlikely). My risk is that my 
opponent plays Z, which is safer, and that q is B or C, which is likely. The risk/reward 
is far too high. When my hint is a or c the correct play is obvious - in the former case, 
playing Y always nets me more than 654, and in the latter, playing Y always nets me less 
than 654, no matter what my opponent does.” (Subject #10, GC).
C hance M axim isers (CM ): “If the hint is c, the best decision is always Z with a higher 
payoff. If the hint is b, it worths choosing Y, because thereis a probablility of 0.875 getting 
A or B, which axe both higher than Z(654). If the hint is a, my decision is definitely Y.” 
(Subject #20, LC).
L earners (L): “At first i played it safe and went with the guarantee button z and then i 
took more of a risk by chosing the y button every time i got the hint "a" or "b". because 
there was a higher probability of gaining more points.” (Subject #18, GE).
M ixers/E xperim en ters  (M /E ): “If the hint was A, choice was Y. If the hint was C, 
choice was Z. If the hint was B, 80% of the time choice was Y and 20%, B.” (Subject 
#15, LE).
N on-independent (N I): “If the hint came up as A i always selected choice Y as I 
would be better off (ie gaining more money) through doing so regardless of what the 
other participant chose. Conversely, if the value of q was C i always chose Z since I would 
be worse off if i choice Y despite what the other person selected. If the value of q came 
up as b i would go systematically throught the choices Y,Y,Z. This was my order since if 
q=b and q=a i would be better off selecting Y and if q=c i would be better off selecting 
Z. Since the probability of q=b was the highest i put Y at the beginning of the order. I 
used my knowledge of maths and probablities to calculate the order in which to place my 
choices.” (Subject #2, GC).
R andom isers (R): “If the hint was a then i chose Y if the hint would have been c then i 
would have chosen Z. apart from this i just guessed randomly, the last 3 i thought i may 
as well take the risk as it was the end of the experiment.” (Subject #19, LC).
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Confused (C): “If the probability was lower than the other option, i chose the other 
option. I did not take risks in the cases where the probability could also go for the lowest 
amount. Becasue i dont know much about the probability theory so i decided to go for 
the safest method.” (Subject #7, LC).
Risk-lovers (RL): “I chose Y every time unless I knew it was C. I was not given the hint 
a at any time. The difference between playing it safe and gambling with the Y option 
was small enough to make the experiment slightly more fun. I knew that I could lose 579, 
but only gain 421, but preferred the gamble.” (Subject #7 , GC).
